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Abstract  
 
Private equity transactions have grown considerably during the last few years. With 
an increase in the growth and size of this market, it has become increasingly 
important to understand the economic forces behind these transactions. Extant 
literature lacks adequate research in this area and studies on the Australian context 
are scarce. This thesis is a rigorous empirical investigation of the interaction of three 
aspects of Australian private equity transactions; namely, information asymmetry 
and undervaluation, managerial shareholdings and corporate governance.  
 
Using a unique hand-collected dataset and a matched-sample of firms from 1990 to 
2010, I developed and tested a predictive choice model that distinguishes firms going 
private through private equity from firms that do not. The empirical results show that 
market undervaluation, rather than information asymmetry, is the dominant factor in 
going private. Further, it was found that institutional holding is a significant deterrent 
to private equity investment decision.  
 
I also analysed the importance of high managerial ownership and undervaluation as 
determinants in private equity deals in Australia. Results show that firms taken over 
by private equity firms suffer from market undervaluation and have high managerial 
shareholdings, a condition which is likely to motivate managers to take their firms 
private. Confirming extant theoretical arguments of non-linear relationship between 
managerial shareholding and firm value, supporting evidence was found in the 
Australian market.  
 
Finally, I investigated the effect of managerial shareholdings and corporate 
governance on private equity takeovers. Evidence is presented of a significant non-
linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm-specific governance 
characteristics. This evidence indicates that corporate governance practices have a 
significant impact on a firm’s choice of going private. In addition, evidence is 
provided that market for corporate control is active in Australia and plays a 
disciplinary role as, and when, necessary.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
“Over a decade and a half after Michael Jensen predicted the eclipse of the public 
corporation, his ‘active’ investors surfaced publicly in Australia and attracted the same 
‘backlash’ as it was observed occurring in the US…......While private equity has long 
been a source of finance for companies……..the volume of private equity funds has 
increased substantially in Australia in the last two years. Notable also are the small 
number of high profile publicly listed companies that have passed into private ownership 
due to purchase by private equity consortiums. Some of the companies acquired, and 
those targeted, were not necessarily viewed by analysts as under-performing. The 
targeting of companies like Qantas by private equity consortiums added to a perception 
that the new owners planned to increase profit by ‘tightening’ operations…..”.  
Westcott, 2009; pp. 1 – 2.  
 
1.1 Introduction 
In February 2007, a consortium of private equity investors known as Airline Partners 
Australia (APA) launched a bid for a private takeover of Qantas, one of the largest and 
best known public corporations in Australia. The bid later collapsed due to mounting 
pressure of political concerns and rival bidding; however, it raises concerns with regard 
to the increasing trend of private equity takeovers in recent times. Fidrmuc et al. (2007) 
argue that going private transactions have been accelerated during the last few decades 
with a view to improve firm performance. Corporate finance literature embodies a 
number of studies on going private and Private Equity (PE) takeovers, most of which are 
primarily based on United States of America (US) and United Kingdom (UK) data (see, 
e.g., Halpern et al. 1999; Weir et al. 2005a and 2005b). Studies on Australian going 
private transactions focus primarily on the implications of financial and governance 
characteristics of target firms (Chapple et al. 2010; Evans et al. 2005; Eddey et al. 1996). 
Little research to date has investigated the interaction of asymmetric information, 
undervaluation, incentive alignment and monitoring mechanism on the likelihood of 
firms going private in the context of private equity. In this study, three different, but 
interlinked, aspects of PE takeovers are examined in an Australian context. These aspects 
relate to asymmetric information and undervaluation as motivation for going private, 
high managerial ownership (used as a proxy for incentive alignment) as a driving force in 
going private and the role of corporate governance mechanism in going private.  
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Private equity takeover, in its most common form, involves a public-to-private (PTP) 
transaction which takes place when a publicly quoted company is taken over by a PE 
firm and the target company goes private through a delisting from the stock market 
(Frankfurter and Gunay 1992). PE investment activities in Australia have grown to 
record levels in recent years. According to the 2010 yearbook of the Australian Private 
Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (AVCAL), private equity investment in 
Australia has increased from $585 million in 2001 to $1,456 million in 2010. Although 
PE bidders are not studied much (Chapple et al. 2010), the growth of these transactions 
in capital markets is significant and has attracted regulatory concerns with the Australian 
Senate holding a parliamentary inquiry into the private equity investment in Australia1 
after the incident with Qantas. Notwithstanding the development and heightened interest 
in going private activities in Australia, the empirical research on what motivates PE 
transactions in Australia is very limited. Given the increase in the growth of this market 
in Australia, it is important to extend the current literature on PE deals focusing on such 
motivations. Using a sample of Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) going private 
firms from 1990 to 2010, I investigate an often cited reason for going private, 
asymmetric information and undervaluation in the context of private equity takeovers in 
Australia. In addition, I examine if high managerial ownership and corporate governance 
characteristics determine the going private decision in Australia.  
 
An obvious outcome of the problem of asymmetric information between managers and 
outside shareholders is the non-observance of true and potential value of a corporation. 
Neither the value of assets in place nor the value of future investment opportunities are 
simple to determine due to the lack of available information. Managers, who are likely to 
have superior information, perceive that the share price does not reflect the true potential 
of their firm (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). The asymmetric information problem is 
aggravated further with increasing difficulty in using the equity market to finance 
available investment opportunities. The resultant low share price deters the interest of 
institutional shareholders and fund managers. Inadequate analyst coverage also 
contributes to investor uncertainty. This lack of sufficient interest from outside investors 
creates further illiquidity in the capital market (Bharath and Dittmar, 2010). All these 
forces provide incentives to the managers to take the firm private to capture the 
                                                 
1Commonwealth of Australia, Private Equity investment in Australia, Senate Standing Committee on Economics, 
August, 2007.  
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underlying value of the firm. Mehran and Persitiani (2010) argue that publicly listed 
firms failing to sustain sufficient financial interest and visibility are more likely to 
undertake PTP transactions. In addition, Renneboog and Simons (2005) also argue that 
financial visibility is an important determinant in the decision to go private for public 
firms.   
 
Despite the role of asymmetric information on firm valuation and its subsequent effect 
on private equity takeovers, the extant literature in this area has been limited. The only 
Australian study in this area is the Chapple et al. (2010) study, which is an exploratory 
investigation into the characteristics of private equity takeovers. The first aspect of PE 
takeovers that I examine in this study is the information asymmetry and undervaluation 
of the public firm as a rationale for going private through PE takeovers. Potentially, this 
study provides an important contribution to the current literature as the interaction of 
asymmetric information and undervaluation and their subsequent impact on private 
equity takeovers have not been examined before.  
 
While asymmetric information and undervaluation can lead to the decision to go private, 
managerial shareholdings also can act as a driving force in a public firm’s going private 
decision. Literature suggests a number of incentive devices that can align the interest 
between insiders and outside shareholders (North, 2001). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argue that increased share ownership may reduce the non-value maximizing behaviour of 
managers. However, evidence suggests that excessive ownership may induce managers 
to behave opportunistically (Demsetz, 1983). The fact that going private transactions can 
increase efficiency in firm operations in the absence of public monitoring and oversight 
(Jensen, 1989) stems from an ineffective incentive device (Fidrmuc et al. 2007) that 
results in a misalignment between insiders and outsiders. While Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) believe high ownership stakes bring about a convergence of interest between 
managers and outsiders, Morck et al. (1988) present evidence that suggests managers 
may become entrenched with excessively high ownership stakes. In such a situation, 
managers would prefer to retain full control over their firm and this makes traditional 
acquisition more difficult. Following on from this, high managerial ownership is more 
likely to increase a firm’s likelihood of going private since PE firms often require 
managers to have a meaningful equity stake within their firm (Jensen, 1989).  
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The presence of asymmetric information may result in managers holding a large share of 
their firm’s stock (Lelenad and Pyle, 1977; Opler and Titman, 1993). Managers may not 
be willing to disseminate sufficient information to attract new investors which may 
divest control. This suggests that high ownership stakes, including the presence of 
managerial private information, might create further impetus for going private decision. 
Consistent with this, Filatotchev et al. (1999) find that managers can become hostile 
towards outside ownership and want to maintain control when they have high ownership 
stakes. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the increase in management shareholdings 
is likely to be driven by their efforts to preserve control. The evidence presented by 
Filatotchev et al. (1999) provides further reason to suggest that managers with high 
ownership stakes have strong incentives to take their firm private to maintain control.  
 
Regardless of the fact that high managerial ownership increases the likelihood of firms 
going private in the US and in the UK (Maupin et al.1984; Maupin, 1987; Weir et 
al.2005a), the extant evidence in this area in the Australian context is limited. The 
second aspect of PE takeovers that I examine to fill this gap is the importance of high 
managerial ownership of the public firm as a determinant for going private through PE 
takeovers. This study is expected to bring new evidence into the corporate finance 
literature as the impact of managerial ownership on PE takeovers has not been examined 
before in the Australian context.  
 
Going private transactions are considered to be a result of a misalignment between 
insiders and outsiders because of lack of effective incentive devices (Cumming et al. 
2007; Jensen, 1989). Florackis and Ozkan (2009b) argue that managerial opportunist 
behaviour is more prominent in firms with ineffective monitoring mechanisms. In effect, 
appropriate governance mechanisms play a role to limit the suboptimal managerial 
behaviour and align the interest between managers and outsiders. Keasey et al. (2005) 
suggest that the development and adoption of good governance codes within the firms is 
expected to improve the alignment between insiders and outsiders. With increasing 
importance being attached to align the manager-shareholder interests, it is necessary to 
examine the role of governance mechanisms in reducing this agency conflict.  
 
Literature suggests that, in the absence of effective internal monitoring mechanisms, the 
market for corporate control will play a disciplinary role (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
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Morck et al. 1988). Consistent with this, Weir and Wright (2006) argue that companies 
that went private had been the subject of takeover speculation whilst being publicly 
quoted and those companies are considered to have ineffective internal monitoring. The 
market for corporate control, therefore, is regarded as a substitute for weak internal 
governance (Kini et al. 1995). A number of studies also have found that companies going 
private have an ineffective internal governance structure and have experienced takeover 
speculation (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Eddey et al. 1996; Weir et al. 2005a; Weir and 
Wright, 2006). Thus, the evidence suggests that firms going private are more likely to 
have an ineffective internal governance structure. In addition, they are more likely to 
experience takeover pressure from the market.  
 
I believe that internal governance mechanisms should be considered more important than 
traditional market for corporate control in disciplining sub-optimal managerial 
behaviour. Despite a considerable body of research on corporate governance mechanisms 
(Florackis and Ozkan, 2009a), the current literature does not encompass empirical 
studies on the interplay of governance mechanisms and going private transactions in the 
context of private equity in Australia. The third aspect of PE takeovers that I examine in 
this study addresses this gap by focusing on the impact of firm-specific governance 
characteristics in going private through private equity takeovers in the Australian 
context. This aspect is particularly important for Australia since the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council (CGC) introduced the Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
and Best Practice Recommendations only in March 2003 to be implemented from 2004 
annual reports onwards (Henry, 2004).  
 
1.2 Objectives of the Study  
Evidence suggests that firms are more likely to go private when they are undervalued 
with less analyst coverage (Bharat and Dittmar 2010). Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that 
information asymmetry increases the adverse selection cost for investors since this type 
of firm has low financial visibility. As a result, firms will be more likely to go private to 
avoid the adverse selection costs. Also, Merton (1987) shows that the benefit of being 
publicly listed is minimized with lower investor recognition. In addition, studies on 
going private transactions suggest that ineffective incentive devices and sub-optimal 
corporate governance mechanisms provide impetus for public firms to go private 
(Halpern et al. 1999; Weir et al. 2005a; Weir and Wright, 2006). Consistent with this, 
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Jensen (1986) argues that going private increases efficiency because of the presence of 
higher debt and better alignment of the management incentives.  
 
The majority of research on going private transactions has focused on the financial and 
governance characteristics of firms going private, the fairness of the price paid to the 
minority shareholders in taking a company private, analysis of cost and benefits of the 
decision to go and the financial performance of firms that have gone private (Evans et al. 
2005). Most of those studies focused on US and UK going private deals with a little 
attention to PE deals. Australian research on going private transactions is so far limited 
to one empirical study (Chapple et al. 2010) on PE deals, a study that explores the 
financial characteristics of Australian PE deals. As a result, Australian research on 
private equity has received little attention in the academic literature. Considering the 
recent surge and significance of PE investments worldwide (Cumming et al. 2007), 
formal studies into the nature and interplay of these investments are warranted. With the 
existence of a number of studies on the financial and governance characteristics of target 
firms in PE transactions, I am not aware of any research linking the asymmetric 
information, undervaluation, high managerial ownership and corporate governance 
mechanism and their interplay in the likelihood of firms going private through PE 
takeovers in Australia. Therefore, this study contributes to the literature by filling several 
of the above mentioned gaps and adds new evidence to the Australian evidence on PE 
deals. In doing so, the study addresses the following principal objectives:   
 
 To examine empirically the influence asymmetric information and undervaluation 
have on the decision to go private by publicly listed firms  
 To examine empirically the impact of high managerial ownership in the decision to 
go private by publicly listed firms    
 To examine empirically the impact of corporate governance practices in the decision 
to go private by publicly listed firms  
 
1.3 Significance of the Study  
The outcomes of this study are expected to contribute to the body of knowledge as 
follows:  
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 Empirical research on going private transactions and private equity takeovers is 
mostly limited to US and UK; this study will contribute to the development of this 
literature as applied in the Australian context.  
 No empirical evidence is available with respect to Australia in determining the 
impact of undervaluation and high managerial ownership in the decision to go 
private by publicly listed firms; this study will provide new evidence on 
undervaluation and managerial ownership as determinants of going private through 
private equity takeovers in Australia.  
 Empirical evidence on the relationship between firm value and managerial 
shareholdings is exclusively limited to the US firms; this study will also provide 
empirical evidence on the relationship between firm value and managerial 
shareholdings as applied in the Australian context. From the regulatory perspective, 
this will help identify possible legislative or judicial changes to align shareholders’ 
and managers’ interests and develop appropriate guidelines of managerial 
competencies in managing corporate resources.  
 This study uses the arguments for going private transactions and develops those 
same arguments applicable to private equity takeovers. Thus, the analysis in this 
study will enable future studies on private equity takeovers to use these arguments to 
analyse the implications of private equity takeovers across different countries.  
 Good governance practices are recommended only from 2004 in Australia (Henry, 
2004). The current study will explore the effectiveness of internal governance 
mechanisms in going private decision in Australia and results will help policy 
makers to understand the effectiveness of existing internal governance mechanisms 
and consider revising the same, if necessary.   
 
1.4 Summary of the Findings  
It is estimated that approximately twelve percent of all takeover announcements in the 
Australian Securities Exchange are PTPs2. Using a unique hand-collected dataset of 
private equity takeover firms and a matched-sample of firms from 1990 to 2010, I 
empirically examine the distinguishing characteristics of firms going private and firms 
that do not.   
 
                                                 
2 Data from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum ANZ M&A Database   
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The empirical analysis shows that market undervaluation, rather than information 
asymmetry per se, is the dominant factor in the likelihood of firms going private through 
PE takeovers in Australia. The results are robust to alternative measures of valuation. 
Further, it is found that institutional holdings significantly deter private equity takeover 
decision.  
 
Evidence is presented that high managerial ownership significantly increases the 
likelihood of Australian firms going private through PE takeovers. Consistent with the 
literature, I also find some evidence of a significant non-linear relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm valuation in the Australian context.  
 
The third major finding in the study is that corporate governance practices have a 
significant impact on a going private decision. In addition, a significant non-linear 
relationship is found between managerial ownership and firm-specific corporate 
governance characteristics. Furthermore, strong evidence is presented that the market for 
corporate control is active in Australia.   
 
The current ratio is found to be highly significant and positive, revealing a strong 
positive relationship between liquidity and the likelihood of going private. My results are 
surprising with regard to leverage ratio which is significant and takes on a positive value. 
This result is in contrast to the theory of financial slack as advanced by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), but consistent with the opportunistic behaviour by private equity 
investors. Combined with the empirical results regarding the effect of liquidity, the result 
suggests that private equity investors in Australia are opportunistic (Chapple et al. 2010) 
in taking advantage of financially unhealthy firms with high liquidity. Table 1.1 presents 
the summary of results:   
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Table 1.1: Summary of the Findings 
 
Construct Hypothesis Findings 
   
Asymmetric Information Firms with high information asymmetry 
are more likely to be subjected to PE 
transactions 
 
Weak support 
Undervaluation Firms with lower market valuation are 
more likely to be subjected to PE 
transactions  
 
Strong support 
Incentive Alignment Firms with high managerial ownership are 
more likely to be subjected to PE 
transactions  
Strong support 
Internal Monitoring Target Firms in a PE led bid are more 
likely to have ineffective internal 
governance structure   
 
Strong support 
External Monitoring Target Firms in a PE led bid are more 
likely to experience takeover pressures
Strong support 
 
 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis  
The thesis is structured around a three-paper format. These papers examine three 
different aspects of private equity takeovers in the context of Australia. The papers are 
placed in chapters four, five and six and are designed for submission to conference and 
journal reviews. Two of those papers have been presented at 2012 AFAANZ 
(Accounting and Finance Association in Australia and New Zealand) Conference, 2012 
MFA (Malaysian Finance Association) Conference and Curtin University Seminars. The 
third paper will be presented at the 25th Australasian Finance & Banking Conference to 
be held at the University of New South Wales, Australia in December 2012. As a whole, 
the thesis consists of seven chapters including the present chapter. The rest of the thesis 
is structured as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 presents a critical review of previous literature that provides the motivation for 
examining the impact of asymmetric information, undervaluation, managerial ownership 
and corporate governance practices on the going private decision. The present study 
hypothesizes that information asymmetry, undervaluation, high managerial ownership 
and ineffective governance mechanism provide impetus to the publicly listed firms to go 
private through PE firms in Australia. Accordingly, the review chapter explores the 
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literatures on the above issues as they relate to going private and private equity takeovers 
specifically.   
 
Chapter 3 discusses the data sources for this study; also, it includes discussions on the 
descriptions of variables and sample selection procedure.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the first aspect of private equity takeovers that I examine in this 
thesis. The chapter presents the paper on the interplay of asymmetric information, 
undervaluation and private equity takeovers in Australia; the paper presented at the 2012 
AFAANZ Conference.  
 
Chapter 5 presents the second aspect of private equity takeovers that I examine in this 
thesis. The chapter presents the paper on the interplay of undervaluation, incentive 
alignment and private equity takeovers in Australia; the paper presented at the 2012 
MFA Conference in Corporate Finance.   
 
Chapter 6 presents the third aspect of private equity takeovers that I examine in this 
thesis. The chapter presents the paper on the interplay of incentive alignment, monitoring 
mechanism and private equity takeovers in Australia; the paper will be presented at the 
25th Australasian Finance & Banking Conference to be held at the University of New 
South Wales, Australia in December 2012.   
 
Chapter 7 provides a summary of major findings from the empirical analysis in this 
study. Conclusions are drawn from these findings followed by discussion of policy 
implications and the contribution of the thesis. In addition, this chapter discusses some 
limitations of the study and scope of further research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The recent rise in PE transactions internationally has raised concerns among academics, 
practitioners and regulators. Corresponding to these concerns, there is an increasing need 
for an evaluation of the impact of these transactions (Cumming et al. 2007). In addition, 
with the increasing growth in the number of PE transactions, as noted by Bharath and 
Dittmar (2010), it becomes increasingly important to understand the economic forces that 
drive a firm to go from public to private. Growing international evidence on financial 
and governance characteristics of target firms in PE-led bids supports the existence of a 
correlation between corporate governance structure and PE takeovers (Cumming et al. 
2007). However, what is less clear from this evidence is the link between market 
undervaluation, high managerial ownership and the likelihood of those firms to be 
involved in PTP transactions through PE firms. This chapter reviews an array of previous 
empirical studies on these relationships.  
 
The principal-agent theory generally is considered a starting point for any debate on 
corporate governance issues. The theoretical underpinnings for much of the extant 
research in corporate governance are found in the classic thesis, ‘The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property’ by Berle and Means (1932); the thesis describes the 
basic agency problem of separation of ownership and control in modern firms. Modern 
corporations are characterized by the separation of ownership and control because they 
are run by professional managers who may not be unaccountable to the dispersed 
shareholders. As such, the owners are confronted with selecting the most capable 
managers and giving the managers right incentives for putting in appropriate effort that 
maximizes shareholders’ wealth. Agency relationships are further defined by Jensen and 
Meckling in their seminal paper in 1976. Jensen and Meckling (1976, pp. 308) defined 
agency relationships as contracts under which “one or more persons (principal) engage 
another person (agent) to perform some services on their behalf, which involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent”. Conflict of interests between 
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managers and outside shareholders arise because managers are motivated to extract rents 
out of corporate resources. As a result, it is necessary to reduce this agency conflict to 
increase the value of the firm. Agency costs may include auditing, budgeting, control and 
compensation systems, bonding expenditures by the agent as well as any residual loss 
that may occur due to divergence of interests between the principal and the agent. 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Literature suggests that improved and effective corporate 
governance mechanisms are necessary to reduce this agency conflict and induce 
managers to be more accountable to outside shareholders (Cumming et al. 2007). During 
the last few decades there has been increased attention on corporate governance 
mechanisms for the purpose of improving company performance. Corporate governance 
has now become a mainstream concern for policy makers around the globe (Netter et al. 
2009). Just after the Asian Financial Crises, the global corporate sector was shaken by 
corporate governance scandals in the US and Europe that triggered some of the largest 
insolvencies in history. Therefore, the corporate world and policymakers began to 
recognize the potential macroeconomic consequences of weak corporate governance 
systems (Khan, 2007).  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a 
comprehensive theoretical background on corporate governance and the discussion then 
flows to the takeover market, going private transactions and private equity takeovers. 
Section 3 describes an overview of the institutional arrangements in Australia in relation 
to the takeover market. Section 4 presents a comprehensive review of the empirical 
literature worldwide, including Australia. A summary of the chapter is presented in 
Section 5.  
  
2.2 The Theoretical Underpinnings 
Corporate governance practices have critical implications on firm performance. As a 
result, improving corporate governance has been a priority in developed market 
economies for over a few decades (Netter et al. 2009). The Asian crisis and the relative 
poor performance of the corporate sectors in Africa have made corporate governance an 
important agenda in the development debate as well (Berglof and Thadden, 1999). A 
number of recent studies show that good corporate governance increases efficiency in 
firm operations. For example, Gompers et al. (2003) show that companies with strong 
shareholder rights yielded annual returns that were 8.5 percent greater than those with 
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weak rights. Claessens et al. (2002) argue that better corporate frameworks benefit firms 
through greater access to financing, lower cost of capital, better performance and more 
favorable treatment of stakeholders. A weak corporate governance system not only leads 
to poor firm performance but is also conducive to macroeconomic crises like the 1997 
East Asian crisis (Berglof and Thaden, 1999).  
 
2.2.1 Corporate Governance  
The main purpose of corporate governance is to assure investors of getting a return on 
their investment. Everywhere around the world, the advanced market economies in 
particular, there is considerable disagreement on the quality of existing corporate 
governance mechanisms. As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) believe, the US, Germany, 
Japan and the UK have some of the most sophisticated corporate governance systems 
around the world. In some less developed countries, corporate governance mechanisms 
are practically nonexistent. Therefore, understanding corporate governance not only 
informs the discussions on the improvements in advanced economies, but may also 
encourages major institutional changes in places where they need to be made (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997).  
 
Corporate governance mechanisms have been scrutinized in a considerable number of 
studies during the past few decades. As Novikova (2004) argues, the concept of 
corporate governance is the system by which corporations are directed and controlled. 
The corporate governance structure identifies the allocation of rights and responsibilities 
among different stakeholders and lays out the rules and procedures for making decisions. 
The system also provides the way through which company goals are set and the means of 
achieving those goals and monitoring performance. To advance the definition in a 
systematic way, one may say then that corporate governance may be defined narrowly 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) as the relationship of a company to its shareholders and 
more broadly (Randoy and Nielson, 2003) as its relationship to the society. According to 
Mayer (1997), corporate governance is concerned with aligning the interests of outside 
investors and managers. Corporate governance may be explained also as the relationship 
between the corporate performance and corporate accountability (Simon and Hughes, 
1997). However, corporate governance systems worldwide are not the same in terms of 
the ownership control of firms. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that separation of 
ownership and control is the result of an efficient form of economic organization.  
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2.2.2 Internal and External Control Mechanism 
Chowdhury (2006) argues that all corporate governance systems revolve around four 
core principles: fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency. The specific 
challenges of upholding these principles depend on the ownership structure of the 
corporate sector (Chowdhury, 2006). In effect, corporate governance is a set of 
arrangements that enforce the discipline between managers and outside shareholders. 
The company’s policies, strategies, reporting system, board of directors, independence of 
the directors and establishing audit committee are fundamental parts of good governance. 
In addition, Annual General Meeting is the primary platform where shareholders can 
raise their concerns towards attaining good governance (Tadesse, 2004). Based on the 
basic theories of corporate governance, there are three key aspects of internal corporate 
governance: ownership structure, monitoring mechanisms and management incentives 
(Novikova, 2004).  
 
The market mechanism can also protect outside investors from the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers or controlling shareholders. In the absence of effective market 
mechanisms, asymmetric information and ineffective monitoring enable managers to 
misallocate resources, often at the expense of the majority shareholders (Talukdar, 2007).  
A well-functioning capital market can facilitate good governance through information 
production and monitoring where shareholder rights are recognized. However, in the 
absence of such recognition the market for corporate control also can play its important 
monitoring role in corporate governance, as poorly managed companies will become 
takeover targets (Morrison, 2004). Takeovers, a market mechanism to discipline the 
opportunistic behaviour of insiders, are treated as value-increasing actions so that the 
new entity might improve its operation through better monitoring and control. In 
addition, it is sometimes considered as an external mechanism for disciplining top 
management when internal corporate governance mechanism is weak or has failed to do 
so (Borstadt et al. 1991). Figure 2.1 shows the interaction between internal and external 
governance mechanism:   
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Figure 2.1: Internal and External Governance Mechanism 
 
Figure 2.1 explains the interplay of governance mechanism. If internal mechanism does not adhere to its role, there is a 
possibility that the internal actors would dominate the corporation and this triggers self-serving behaviour by 
incumbent management. This managerial opportunistic behavior, henceforth, necessitates a corrective action to be 
enacted from outside. The market for corporate control, often referred to as the takeover market, is expected to serve 
this purpose to ensure long-term shareholder wealth maximization through takeover or other actions as appropriate.  
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2.2.3 The Takeover Market 
Manne (1965) argues that if a company is poorly managed, the market price will 
decrease relative to the shares of other companies in the same industry. An immediate 
effect of this phenomenon is the possibility of takeover attempts. The lower the stock 
price, the more attractive the takeover becomes for those who are confident of managing 
the company more efficiently. As a result, the future return from the successful takeover 
of a poorly run company can be very high. Takeovers, thus, serve as an external control 
mechanism in that they limit major managerial opportunistic behaviour by taking over 
the firm. However, the threat of takeovers may not ensure complete coherence between 
managerial actions and value maximization. Nonetheless, the inability of market for 
corporate control in disciplining the opportunist managers does not imply that 
managerial inefficiencies are prevalent in modern corporations since there are other 
mechanisms as well (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Usually, takeovers are done through 
merger, tender offer, proxy contest or involving all of these three elements. Generally, 
the bidding firm offers to buy the target common stocks at a price higher than its market 
value. Mergers take place when there are negotiations with the target managers, subject 
to the approval of the target’s board of directors and shareholders. In a tender offer, 
offers are made directly to target shareholders for sale to the bidding firm. In a proxy 
contest, an insurgent group led by some dissatisfied former manager or shareholder 
group or any other group in the market, challenges to gain controlling interest on the 
board of directors (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Grossman and Hart (1980) and Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986) argue that takeovers are attempts to replace inefficient managers. On 
the other hand, Jensen (1986) and Griffin and Wiggins (1992) believe that takeovers 
arise to remove opportunist managers and are designed to restrain managers from 
squandering the excess cash flow.  
 
In effect, one of the greatest benefits of a successful takeover is the managerial efficiency 
because a takeover provides assurance of competitive efficiency among managers and 
creates strong protection for the minority, non-controlling shareholders. In addition, an 
efficient market for corporate control can protect capital losses through an increase in the 
share price because of the presence of a takeover attempt (Manne, 1965). However, one 
definite problem with the market for corporate control lies in its designing the methods 
for differentiating between mergers out of a hunt for monopoly profit and mergers 
motivated to establish efficient management. Nevertheless, once the theoretical aspects 
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of these transactions are clearly understood, this problem should not be dissipated 
(Malmgren, 1961).  
 
Theories related to managerial behaviour have a long history of disagreement. Some 
argue that managers have considerable discretion in corporate affairs and have sufficient 
incentives to use it for their own benefits. Opponents argue that such behaviour should 
not persist since such managers would be disciplined through competitive takeovers. 
However, evidence suggests that neither shareholder opposition nor a takeover threat 
could be able to discipline the management (Edlin and Stiglitz, 1995). Given the 
theoretical debates on managerial behaviour and the role of market for corporate control, 
going private transactions are another form of takeover created to resolve the issue 
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983). In a pure going private transaction, public ownership of the 
stocks is replaced by privately owned equity and the company is delisted from the public 
market. In leveraged buyouts (LBOs), another form of going private transaction, 
replacement of public ownership by privately owned equity is done through debt 
financing. The immediate gains from going private are due to savings of registration and 
other public ownership expenses, and improved incentives for the management team 
under private ownership (Jensen and Ruback, 1983).  
 
2.2.4 Going Private Transactions 
Jensen (1989, pp. 1) says the following about going private transactions, “the publicly 
held companies, the main engine for economic progress for a century, have outlived its 
usefulness in many sectors of the economy and are being eclipsed”. Jensen (1989) 
explains that new organizations are taking the place of public corporations. Their 
primary owners are large institutions and entrepreneurs who appoint agents to manage 
and monitor on their behalf and bind them with large equity interests. By resolving the 
conflict between owners and managers over the control of corporate resources, these new 
investors make significant gains in operating efficiency, employee productivity and 
shareholder value. The efficient resolution of agency conflict by these organizations 
explains how they can motivate and manage the same resources to perform much more 
effectively than publicly held corporations. Takeovers, corporate restructuring, divisional 
spinoffs, LBOs and going private transactions are the most visible actions of these 
organizations. As noted by Jensen (1989), these transactions have inspired criticisms 
from many business leaders and government officials who have called for legislative and 
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regulatory restrictions. Going private transactions, often referred to as the PTP 
transactions, take place when a publicly quoted company is taken over by privately 
owned equity investments, the target company goes private and is delisted from the stock 
market (Frankfurter and Gunay, 1992). Most of these transactions are financed by 
borrowing substantially, thus are often referred to as LBOs. Effectively, LBOs include 
not only PTP transactions but also private firms that are bought out with an increased 
position in leverage (Jensen, 1988). The majority of PTP transactions are management-
led transactions. If the incumbent management team takes over the firm, the transaction 
is called a management buy-out (MBOs). If an outside management team acquires the 
firm and takes it private, then it is referred to as a management buy-in (MBIs). If the new 
owners of a delisted firm are solely institutional investors or private equity firms, those 
are sometimes referred to as institutional buyouts (IBOs) (Renneboog and Simons, 
2005). Figure 2.2 shows the growth in PTP transactions globally during the period from 
1970 to 2007.  
 
Figure 2.2: Global PTP Deals over Time  
 
Figure shows the growth of PTP deals globally over time from 1970 to 2007 by all types of PTPs. Total number of deals as recorded 
by the source mentioned is 21,370 globally. It is apparent from the figure that PTP deals are experiencing an increased trend from 
1970, until they had a little decrease during the year 2006 and 2007 (Data Source: Stromberg, 2007).   
 
 
 
 
During the 1980s, a huge number of public companies went private through LBOs. The 
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junk bond market. After a lull in the 1990s, going-private transactions increased with the 
development of the PE market after the 2000s. During the 1990s and since, there have 
been improvements in corporate governance structures and active monitoring and this 
was expected to reduce the need for such organizational restructuring (Holmstrom and 
Kaplan 2001). Mehran and Peristiani (2010) argue that the incentive to reduce agency 
conflicts and to remove information asymmetries between managers and shareholders 
have been the root causes for going private transactions. In addition, public firms with 
less financial visibility are more likely to undertake PTP transactions. Other explanations 
for going-private transactions include the elimination of widespread publicly traded 
ownership and the elimination of listing costs which arise from being listed in a public 
market (Jensen, 1986). Going-private may also occur as a form of takeover defense 
(Eddy et al. 1996). However, the literature indicates that different factors drive PTPs in 
different countries having different institutional arrangements (Weir et al. 2005a). 
Empirical evidence on post-operating performance of companies taken over through 
LBOs is largely positive. For US PTP deals in 1980s, Kaplan (1989) found that the ratio 
of operating income to sales increased by ten to twenty percent. Lichtenberg and Siegel 
(1990) found that LBOs experience significant increases in total factor productivity after 
a buyout. In a more recent PTP buyout study, Guo et al. (2011) found modest increases 
in operating and cash flow margins that are much smaller than those found in the 1980s 
in the US. Acharya and Kehoe (2010) and Weir et al. (2007) found similarly modest 
operating improvements for PTP deals in the UK during the same period. Overall, the 
empirical evidence is largely in support of the presence of operating and productivity 
improvements after the firm is actually taken private.  
 
Lowenstein (1985) concludes that going private transactions eliminate asymmetric 
information and thereby remove undervaluation. As a result, the presence of information 
asymmetries may provide incentives for managers to manipulate information to lower 
the value of the firm before they take their firm private. Specifically, as suggested by 
Bharat and Dittmar (2010), firms will be prone to go private if the market incorrectly 
values their prospect with less analyst coverage. Merton (1987) notes the same evidence 
by arguing that the benefit of being public is diminished with lower investor recognition. 
In addition, studies on going private transactions suggest that PTPs increase efficiency 
with the presence of higher debt and alignment of the management incentives by 
increased ownership stakes (Jensen 1986). Thus, an important explanation for going 
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private is to improve the incentive alignment and governance structure of the firm. In 
addition, most PE transactions enable management to transfer wealth from bondholders 
to equity holders (Asquith and Wizmann, 1990).  
 
2.2.5 Private Equity Transactions 
A private equity firm is usually organized as a partnership or limited liability corporation 
(Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). Jensen (1989) described these firms as decentralized 
organizations with relatively few investment professionals who raise equity capital 
through private equity funds. In its legal form, private equity firms are organized as 
limited partners and general partners. The general partners manage the firm and limited 
partners provide most of the capital. The limited partners may include institutional 
investors and, in some cases, wealthy individuals. The private equity firm usually serves 
as the firm’s general partner. The general partner is compensated in three ways. First, the 
general partner earns a management fee as a percentage of the equity provided plus a 
percentage of equity employed on realized investments. Second, the general partner 
earns a share of the profits of the firm. Finally, some general partners may charge dealing 
and monitoring fees. The private equity firm buys majority control of an existing or 
mature firm using a relatively small portion of equity and a large portion of outside debt 
financing, sometimes as large as ninety percent (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). On this 
basis, PE firms are generally referred to as LBO investment firms in academic literature. 
As LBO activity increased after the 1980s, Jensen (1989) argues that PE firm has 
concentrated ownership stakes with high-powered incentives for management at low 
overhead costs. PE firms apply performance-based managerial compensation, highly 
leveraged capital structure and active governance. Despite some incidents of default and 
bankruptcy during the later 1980s and early 1990s, PE firms have continued their LBO 
transactions until now. In 2006 and 2007, a record amount of capital was committed 
internationally to LBO transactions through private equity firms (Kaplan and Stromberg, 
2009).  
 
Typically, a PE deal is organized as shown in Figure 2.3 below. The parties involved in a 
PE transaction are the PE firm, the target company, the shareholders and management of 
the target company and the financial institution that lends required money. The key 
participants in such a deal are the PE firm that invests in the transaction and the banks 
who lend in support of the deal and their respective advisers. The bid is made by a 
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newly-formed company, usually referred to as ‘Newco’. On the other side of the 
transaction, are the shareholders who are seeking to maximize their capital gain (Gilligan 
and Wright, 2010).  
 
Figure 2.3: Organizational Structure of PE Deal  
 
This Figure shows the way PE deals are organized. It includes the actors who play the crucial role in the 
successful completion of a PE deal. ‘Newco’ is the newly formed company on behalf of which a bid is 
made to acquire an existing pubic company (Source: Gilligan and Wright, 2010, pp. 2).     
 
 
 
 
Typically, PE firms offer the management team a large equity stakes through stocks and 
options (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). PE firms also require management to make a 
meaningful investment in the company; these equity stakes are expected to reduce 
management’s incentive to manipulate performance (Kaplan, 1989). Moreover, leverage 
creates pressure on managers to make interest and principal payments (Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2009). This pressure reduces the ‘free cash flow’ problems as described by 
Jensen (1986), in which management with weak corporate governance could dissipate 
excess cash flows. Also, Axelson et al. (2009) argue that leverage provides discipline to 
the acquiring LBO fund. In addition, PE firms control the boards of their portfolio 
companies and are actively involved in their internal governance structure (Gertner and 
Kaplan, 1996; Acharya and Kehoe, 2010; Cornelli and Karakas, 2008) thereby creating a 
more transparent and operationally efficient internal governance structure.  
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Figure 2.4 below, shows the value of worldwide LBO transactions backed by PE firms 
during the period between 1985 and 2007. It is evident that the transaction values peaked 
in 1988, dropped during the early 1990s and rose and peaked in the later 1990s until 
recently. From 2005 through June 2007, record buyout transactions occurred at a 
combined estimated enterprise value of over $1.6 trillion (in 2007 dollars), accounting 
for around thirty percent of the total transactions that occurred during the period of 1985 
to 2007 (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). Figure 2.5 shows the growth of Global PE deals 
in number over time from the period 1985 to 2007. A total of 17,171 PE backed buyout 
transactions occurred during this period with a record 5,188 buyout transactions 
occurring within 2005 and 2007.  
 
Figure 2.4: Global PE Deals in Value  
 
Figure depicts the increase in global PE deals in value over time. Transaction values are calculated as 
Enterprise value of the Target Firms = Market value of equity + Book value of debt – Cash. The values are 
then converted into 2007 US dollars (Data Source: Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
A considerable increase in PE takeovers through LBOs in the 1980s is an indication that 
these transactions are a significant tool for corporate restructuring. PE firms and buyout 
specialists extracted value through reorganization of the slow-growth public firms into 
more efficient private companies (Mehran and Peristiani, 2010). PE firms use their 
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those investments. They consider the issue of cost-reducing opportunities, acquisition 
opportunities, as well as management changes and upgrades (Acharya and Kehoe, 2010; 
Gadiesh and MacArthur, 2008). Cumming et al. (2007) conclude that PE takeovers 
enhance performance and have a profound effect on work practices. Interestingly, as 
Mehran and Peristiani (2010) point out, the decision to go private through PE takeovers 
lies in the hands of insiders and managers seeking a more efficient corporate structure 
and better value for their company.  
 
Figure 2.5: Global PE Deals in Number  
 
Figure depicts the increase in global PE deals in number over time. 2005 and 2007 experienced most 
number of PE deals worldwide. (Data Source: Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009).  
 
 
  
 
Table 2.1 shows the distribution of global PE transactions by region. The US and Canada 
constitute the major portion of PE transactions worldwide. The increased expansion in 
PE markets from 2005 to 2007 (evident from Figures 2.4 and 2.5) might have many 
different reasons. This might be the picture that Jensen (1989) described as the fact that 
LBO organizations would eventually dominate the corporate organizational form.  PTPs 
grew rapidly in numbers and size and spreads to some new regions of the world (Kaplan 
and Stromberg, 2009). Like other developed economics, Australia also experienced a 
steady increase in LBOs after the year 2000s. 
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Global PE Deals by Region 
 
Table 2.1 shows the distribution of PE deals by world region from 1985 to 2007. US and Canada 
experienced most number of PE deals. The value of Australian PE deals is very low in comparison to the 
other developed region of the world. However, there is an increasing trend in Australian PE deals (Data 
Source: Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009).  
 
 
Region of the World  % of Enterprise Value in PE Deals over Time  
 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2007 
USA and Canada  87% 72% 60% 44% 47% 
United Kingdom  7% 13% 16% 17% 15% 
Western Europe  
(except UK) 
3% 13% 20% 32% 26% 
Asia and Australia  3% 1% 2% 4% 4% 
Rest of the World  0% 2% 2% 2% 3% 
  
 
2.2.6 Private Equity Transactions in Australia  
As stated by Westcott (2009, pp. 1 – 3), “Over a decade and a half after Jensen (1989) 
predicted the eclipse of the public corporation, Jensen’s ‘active’ investors surfaced 
publicly in Australia…….the growth in PE as an asset class, particularly the increasing 
media attention gained by private equity investors, has arguably piqued an increased 
interest”. Thus the relationship between ownership and PE investment has long been a 
source of finance for companies in Australia, for the venture capitalist in particular. 
However, the direct intervention of PE investment, in terms of the volume of 
transactions, has increased to a considerable extent during recent times. Some of the 
companies acquired and targeted by PE firms are not necessarily under-performers. 
Targeting of companies like Qantas by PE investors reveals the fact that PE investors are 
determined to increase efficiency of firm operations (Westcott, 2009). The central voice 
of the Australian PE Industry, the AVCAL suggests that there are at least five important 
factors that make a PE investment highly efficient in the value addition process, as noted 
by Chapple et al. (2010). These five factors are alignment of managers and outside 
shareholders, long-term value creation, detailed due diligence, appropriate planning for 
the future investment and an active stewardship in value addition.  
 
The PE industry attracted considerable attention in Australia with the attempt by APA to 
purchase Qantas in November 2006. Originally, Qantas was a wholly government-owned 
company and was privatized in the first half of the 1990s. Over a six month period 
between the initial announcement and the eventual failure of the bid, the PE industry 
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sector came under major scrutiny from the press and politicians. Although the Qantas bid 
failed, the impact of PE transactions in Australia remains significant (Westcott, 2009). 
According to Ernst and Young (2010), during the last ten years Australia/New Zealand 
PE investment grew their annual profit on an average by a thirty six percent, as compared 
to only eleven percent for equivalent public companies. Among the three largest PE 
backed Initial Public Offerings (IPO) globally, the largest was the floatation of Myer 
Holdings equivalent to US$ 1.9 billion on the ASX (AVCAL, 2010). Although PE 
investment still accounts for a small proportion of Australia’s capital market funding, the 
extent of PE transactions has increased since the 2000s; while these investments are 
small in number, the value of these transactions went up considerably during the decade 
(Westcott, 2009). Consistent with this, Farrell (2007) notes that the influence of PE 
investment is larger than its size suggests.  
 
During the last decade, the PE transactions in Australia experienced a remarkable 
growth. In the year 2006 alone, value of PE transactions reached to AUD$ 26 billion, 
whereas it averaged AUD$ 10 billion in the preceding five years (see Figure 2.6). Given 
that PE bidders can make a significant economic contribution to the Australian capital 
market with a persistent increase in their investment, the role of PE transactions in the 
market has attracted recent attention (Chapple et al. 2010). It is important to note, also, 
that the number of companies listed on the ASX is low compared to that in other 
developed market economies. Concentration of market capitalization value among some 
of the biggest firms, together with a small population, limits the operational efficiency of 
managers and directors. Therefore, traditional monitoring mechanisms might be less 
effective in Australia (Henry, 2010).  
 
2.3 Institutional Set-up in Australia  
An important feature of the Australian capital market is the high level of investment from 
the household sector in publicly listed companies. Hill (2010) reports that around 6.7 
million people, 41 percent of Australians, own shares either directly or indirectly. The 
proportion of shareholding by institutional investors is somewhat lower than that found 
in the US and in the UK (Hill, 2010). As a result, capital market regulations form an 
important part in the smooth functioning of these markets. Takeover activity in Australia 
is controlled through the regulations laid down in Chapter 6 (Takeovers) of the 
Corporations Act (CA), 2001. Other legislation such as the Trade Practices Act, the 
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Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act and the Listing Rules of the ASX are also 
prevalent in regulating takeover bids made for Australian companies. Farrer (1997) and 
Mayanja (1999) mention the inadequacy of the current takeover legislation form in 
Australia and put forward proposals to reform rules guiding takeover actions and 
directors’ responsibility laws within corporation’s legislation. These reform proposals are 
based on the premise that takeovers are value-creating transactions (Henry, 2005; CA, 
2001). In addition, non-binding codes of practice and guidelines also form a part of the 
regulatory atmosphere. The ASX Good Governance Principles and Best Practice 
Recommendations fall within this category. The ASX has adopted a flexible and non-
prescriptive regulatory approach, meaning that listed companies are allowed to deviate, 
but with an appropriate explanation justifying the deviations. Shareholder practice 
guidelines, such as those issued by the Australian Council of Superannuation Investors 
(ACSI) and the Investment and Financial Services Association (IFSA) also have been 
influential sources of governance standards in Australia (Hill, 2010).   
 
Figure 2.6: Australian PE Investment (in value) over Time 
 
This Figure shows the growth of PE investment over the last decade in Australia. Australia also has a peak 
in PE deals during 2005 to 2007 as it happens globally (see Figure 2.4) (Data Source: AVCAL, 2010).   
 
  
 
The duties and responsibilities of company directors as officers of the company are less 
authoritatively stated in Australia, and there are no specific regulations that exist to 
specify the actions or responsibilities of directors in response to takeover bid 
FY20
01
FY20
02
FY20
03
FY20
04
FY20
05
FY20
06
FY20
07
FY20
08
FY20
09
FY20
10
Amount (AU$m) 1,219. 1,224. 805.46 611.32 1,520. 2,141. 2,152. 2,610. 1,922. 2,183.
0.00
500.00
1,000.00
1,500.00
2,000.00
2,500.00
3,000.00
In
v in
 M
ill
io
n A
U
D$
 
Growth of PE Investment in Australia
 27 
 
announcements (Henry, 2005). Section 180(1) of CA (2001) states that directors are 
required to “discharge their duties with degree of care and diligence that a reasonable 
person would exercise”. In addition, Section 180(3) explains this duty as a “business 
judgment” rule in determining if decisions are made in the best interests of the company. 
Also, in the case of takeover circumstances, there are no guidelines existing in the 
Legislation regarding the legal responsibilities or requirements of target directors in 
response to takeover bids. However, information is required to be disclosed in the target 
company’s Part B or Part D response statement (Henry, 2005). Section 638(1) of CA 
(2001) requires the target Part B or D statement to contain “all information that holders . 
. . would reasonably require to make an informed assessment of whether to accept the 
offer under the bid”. Section 638(3) also requires the target response to contain a 
separate statement by each director with regard to their recommendation on accepting or 
rejecting a bid including the reasons for their recommendation. The target statement is 
also required to include details regarding the directors’ shareholdings in the target 
company and their own intention regarding the bid. All this information is to be sent to 
target shareholders, the bidding company and the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) within fourteen days of the takeover announcement (CA, 2001; 
Henry, 2005).  
 
In recent times, there has been a growing emphasis to develop good governance practices 
around the world to limit agency conflicts (Henry, 2004). During the last decade, 
Australia has experienced a number of major corporate governance scandals which have 
had a significant effect on corporate law reform and enforcement (Hill, 2005 & 2010). 
The corporate governance best practice recommendations are only in preliminary stage 
in Australia. The CGC released a set of ‘Principles of Good Governance and Best 
Practice Recommendations’ only in March 2003, and the recommendations became 
observable first in the 2004 corporate reporting year. It is argued that the adoption of the 
Cadbury Committee recommendations by UK companies has resulted in more 
independent boards, which are thought to prioritize shareholders’ interests (Henry, 
2005). The main objectives of these recommendations include improving the 
independence and integrity of the directors of listed companies through majority 
representation by independent outside directors, creating independent nomination, 
remuneration and audit committees, reducing Chief Executive Officer (CEO)-Chair 
duality and linking the remuneration structure closely with performance. Henry (2005) 
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argues that good governance practices have been prevalent in larger listed companies in 
Australia because larger companies are subject to more analysts following and 
monitoring their performance, which has ensured a greater level of transparency. On the 
other hand, many of the smaller companies have sub-optimal governance structures and 
they commonly become takeover targets. In the absence of a good governance structure, 
the outcome of takeover bids may be dependent on the self-serving behaviour by 
insiders. Self-serving behaviours may encourage managers to resist value-creating 
takeover bids. Alternatively, self-serving behaviour also may encourage managers to take 
their firm private where they have substantial benefits in doing so (Henry, 2004). With 
the present condition, Australian corporate governance, particularly in the smaller 
companies, is less likely to meet best-practice models in near future as argued by Henry 
(2004).  
 
Hill (2010) argues that the level of legal actions against directors and officers in 
Australia has been very low. A number of developments over the last few decades have 
strengthened the accountability in the regulatory environment in Australia. Reforms in 
2004 granted ASIC the authority to issue infringement notices for lack of compliance. In 
recent times, ASIC has launched high level enforcement actions under the civil penalty 
regime, many of which are related to some well-known Australian corporate scandals. 
Moreover, the corporate governance recommendations have been under constant scrutiny 
since their inception in 2003, and a revised second edition was released in 2007. In April 
2010, the ASX released a further proposal for amendments to the guidelines relating to a 
number of issues including board diversity. At the same time, the ASX also released a 
draft amendment to its Listing Rules relating to remuneration committees and a 
company’s trading policies. With all these changes and developments being made in the 
Australian regulatory environment, it is expected that the CGC Recommendations will be 
able to improve the overall corporate governance practices in Australia (Hill, 2010).  
   
2.4.1 Empirical Evidence on Going Private Transactions  
As Jensen (1989) expected, LBOs have become an increasingly important corporate 
organizational form over the course of time. With better corporate governance practice, 
concentrated ownership by active owners, strong managerial incentives and efficient 
capital structure, the LBO organizational form appears superior to that of the public 
corporation where there are disperse shareholders and weak governance. Weir and 
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Wright (2006) report that PTPs have lower valuations than do other traditional 
acquisition forms of listed corporations; this suggests the existence of managerial private 
information in firms going private.  
 
The literature on PTP and PE transactions has various aspects. One of which deals with 
free cash flow and argues that agency costs are prevalent in firms going private (Jensen, 
1986). Firms going private are expected to have high free cash flows which are being 
used to achieve managerial objectives rather than shareholder wealth maximization 
(Weir et al. 2005a). Supporting this notion, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Singh (1990) 
find that firms going private have greater free cash flows. Another aspect deals with the 
market for corporate control, based on the idea that takeover bids are disciplinary and 
hostile. If PTP firms had been the subject of takeover speculation whilst publicly quoted, 
they are likely to have ineffective internal governance mechanisms. A number of studies 
(Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Singh, 1990; Halpern et al. 1999) also report that companies 
going private are more likely to experience takeover speculation than firms that did not. 
Below an overview of the extant literature that is relevant to the present study is 
presented:   
  
Maupin et al. (1984) examine the differences between pre-existing characteristics of 
companies going private through MBOs and firms taken over but which remain publicly 
quoted. The study compares 63 US firms with a matched sample between the period 
1972 and 1983. They find that firms going private through MBOs possess some financial 
and stock market characteristics that are significantly different from those that do not go 
private. The analysis shows that going private firms are more likely to have high level of 
share ownership by managers and directors and a higher level of cash flow to net worth 
ratio and low market prices for their stocks. A similar study is conducted by Maupin 
(1987) having a slightly larger sample from the US between 1972 and 1984. Using a 
sample of 97 going private firms and comparing them with a matched sample of 
traditional takeover firms, the study shows similar results to those of by Maupin et al. 
(1984). Thereafter, Malone (1989) studies the characteristics of smaller LBO transactions 
of 56 US firms between 1981 and 1987. Malone (1989) concludes that management 
equity stake plays an important role in the changes that may occur within firms after the 
buyout has taken place.  
 
 30 
 
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) investigate the source of stockholder gains in going private 
transactions using a sample of 263 US going private transactions from 1980 through 
1987. They compare the going private firms with a matched sample and find support for 
the hypothesis advanced by Jensen (1986) that a major source of PTP gains is the 
elimination of agency problems associated with free cash flow. They also find that their 
results become strongest when managers are confronted with a hostile takeover threat. 
The results of their study are especially interesting since they find strong evidence that 
managers of the firms going private own relatively little equity before the transaction. 
This finding is in contrast to the results reported by Maupin et al. (1984) and Maupin 
(1987).  
  
Kosedag and Lane (2002) examine the applicability of the free cash flow hypothesis and 
the tax savings hypothesis to re-LBOs: the practice of going private via LBO, re-
obtaining public status through a new IPO and then going private for the second time. 
Kosedag and Lane (2002) argue that if Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis works 
as an explanation for going private in general, then the same perception should also hold 
for a second LBO. Using a sample of 21 US re-LBO firms during the period from 1980 
to 1996 and comparing them with a control sample, Kosedag and Lane (2002) do not 
find any evidence that going private is strongly related to free cash flow.  
 
Using a survey to collect data on pre and post-LBO goals, strategy, structure and 
productivity for a sample of  214 US going private firms between 1986 and 1989, Phan 
and Hill (1995) report evidence that LBOs are associated with an increase in 
management equity holdings. They note that the increase in management shareholdings 
is correlated with substantive changes in strategy and structure ex-post. Phan and Hill 
(1995) believe debt might play an important role; however, management equity stakes 
might have the most lasting impact upon firm efficiency. They conclude that LBOs may 
be used to transfer wealth from outside shareholders and bondholders to the senior 
managers.  
 
The studies by Maupin et al. (1984) and Maupin (1987) are extended by Singh (1990), 
who investigates distinguishing characteristics of firms engaged in MBOs and 
incorporates the prior context of the firm before going private. Singh (1990) uses a 
sample of 65 US MBOs in the period between 1980 and 1987 and compares them with 
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130 non-going private firms. The results of the study add new evidence to the literature 
by showing that firms undergoing buyouts have higher levels of liquidity and have a 
significantly higher incidence of takeover speculation prior to the buyout.  
 
Green (1992) studies owner-managers' perceptions in eight UK MBOs between 1980 and 
early 1990 and investigates the strategic implications of the highly leveraged, 
management based ownership structure in MBOs and brings new insight to the literature 
by saying that managers may have motivations to transfer the firms’ ownership to the 
personal form for efficiency reason. The study is a case-based qualitative analysis 
utilizing interviews with owner-managers of MBOs. It reveals that owner-managers 
generally interpreted owner-control and debt-control as enhancing managerial motivation 
and improving efficiency. One of the impending views of the study is that a part of any 
efficiency gains resulting from a transfer to personal ownership occurs because 
inefficient control is removed. Thus, buyout ownership allows managers to perform tasks 
more effectively through greater independence to take decisions and formulate strategies.   
 
Halpern et al. (1999) argue that the LBO population is heterogeneous. They examine the 
characteristics of 126 US LBOs during the period from 1981 to 1986. The study employs 
three different types of samples, namely, an LBO sample, a sample of firms that 
remained public and not acquired and, finally, a sample of firms acquired by another 
public corporation. Using cluster analysis and a multinomial logistic regression model, 
they argue that there are two types of poorly performing firms going private through 
LBOs. The first group, in which management has a small shareholding, faces takeover 
pressures that force management to consider a buyout of the firm or be subject to hostile 
takeover. The second group is characterized by much higher management shareholdings 
and, as such, do not face external takeover pressure. However, with large and 
undiversified portfolio holdings, management might have an incentive to take cash out of 
their firm by taking it private. The main attribute of this study is not to show the impact 
of managerial ownership on the going private decision but it does provide insight that 
high managerial ownership can play an important role in going private. In that respect, 
Halpern et al. (1999) support the evidence forwarded by Maupin et al. (1984), Maupin 
(1987) and Phan and Hill (1995).  
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Opler and Titman (1993) build upon Jensen (1986) and Lehn and Poulsen (1989) study 
on the free cash flow hypothesis and investigate the determinants of LBO activity by 
comparing firms that have implemented LBOs to those that have not. Using a sample of 
180 US firms that undertook LBOs in the 1980 to 1990 period, they suggest that going 
private firms can be characterized as having a combination of unfavorable investment 
opportunities, in terms of low Tobin's Q and relatively high free cash flow. Further, 
Opler and Titman (1993) added new evidence to the literature by examining the effect of 
financial distress cost on LBOs. They do not find any evidence that firms with high 
expected costs of financial distress are likely candidates of LBO.  
 
Weir et al. (2005a) bring a new dimension to the largely exploratory extant research into 
characteristics of going private decisions by investigating three important aspects of 
governance mechanism. They examine the extent to which the going private decision is 
influenced by incentive effects, internal monitoring mechanism and external monitoring 
mechanism. Employing the multivariate logistic regression model and using 95 UK PTP 
firms during 1998 to 2000, including a control sample of the same number, the study 
reveals that firms going private have higher CEO shareholdings and have more CEO-
Chair duality; but no effect is found in respect of the board independence and excess free 
cash flow. In addition, no evidence is found that firms going private experience a greater 
threat of hostile acquisition from outside. The results, thus, provide support for the 
incentive and internal monitoring explanations for undertaking a PTP transaction. 
Moreover, the probability of going private shows that incentive effects are stronger than 
the monitoring effects. Weir et al. (2005a) believe that, in the context of increasing 
globalization, PTP firms might be too small to become an attractive target for the 
corporate buyer and hence do not face much pressure from the market for corporate 
control. The significance of CEO shareholdings in this study is consistent with the 
evidence suggested by Maupin et al. (1984), Maupin (1987), Phan and Hill (1995) and 
Halpern et al. (1999). Using the same sample set within the same time period, Weir et al. 
(2005b) conduct another study that analyses the valuation, agency costs and ownership 
characteristics of UK firms going private and compares them with a set of control firms. 
The study reveals that firms going private suffer from undervaluation indicating the fact 
that management of going private firms has private information. In contrast to Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989), this study does not find any evidence that pressure from the market for 
corporate control plays any role in going private. The evidence, however, suggests the 
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existence of financial incentives in going private through higher share ownership by the 
board members of the firms going private.  
 
Weir and Wright (2006) conduct another study using the same UK PTP sample and a 
larger Non-PTP sample within the same time period. They evaluate the extent to which 
firms going private have specific external and internal governance and monitoring 
characteristics that differ from traditional acquisitions of listed corporations. The results 
of the study, consistent with the evidence found by Weir et al. (2005a and 2005b), 
support the argument for non-disciplinary takeovers. They suggest that PTPS are not 
exposed to takeover pressure from the market for corporate control in the form of 
takeover speculation as well as hostile threats. They present evidence that PTPs are likely 
to have higher board ownership, CEO-Chair duality, low growth prospects and lower 
valuations. Moreover, the results suggest that going private might be an outcome of 
management having private information about the company’s future prospects.  
 
Renneboog et al. (2007) analyse a large PE backed UK PTP sample consisting of 177 
firms between 1997 and 2003 to examine the magnitude and sources of the expected 
shareholder gains in PTPs. The study identifies a positive relation between 
undervaluation and the expected shareholder gains at the PTP transaction. The study 
does not find any evidence of the existence of high free cash flow as predicted by Jensen 
(1989). These results are consistent with early UK studies by Weir et al. (2005a and 
2005b) and Weir and Wright (2006).  
 
Fidrmuc et al. (2007) examine whether PE investors take firms private for different 
reasons than other going private transactions. This is an important study in corporate 
governance literature that explores the distinguishing features of PE takeovers in 
compared to the other buyout transaction firms. The study is built on the heterogeneity 
hypothesis as suggested by Halpern et al. (1999) and highlights the involvement of PE 
funds in going private transactions. Fidrmuc et al. (2007) use a sample of 212 UK going 
private transactions covering a period between 1997 and 2003 and compare them to 200 
randomly selected UK firms that remained public. The sample of 212 going private 
transactions consisted of 90 PE backed deals and 122 of other going private deals. The 
empirical results of the study provide evidence, consistent with Halpern et al. (1999), 
that the population of going private firms is heterogeneous. They show that PTPs not 
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backed by PE deals are significantly undervalued, not followed by analysts, have 
relatively high free cash and have high executive ownership. But PE deals, in contrast, 
have high executive ownership, but with low levels of cash, low debt levels and high 
dividend payments. These results suggest that Jensen’s (1989) cash rich hypothesis does 
not apply to PE backed deals and the target firms in PE deals seemed to be short of cash. 
The idea, then, is that the PE firms might provide these firms with the necessary 
financing and other efficiency gains for their strategic restructuring.  
 
Florackis and Ozkan (2009a) empirically investigate the relationship between managerial 
entrenchment and agency costs for a large sample of UK firms over the period 1999 – 
2005. The study develops a managerial entrenchment index to capture the extent to 
which managers have the ability to expropriate wealth from shareholders. Based on a 
dynamic panel data analysis, the study shows strong evidence that internal corporate 
governance mechanisms, ownership and board structures, and managerial compensation 
play an important role in determining the extent of managerial entrenchment. Moreover, 
the analysis suggests that higher managerial entrenchment leads to greater agency costs. 
These finding are also robust to alternative definitions of agency costs and managerial 
entrenchment. Florackis and Ozkan (2009b) conduct another study to investigate the 
effect of managerial incentives and corporate governance on capital structure using a 
large sample of UK firms during the period between 1999 and 2004. The analysis reveals 
evidence of a significant non-monotonic relationship between executive ownership and 
leverage. The results also suggest that corporate governance practices have a significant 
impact in determining the financing mix of a firm.  
 
Mehran and Peristiani (2010) highlight another important reason behind the decision to 
go private; viz., the inability of the firms to have sufficient financial visibility. They 
study 262 US firms (169 LBO targets and 93 non-LBO firms) that went private in the 
period between 1990 and 2007. They propose that an important driving force in going 
private is the inability to attract a critical level of analyst coverage and investor interest. 
The results suggest that IPO firms with low analyst coverage, low level of institutional 
ownership and low stock turnover are more likely to go private. Thus, it is evident that 
market analysts play a crucial role in getting more investor recognition and in reducing 
information asymmetries.  
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Bharath and Dittmer (2010) conduct a comprehensive study on US going private 
transactions to examine how firms determined the costs and benefits of being public and 
decide to go private through the use of PE investment. The study employs a 
comprehensive sample of 1,377 going-private transactions from 1980 to 2004 in the US 
and compares them with 6,464 IPO firms that went and remained public. Bharath and 
Dittmer (2010) examine firm characteristics of both the samples over their publicly listed 
lives to investigate how the evolution of firm characteristics impacted on the decision to 
go private. The results of the study suggest that the decision to go private is more 
prominent with firms having less information available about them in the public market 
and that such firms also have low institutional ownership. Also, strong evidence is found 
in support of high free cash flow in determining which firms go private; but this evidence 
is restricted to the 1980s. This is also consistent with some earlier studies (Kosedag and 
Lane, 2002; Weir et al. 2005a and 2005b) that do not find any evidence of high free cash 
flows as important driving factor in going private decision after 1980s.  
 
The review of extant literature, thus, suggests specifically that the influence of 
asymmetric information, undervaluation, high managerial ownership and firm specific 
governance characteristics in going private transactions in the context of private equity 
takeovers has not been examined empirically. This study attempts to address this gap and 
is expected to bring new evidence into the corporate finance literature as applied to the 
Australian going private research.  
     
2.4.2 Empirical Evidence on Going Private Transactions in Australia  
Private equity investment in Australia has grown considerably and changed in nature 
over the past few years. Increasingly, PE firms are buying out more mature publicly 
listed companies. Westcot (2009) makes the case that despite the potential that going 
private transactions may play a different role internationality in terms of economic, legal 
and institutional factors, there is relatively little empirical analysis of these transactions 
outside the US and the UK.  
 
Eddey et al. (1996) conduct the first ever study on going private transactions in Australia 
by investigating their determinants. The study is exploratory in nature which includes 46 
Australian firms going private from 1988 through 1991 and compares those firms with a 
control group matched on the basis of size and industry attributes. Eddey et al. observe 
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that around ten percent of all completed Australian takeovers were going private 
transactions during that period and detect that increasing share ownership concentrations 
are the primary motive for such transactions. Although they do not find any direct 
support for the free cash flow hypothesis, they provide evidence that going private 
transactions in Australia are a response to an actual or perceived threat of a competing 
bid. This evidence is complemented by the fact that competing offers might work as a 
way to reduce potential information asymmetries between insiders and the outside 
shareholders.  
  
Evans et al. (2005) update and extend the work of Eddey et al. (1996) and identify the 
financial and market characteristics of firms being taken private in an Australian context. 
They study 80 successful going private bids listed on the ASX within the period of 1990 
and 1999 and compare them with a control sample of 80 traditional takeover firms 
matched by size and industry within the same time period. The firm characteristics 
examined in the study are free cash flow, growth, leverage, liquidity, managerial 
ownership and takeover threats. It is interesting to note that higher levels of free cash 
flow have not been a driving factor in going private. The results indicate that Australian 
going private firms are more likely to have high liquidity, low growth prospects and 
lower levels of leverage. Managerial ownership and takeover threats do not seem to have 
any impact in going private deals. Jensen’s free cash flow theory (1986) does not seem to 
work in Australian firms. This evidence is consistent with some earlier works on US and 
UK firms after 1990s (Halpern et al. 1999; Kosedag and Lane, 2002; Weir et al. 2005a). 
Evans et al. (2005) believe that management of the firms may have private information 
that motivates them to value their firm differently to the market. Although Eddey et al. 
(1996) find takeover threats to be an important driving factor, Evans et al. (2005) do not 
find any evidence in support of this.   
 
Chapple et al. (2010) conduct the first formal study into the determinants of PE bids in 
Australia, which they called “the beginnings of a scientific foundation for further 
investigation into the determinants of private equity bids in Australia” (pp. 101). They 
apply existing theories on motivations for going private to examine the determinants of 
private equity bids in Australia. The study examines a sample of 23 Australian PE targets 
between 2001 and 2007 against a control sample of 81 remained public firms matched by 
year and industry. The study provides a looming view on how PE investors choose their 
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targets and arrange their bids. The results indicate that PE targets have relatively greater 
financial slack, greater free cash flow and lower measurable growth prospects. Given that 
debt funding constitutes a large part of PE investment, the preferred mode of payment for 
private equity bidders is cash. Chapple et al. (2010) also suggest that PE bids would be 
of a friendly nature. Although exploratory in nature, the study does provide a basis on the 
nature of PE transactions in Australia.  
 
Despite significant reforms having been undertaken in corporate governance mechanisms 
globally (Netter et al. 2009), LBOs and other going private transactions continue to 
increase their presence in capital markets around the world. The emergence of private 
equity is an important mechanism that captures a significant portion within the recent 
growth of going private transactions. The decision to go private is still controlled by 
insiders and managers who are looking for a more efficient corporate organizational 
structure and better value for their company. The incentive to mitigate agency conflicts 
and information asymmetries between managers and shareholders continue to influence 
firms’ reorganization decisions (Mehran and Peristiani, 2010). Table 2.2 exhibits a 
chronological summary of the literature reviewed in the context of this study:   
 
Table 2.2: Summary of the Literatures Reviewed on Agency Issue and PTPs 
 
Authors Region Focus Outcome 
    
Maupin et al. 
1984 
US  Distinguishing features of 
firms going private 
through MBOs  
High insider ownership, high cash flow to net 
worth and high cash flow to assets are the 
factors that distinguish PTPs.    
    
Maupin, 1987  US  Distinguishing features of 
firms going private 
through MBOs   
High ownership concentration, high cash flow 
to net worth and low P/E ratio are the factors 
that distinguish PTPs.  
    
Malone,  1989  US  Characteristics of Smaller 
LBOs  
Management ownership stake plays important 
role in post buy-out changes.   
    
Lehn and 
Poulsen, 1989  
US  Sources of stockholder 
gains in PTPs  
A significant relationship exists between high 
free cash flow and the decision to go private.  
    
Singh, 1990 US  Characteristics of firms 
bought out by MBOs  
Firms going private have high cash flow and 
have a significantly higher incidence of 
takeover speculation prior to the buyout.  
    
Green, 1992  UK  Owner-managers'  
perceptions and strategic 
implications of MBOs  
MBOs allowed managers to perform tasks 
more effectively through greater independence 
to take decisions.  
   
Opler and 
Titman, 1993  
US  Motivations for LBO 
activities  
Firms with high free cash flow and low 
Tobin’s Q are more likely to undertake LBO.  
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Author Region Focus Outcome 
 
Eddey et al. 1996  Australia  The motivations for going 
private transactions  
Going private transaction is frequently 
preceded by the threat of a takeover offer.  
    
Halpern et al. 
1999 
US  Differential characteristics 
of firms going private 
through LBO  
LBO population is heterogeneous. For firms 
with low managerial stake, outside takeover 
pressures force management to consider a 
buyout of the firm. For firms with high 
managerial stake, management has incentive 
to take their firm private through LBOs.  
    
Kosedag and 
Lane, 2002  
US  Effects of free cash flow 
and tax savings on re-
LBOs  
No evidence on free cash flow hypothesis; but 
tax savings still holds as an explanation for 
going private.  
    
Weir et al. 2005a  UK  The motivations for going 
private transactions  
Firms going private have higher CEO 
ownership, more CEO-Chair duality but no 
difference in outside directors or takeover 
threats compared with firms remaining public.  
    
Weir et al. 2005b  UK  Valuation, agency costs 
and ownership structures 
of firms going private  
Firms going private suffer from 
undervaluation and are found to have poor 
internal governance structure.  
    
Evans et al. 2005 Australia  Assessing the 
characteristics of firms 
going private  
Going private firms in Australia are likely to 
be characterized as having high liquidity, 
lower growth rates and low leverage.  
    
Weir and Wright, 
2006 
UK  The extent to which PTPs 
have different governance 
features   
PTPs are more likely to have higher board 
ownership, CEO-chair duality, lower growth 
prospects and lower valuations.  
    
Renneboog et al. 
2007  
UK  Examined the magnitude 
and sources of expected 
shareholder gains in PTPs  
The main sources of shareholder wealth gains 
are undervaluation of the pre-transaction 
target firm, increased interest tax shields and 
incentive realignment.  
    
Fidrmuc et al. 
2007  
UK  The motivations for PE 
investors to take a firm 
private  
The PE backed deals have high executive 
ownership, shortage of cash, low debt levels, 
and pay high dividends.  
    
Florackis and 
Ozkan (2009a)  
UK  The relationship between 
managerial entrenchment 
and agency cost  
Internal governance mechanisms, ownership 
structures and managerial compensation play 
an important role in determining the extent of 
managerial entrenchment.  
    
Florackis and 
Ozkan (2009b)  
UK  Effect of managerial 
incentives and corporate 
governance on capital 
structure 
Strong evidence of a significant non-
monotonic relationship between executive 
ownership and leverage. The results also 
suggest that corporate governance practices 
have a significant impact on leverage. 
    
Stuart and Yim, 
2010  
US  Effect of board network on 
the likelihood of being 
targeted in PE deals  
The companies having directors with past PE 
experience are more likely to receive PE 
offers.  
    
Chapple et al. 
2010 
Australia  The pattern of selection of 
target firms by PE 
investors  
PE targets have greater financial slack, greater 
financial stability, greater free cash flow and 
lower measurable growth prospects.  
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Author Region Focus Outcome 
 
Mehran and 
Peristiani (2010) 
US  Financial visibility and the 
decision to go private   
An important driving force in going private is 
the inability to attract a critical level of analyst 
coverage and investor interest.   
    
Bharath and 
Dittmar, 2010   
US  To examine how firms 
decided to go private 
through the use of PE 
investment 
The decision to go private is apparent when 
firms have less information available about 
them in the public market.  
 
In general, the existing research on going private transactions has looked into the 
financial and governance characteristics of PTPs, as denoted by Evans et al. (2005). 
Most of those studies focused on LBOs, MBOs, MBIs and other dimensions of US and 
UK going private deals with a little attention to PE deals. In addition, Australian research 
on going private transactions is limited to Chapple et al. (2010) study. A possible reason 
for the lack of research in this area is the difficulty of obtaining public information on 
such transactions. Therefore, research on private equity is very limited in the academic 
literature and, in particular, in Australian going private studies. Considering the recent 
surge and significance of PE investments worldwide (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009), 
formal studies into the nature and interplay of these investments are warranted.  
 
As Chapple et al. (2010, pp. 101) said, “private equity bidders appear to occupy an 
unusual place in the market as disciplinary, friendly acquirers. However…the 
disciplinary motive for takeover activity in Australia appears to be oversold. Moreover, 
as private equity bidders appear not to focus on particular industries, the synergistic 
motive is obviously less plausible. Consequently, private equity bidders appear to play 
an ‘opportunistic’ role not readily explained by either the disciplinary or synergistic 
hypothesis”. Jensen (2007) claims PE as a new model of corporate management; one 
which can be applied to many firms and organizations. He (Jensen) supports the 
emergence of private equity investment since it can recapture the value destroyed by 
agency problems, as evidenced from the recent growth and success of the private equity 
sector. Hence as a new form of corporate control, it is difficult to classify private equity 
bids in the traditional manner. Thus, with the existence of a number of studies on the 
financial and governance characteristics of target firms in PTP and PE transactions and a 
lesser number of studies on Australian PE takeovers in particular, I am not aware of any 
research linking the relationship among managerial private information, high managerial 
ownership, governance mechanisms and the likelihood of Australian firms being 
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involved in going private transactions through PE takeovers. Essentially, in this study the 
aim is to determine the significance of information asymmetry, undervaluation, incentive 
and monitoring mechanisms in Australian PE takeovers firms.  
 
2.5 Chapter Summary    
To date, researchers have explored various features of going private transactions 
worldwide. The review of literature in this chapter uncovers the research related to going 
private transactions and establishes a gap in the research related to private equity in the 
Australian context. In addition, the recent rise in private equity transactions 
internationally provides an impetus to conduct an in-depth empirical investigation on the 
nature and implications of these transactions. This chapter reveals that no studies have 
been conducted to investigate the link among undervaluation, incentive alignment, 
governance mechanisms and private equity takeovers. In this study, the importance of 
managerial private information and high managerial ownership have been highlighted as 
determinants for a public firm in a going private decision and, in particular, being taken 
over by a PE firm from an Australian context. Given the dynamism in PE transactions 
and a dearth of research in the area, this study extends prior research by using more 
relevant, recent and large-scale data and is expected to bring new insights into the 
corporate finance literature in terms of the nature and implications of PE takeovers in 
Australia.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE DESIGN  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the data sources, the sample selection process and the variables 
utilized in the empirical investigations throughout this thesis. The remainder of this 
chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the details of data collection and 
sample selection procedures; Section 3 defines the variables used in this study; Section 4 
presents the descriptive statistics and a chapter summary is presented in Section 5.  
 
3.2 Data Sources and Sample Design  
Analysis in this thesis is based on a unique hand-collected dataset. The empirical analysis 
covers the period from 1990 through 2010. The sample consists of all successful going 
private bids involving companies listed on the ASX and made between the sample period 
of 1 January 1990 and 31 December 2010. The firms included in the sample are 
categorized into two groups. The first group consists of the target firms successfully 
taken over by private equity firms, referred to as ‘PE’ firms hereafter. The second group, 
a matched sample, consists of target firms involved in public-to-public transactions 
within the same accounting year as the PE takeovers. This group is matched with PE 
firms by time period and industry as classified by the ASX industry classification code 
and is referred to as ‘Non-PE’ firms hereafter. Matching samples have been used in 
numerous studies, for example, Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Weir et al. (2005a and 2005b), 
Weir and Wright (2006). All financial and governance variables are measured by means 
of the balance sheet date prior to the year of the announcement of the takeover activity.  
 
The sample was formed by utilizing a variety of databases and resources. The databases 
used for forming the sample are as follows:  
‐ SDC Platinum 
The initial sample of all takeovers is collected from the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) Platinum ANZ M&A Database. A total of 4546 completed ASX deals are 
retrieved from the SDC within the sample period. From among 4546 deals, a total of 
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517 successful going private bids are identified initially. A screening process is then 
employed to finalize the observations. All successful going private bids involving an 
acquirer that has a status of ‘Joint Venture ’or ‘Subsidiaries’, have been screened out 
of the sample to ensure that no ‘Publicly’ listed companies remain a part of the 
acquirers in the going private bids.  
‐ DatAnalysis  
Aspect Huntley Morning Star DatAnalysis Database is an ASX based database. The 
list of ‘ASX Delisted Firms’ within the same sample period is retrieved from 
DatAnalysis. The list of ‘ASX Delisted Firms’ is used to re-confirm all successful 
going private bids involving an acquirer that has a status of a ‘Private’ company.  
‐ ORBIS  
The list of PE takeovers, out of the going private bids, is then confirmed finally 
through the ‘Deal Financing’ and ‘Deal History’ menu of Bureau Van-Dijk ORBIS 
Global Database. The going private bids are considered as a PE led bid only when it 
was financed wholly or partly by a PE firm in Australia. After finalizing the screening 
process through ORBIS, a total of 178 PE led going private bids are identified within 
the sample period from ASX.  
‐ FinAnalysis  
After finalizing the observations from ORBIS, the financial data are then collected 
from Aspect Huntley Morning Star FinAnalysis Database for all PE target firms. 
Based on the availability of at least 3 years of financial data, 129 companies are 
finally selected as ‘PE’ target firms in ASX during the specified period. 49 PE target 
firms are screened out of the sample since they do not have complete information.  
‐ Annual Reports  
Once the financial data are collected from FinAnalysis, the annual reports of those 
129 PE target firms have been downloaded from DatAnalysis database. Managerial 
ownership, institutional shareholdings and other data related to internal governance 
variables are then retrieved from the annual reports on a company by company basis.  
‐ DatAnalysis ASX Announcement Window  
The ASX announcement window of DatAnalysis database is thoroughly scrutinized to 
find if there was any takeover bid and/or speculation for taking over the target firms 
within the last 24 months of the actual takeover. This information is collected on a 
company-by-company basis.  
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Thus, the 129 observations included in the PE sample meet the following criteria as 
shown in Table 3.1 below:  
‐ All transactions are to take place between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 2010 in 
the Australian Securities Exchange  
‐ All transactions are to be successful going private bids  
‐ All acquirer firms should be private companies and should not have a status of ‘Joint 
Venture’ or ‘Subsidiaries’  
‐ To be considered as a PE led bid, all transactions are to be financed, either wholly or 
partly, by PE firms  
‐ All the target firms must have complete information for at least the last 3 years prior 
to takeover activity   
 
A matched sample of target firms involving traditional public-to-public transactions in 
the ASX is then created. As mentioned earlier, the initial list of all successful non-PTP 
deals is collected from SDC Platinum ANZ M&A database. The matched sample also 
has the same number of companies, i.e., 129 target firms, in public-to-public 
transactions. Financial data for the firms included in the matched sample are also 
collected from FinAnalysis database. Finally, annual reports, of all the companies 
included in the matched sample, are downloaded from the DatAnalysis database. 
Managerial ownership and other internal governance variables related data of those 129 
non-PE target firms are then retrieved from the annual reports on a company-by-
company basis. In addition, information on takeover bids and/or speculations for these 
Non-PE firms is collected from the ASX Announcement Window through the 
DatAnalysis database.  
 
Table 3.1 shows the frequency of PTP deals and the selection of PE deals in Australia. 
Panel A provides the frequency distribution of PTP deals in Australia in terms of number 
of deals. It shows that a little over eleven percent of all completed deals are PTP deals 
within the sample period. This is broadly consistent with Evans et al. (2005)’s finding 
that approximately ten percent of all deals in Australia are going private deals. The 
proportion of going private deals has grown over time to around twelve percent until 
2010. Stromberg (2007) notes that, the number of PTP deals has increased considerably 
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since 2000. Panel A presents similar evidence for Australia with the majority of PTP 
deals taking place between 2001 and 2007. Panel B describes the selection procedure of 
PE deals out of the PTP deals in Australia within the sample period.  
 
Table 3.1: Frequency and Sample Selection of PE Deals in Australia 
 
Panel A: Annual Frequency of all completed Going Private Transactions 
 
 All Non-PTP Deals All Going Private Only Private Equity 
    
Year Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
1990 - 1992 171 4.24 11 2.13 0 0.00 
1993 - 1995 340 8.44 34 6.58 1 0.77 
1996 - 1998 462 11.47 40 7.74 5 3.88 
1999 - 2001 341 8.46 51 9.86 19 14.73 
2002 - 2004 777 19.29 93 17.98 33 25.58 
2005 - 2007 799 19.83 133 25.73 52 40.31 
2008 - 2010 1139 28.27 155 29.98 19 14.73 
   
Total 4029 100% 517 100% 129 100% 
     
 
Panel B: Private Equity Deals in Australia  
 
  Sub-total  Total 
   
All PTP Deals   517 
    
Less:  Acquirers or targets with status of ‘Subsidiary’ or ‘Joint Venture’  95 422 
    
Less:  Deals not financed (wholly/partly) by private equity firms  244 178 
    
Less:  Information not available for the last 3 years  49 129 
   
 Final Total of Private Equity deals   129 
 
 
3.3 Variable Definition  
The following valuation variables are used throughout the thesis:  
Enterprise Value Ratio (EV): EV is used as a measure of valuation. It is measured as 
enterprise value at time ‘t’ divided by enterprise value at time ‘t-2’. Enterprise value is 
calculated as market capitalization plus debt minus cash. Following Weir et al. (2005b), I 
expect EV to exhibit a negative relationship with the likelihood of going private.  
Q Ratio (Q Ratio): Q ratio is used as a second measure of valuation. It is defined as 
market capitalization divided by total assets. Following Weir et al. (2005a), I expect Q 
ratio to exhibit a negative relationship with the likelihood of going private.  
Market-to-Book ratio (MTB): MTB is used as a third measure of valuation. It is 
calculated as market value of the company divided by book value of the company’s 
 45 
 
assets. MTB is considered as an indicator of the growth prospect of a firm (Evans et al. 
2005; Chapple et al. 2010). As firms with low MTB are more likely to be undervalued, I 
expect MTB to exhibit a negative relationship with the likelihood of going private.  
 
To estimate information asymmetry, four variables are used to capture the information 
environment of a firm. Leland and Pyle (1977) and Bharath and Dittmar (2010) show 
that smaller and younger firms have substantial difficulty in signaling the value of their 
firms. Firms with low visibility and low institutional ownership are also likely to go 
private. Following Bharath and Dittmar (2010), I choose total assets and revenues of a 
firm as proxies of information asymmetry. Bharath and Dittmar (2010) argue that the 
total assets and sales revenues proxy for a host of factors that relate to investor 
recognition and information production in a public market. Their argument relies on the 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) duplicative information production model in which the 
information production costs are inversely related to larger firms. Hence, I choose the 
following variables as my information asymmetry variables:  
Age of firm (LNAGE): LNAGE is the natural logarithm of number of years between the 
firms’ IPO and being taken over.  
Total Assets (LNTA): LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets.  
Sales Revenue (LNSA): LNSA is the natural logarithm of sales revenue. 
Institutional Shareholding (INST): INST measures the number of ordinary shares held 
directly and indirectly by the institutional holders. The institutional shareholding is 
determined from the annual reports of the sample companies by adding up the 
shareholding of different institutions. All individual shareholdings were excluded from 
this category. It is calculated as the absolute number of ordinary shares held by the 
institutional holders divided by the total number of ordinary shares outstanding and it is 
expressed as a percentage. Following Bharath and Dittmar (2010), I expect INST to 
exhibit a negative relationship with the extent of asymmetric information.  
 
For the incentive alignment and monitoring mechanism, I use the following variables:  
Managerial Share Ownership (MSO): MSO measures the number of ordinary shares 
held directly and indirectly by the management of the company. If any person is a 
member of both management and board, his/her shareholding is considered to be MSO. 
It is calculated as the absolute number of ordinary shares held by the management team 
divided by the total number of ordinary shares outstanding and it is expressed as a 
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percentage. Following Halpern et al. (1999) and Weir et al. (2005a), I expect MSO to 
exhibit a positive relationship with the likelihood of going private.  
Board Share Ownership (BSO): BSO measures the number of ordinary shares held 
directly and indirectly by the company board. If any person is a member of both 
management and board, his/her shareholding is considered to be MSO and thereby 
excluded from BSO. BSO is calculated as the absolute number of ordinary shares held by 
the company board divided by the total number of ordinary shares outstanding and it is 
expressed as percentage. Following Weir et al. (2005a) and Weir and Wright (2006), I 
expect BSO to exhibit a positive relationship with the likelihood of going private.  
Board Independence (BIND): BIND is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
independent non-executive directors represent equal to or less than 50% on the board and 
0 otherwise. CGC defines an independent non-executive director as being independent of 
management and free from any business or other relationship that can hinder the exercise 
of their free and independent judgment, and their ability to act in the best interests of the 
company as a whole. CGC recommends a majority of the board members should be 
independent non-executive directors to ensure the board is independent (CGC, 2003). 
Following Weir et al. (2005a), Weir and Wright (2006) and Florackis and Ozkan 
(2009a), I expect firms going private to have fewer independent non-executive directors.  
CEO-Chair Duality (DUAL): DUAL is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
posts of CEO and Chairman are combined and 0 if they are separated. Following Weir et 
al. (2005a) and Weir and Wright (2006), I expect that firms going private to be more 
likely to combine the posts.  
Board Size (BRDSZ): BRDSZ represents the number of directors on the company 
board. Following Florackis and Ozkan (2009a and 2009b), I expect BRDSZ to exhibit a 
positive relationship with the likelihood of firms going private.  
Takeover Threat (THREAT): THREAT is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
there is a takeover bid and/or speculation on the target firms within the last 24 months 
prior to the actual takeover and 0 otherwise. The information on bid and/or the 
speculation of a bid were identified from the ‘ASX Announcement Section’ from the 
DatAnalysis database by a company-by-company basis. Following Eddey et al. (1996), 
Evans et al. (2005) and Weir and Wright (2006), I expect a positive relationship between 
takeover threat and the likelihood of going private.  
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My control variables are drawn from prior literature of firm-specific accounting variables 
that may also contribute to the going private decision. Specifically, following Weir et al. 
(2005a and 2005b) and Evans et al. (2005), I select the following control variables:  
Leverage Ratio (LVG): LVG is a measure of the debt condition of the firm. It is 
calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. I expect LVG to exhibit a negative 
relationship with the likelihood of going private (Weir et al. 2005a and 2005b; Evans et 
al. 2005).  
Current Ratio (CURR): CURR is a measure of the liquidity conditions of the firms. It 
is calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. Following Carroll et al. 
(1988) and Evans et al. (2005), I expect CURR to exhibit a positive relationship with the 
likelihood of going private.  
Relative Free Cash Flow (FCF): FCF measures a company’s free cash flow. FCF is 
defined as free cash flow divided by total assets. Free cash is calculated as operating cash 
flow minus interest, taxes and dividends (Kieschnick 1998; Halpern et al. 1999; Weir et 
al. 2005a, 2005b). Following Evans et al. (2005) and Chapple et al. (2010), I expect FCF 
to exhibit a positive relationship with the likelihood of going private.  
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX): CAPEX measures net capital expenditure. It is defined 
as spending on new buildings, property and equipment minus depreciation, divided by 
the book value of total assets expressed as a percentage (Weir and Wright, 2006). 
Following Opler and Titman (1993) and Weir and Wright (2006), I expect CAPEX to 
exhibit a negative relationship with the likelihood of going private.  
 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample   
Table 3.2 below exhibits the descriptive statistics of the whole sample within the sample 
period. EV, Q ratio and MTB are used as valuation measures in this study. EV has a 
mean value of 2.79 for which no Australian evidence is available. However, the UK 
evidence (Weir et al. 2005b) on the mean value of EV of 1.27 suggests that the enterprise 
value of Australian firms is higher in general. The mean value of Q ratio is 2.34. 
Australian evidence is also not available for Q ratio. The UK evidence (Weir et al. 
2005a), however, suggests that the mean value of Q ratio ranges from 0.79 for going 
private firms to 1.08 for firms that do not go private. This suggests that the Q ratio value 
of Australian firms is also higher in general. MTB has a mean value of 2.77. Chapple et 
al. (2010) suggests that the mean value of MTB ranges from 2.07 for PE firms to 3.25 
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for Non-PE firms. This suggests that the sample firms used in this study also have a 
similar pattern in terms of their MTB.  
 
LNAGE, LNTA, LNSA and INST are the information variables in my study. The mean 
value of LNAGE of 2.12 with a very low variation shows firms included in the sample 
have not been listed on the ASX for a longer time before they are subject to the 
takeovers. LNSA and LNTA show a similar pattern of low variation in their mean 
values. The INST shows, on average, Australian firms have around 34 percent 
institutional holding, consistent with Nottage (2008) who finds Australian takeover target 
firms generally have 35 to 50 percent institutional shareholdings.  
 
MSO variable indicates an average of nine percent shareholdings by the management of 
Australian takeover target firms. It is interesting to see that the maximum level of MSO 
is 76.4 percent and the minimum level of MSO is only 0.25 percent. Evans et al. (2005) 
suggest that the Australian firms, on an average, have 14 to 16 percent managerial 
ownership. BSO shows a mean value of seven percent. This means that the board 
members of the Australian target firms do not hold a large portion of ordinary shares in 
comparison to their management. BIND variable shows that 43.4 percent of Australian 
target firms do not have a majority of independent non-executive directors on their 
board. The UK evidence (Weir and Wright, 2006) suggests that on an average 61 percent 
of the UK target firms do not have board independence. This suggests that Australian 
target firms have more independence on their board. The mean value of DUAL variable 
shows that only around ten percent of the target firms have duality in their board, which 
indicates that the Australian target firms, in most cases, separate the post of CEO and 
Board Chair. On the other hand, twenty percent of the UK target firms have duality 
(Weir and Wright, 2006). A mean value of around six of BRDSZ indicates that 
Australian target firms do not have larger boards. Over a third of the Australian target 
firms are subject to takeover speculation before they are taken over. UK evidence 
suggests a similar picture (Weir and Wright, 2006) that around 31 percent of the UK 
target firms experience takeover rumors or threats within 15 months prior to their 
takeover. Takeover threat is considered as an external control mechanism (Lehn and 
Poulsen, 1989) and is expected to play their role when internal control mechanism is 
weak. This indicates a possibility that the market for corporate control might be active in 
Australia.  
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Whole Sample 
 
This table shows the basic characteristics of all the firms included in the study. EV is the enterprise value 
ratio calculated as enterprise value at time t divided by enterprise value at time t-2. Q Ratio is market 
capitalization divided by total assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio calculated as market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. LNAGE is the natural log of the number of years between the firms’ 
IPO and their being taken over. LNTA is the natural log of total assets. LNSA is the natural log of sales. 
INST is the percentage of ordinary shares held by the institutional holders. MSO is the percentage of 
ordinary shares held by management. BSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by the board members. 
BIND is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if majority of the board members are independent non-
executive directors and 0 otherwise. DUAL is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if CEO and Board-
Chair are the same person and 0 otherwise. BRDSZ is the number of directors on the company board. 
THREAT is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the target firm faces takeover threat and/or 
speculation of being taken over within the last 24 months of actual takeover and 0 otherwise. LVG is the 
leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. CURR is the current ratio calculated as 
current assets divided by current liabilities. FCF is the free cash flow divided by total assets. Free cash 
flow is calculated as operating cash flow minus interest, taxes and dividends. CAPEX is the spending on 
new buildings, property and equipment minus depreciation, divided by the book value of total assets. 
 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
EV 2.797 1.938 22.87 0.035 2.864 
Q RATIO 2.341 1.083 65.56 0.055 5.057 
MTB 2.771 1.571 37.24 0.161 3.521 
LNAGE 2.116 2.197 4.159 0 0.908 
LNSA 17.67 18.006 24.008 9.531 2.781 
LNTA 18.54 18.607 23.12 12.75 1.889 
INST 0.341 0.313 0.848 0.003 0.189 
MSO 0.091 0.051 0.764 0.003 0.122 
BSO 0.067 0.026 0.878 0.0002 0.117 
BIND 0.434 0 1 0 0.497 
DUAL 0.101 0 1 0 0.302 
BRDSZ 5.779 6 14 3 1.797 
THREAT 0.364 0 1 0 0.482 
LVG 0.437 0.421 2.169 0.005 0.324 
CURR 2.714 1.655 100.85 0.111 6.806 
FCF 0.068 0.102 1.265 -3.174 0.351 
CAPEX 0.097 0.041 1.871 1.34E-05 0.182 
Observations  258 
 
 
The mean value of leverage ratio is 44 percent with a low level of standard deviation. 
Evans et al. (2005) suggest that the leverage ratio in Australian target firm ranges from 
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31 percent for remaining public firms to 64 percent for going private firms, while 
Chapple et al. (2010) suggest that the average debt-to-equity ratio in Australian PE target 
firms is 43 percent. Current ratio has a mean value of 2.71 with a very high level of 
standard deviation. This is consistent with Chapple et al. (2010) who suggest that current 
ratio in Australian target firms varies from 1.43 to 4.48 for PE and Non-PE target firms. 
The relative FCF has a mean value of 0.07 and this picture is also similar to that of 
Chapple et al. (2010) who suggest that Australian PE target firms have an average 
relative FCF of 0.06. CAPEX has a mean value of 0.09 with a low standard deviation. 
This is also similar to the evidence presented by Chapple et al. (2010) who suggest that 
Australian target firms have relative capital expenditure between 0.06 and 0.07.  
 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary   
This chapter presents a comprehensive description of the sample selection and data 
collection process. The variables, which have been selected for this study, are also 
defined and explained in the chapter. Finally, descriptive statistics of the sample have 
been presented. For the purpose of empirical investigation, the final sample in the study 
consists of 129 PE and 129 traditional takeover target firms, which means that 258 target 
firms in successful takeovers have been included in the sample from ASX. The following 
three chapters present three different papers on three different aspects of private equity 
that I examine in this study in the context of Australia.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY, UNDERVALUATION 
AND PRIVATE EQUITY   
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In February 2007, a consortium of private equity investors known as APA launched a 
private takeover bid for Qantas, one of the largest and best known public corporations in 
Australia. Facing the bid, the Qantas board recommended its acceptance to the 
shareholders, citing low share market valuation as the primary reason. In a letter to the 
shareholders Qantas chairperson Margaret Jackson indicated that the private equity led 
bid offer was at a substantial premium on the existing share price range and said, 
"Qantas has delivered year-on-year profits, growth and diversification. But while the 
business had prospered, the Qantas share price has not. The offer is the best available 
option to enable Qantas shareholders to realize significant value for their investment."3 
Although the bid later collapsed due to mounting pressures of political concerns and rival 
bidding, it brought to the fore the most often cited reason for a public corporation going 
private: undervaluation.  
 
The true worth of a corporation is plagued with the problem of information asymmetry 
between management and outsiders. The maximum value that can be realized from the 
assets in place and available future investment opportunities is difficult to determine due 
to lack of information and the ensuing information asymmetry. Managers, who are likely 
to have superior private information, often perceive that the share price is undervalued 
and does not reflect the true potential of their firm. The information asymmetry and the 
concomitant undervaluation problem are further exacerbated in the capital market. For 
example, it is difficult to use the equity market to finance available investments since 
low share price is a deterrent to attracting the interest of institutional shareholders and 
fund managers. The lack of institutional interest in itself creates trading illiquidity in the 
equity market (Bharath and Dittmar, 2010). All these provide incentives to both 
                                                 
3 Letter to Shareholders, Qantas Corporation, 10 February 2007. 
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managers and private equity investors to take the firm private in order to ‘capture the full 
value’ of an ongoing public corporation. The anecdotal evidence of the private equity 
takeover attempt of Qantas in 2007 typifies the undervaluation hypothesis as a 
motivation for private equity takeovers.  
 
Despite the major role of information asymmetry in valuation and its subsequent effect 
on private equity takeovers, the extant research in this area has been limited. The only 
paper in this area, in Australia, is by Chapple et al. (2010) with a focus on an exploratory 
investigation into characteristics of private equity transactions. Beyond the research 
evidence available for the Australian market, the general nature of information 
asymmetry and undervaluation and their interplay in the private equity context remains 
an unexplored area. In this paper, I investigate the information asymmetry and 
undervaluation of the public firm as a rationale for going private.  
 
Besides the need to understand the role of information asymmetry and undervaluation, 
there are specific important reasons for studying private equity takeovers in the 
Australian context. Private equity investment activity in Australia has grown to record 
levels in recent years. According to the 2010 yearbook of the AVCAL, private equity 
funds raised in Australia have increased from $585 million in 2001 to $1,456 million in 
2010 with commensurate levels of growth over the same years in going-private deals. 
The growth and effect of these transactions in capital markets has attracted regulatory 
concerns in Australia with the Australian Senate holding a parliamentary inquiry into the 
private equity investment4. Despite the development and ensuing interest in capital 
markets in going private activities, there has not been any proper analysis of what 
motivates going private transactions in Australia. Given the size and growth of this 
market in Australia, it is important to understand such motivations.  
 
Prior research on private equity, in general, has been exclusively limited to US and UK 
samples. There has been no systematic research on the rationale for Australian firms 
opting for private equity takeover while a vigorous private equity market has been 
                                                 
4Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Private Equity investment in Australia, 
August, 2007.  
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developed in Australia since the 1990s5. It is also questionable whether the evidences 
applicable to US and UK private equity transaction studies can be generalized in the 
Australian context. First, the US private equity market is characterized by the relative 
ease of credit availability, especially via junk bond and mezzanine financing. In contrast, 
the Australian market is characterized with a lesser depth of financing choices and the 
size of financing tends to be smaller. Since the sources of funds in the US and UK 
settings have different characteristics (flexibility, terms of maturity, rates and covenants) 
to those in Australia, it is likely that these differences will have effect on all aspects of 
going private deals (Renneboog et al. 2007). Second, the Australian takeover laws do not 
specifically address the potential for conflicts in any takeovers, including PTP takeovers. 
In the US and UK, specific rules have been established to govern going private 
transactions. For example, rule 13e-3 under the s13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act in 
the US requires detailed disclosure regarding the fairness of the transaction and imposes 
binding wait periods before consummation of the takeover. In Australia, under the 
Corporations Act 2001, private equity transactions are viewed as any other takeover 
requiring disclosure only after the acquirer raises its stake in the target firm above the 
threshold level of twenty percent (Hill, 2005 and 2010). For these reasons, a 
comprehensive study on motivation for Australian firms going private provides an 
important contribution to the private equity literature.  
 
My analysis reveals that market undervaluation is the dominant factor in the likelihood 
that firms will be involved in PE transactions in Australia. Information asymmetry per se 
is not a sufficient condition for firms going private but valuation measures are. 
Regardless of the measure of information asymmetry used, I find that once valuation is 
introduced as an explanatory factor, the likelihood of private equity takeover (as opposed 
to a public takeover) changes significantly. A similar result is obtained for alternative 
measures of valuation. In other results, I find that the level of institutional holdings and 
private equity transactions are negatively related.  
 
The next section of the paper is a discussion of the underlying factors and interplay of 
information asymmetry and undervaluation for going private firms. Section 3 explains 
                                                 
5Chapple et al. (2010) provide an exploratory study of features of Australian going private firms with a smaller number 
of observations. 
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data and empirical models. Section 4 is discussion of results and analysis. Section 5 is 
conclusion.    
 
4.2 Information Asymmetry, Undervaluation and Going-Private  
Private equity takeovers, in their most common form, involve a PTP transaction which 
takes place when a publicly quoted company is taken over by a specialist fund or 
consortium and the target company goes private through a delisting from the stock 
market (Frankfurter and Gunay, 1992). The reasons and decision to go private are 
complex with myriad issues such as information, liquidity, control, agency and other 
considerations in interplay. In this section I draw upon extant theories to focus on the 
information asymmetry aspects of private equity takeovers to build a testable model of 
how information asymmetry via undervaluation (or mis-valuation) affects the going-
private decision.  
 
A key aspect of a firm’s decision to go public via initial public offering and stay listed on 
the stock exchange is to make information about the firm available to the outside 
investors. Nonetheless, several information asymmetry models highlight the costs 
associated with information production and dissemination which can lead to reversing 
the decision to stay public and push the firm to go private. In the Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri (1999) model, costs are related to duplicative information production in an 
initial public offering setting when firms are faced with a large pool of outside investors. 
These costs are ultimately borne by the firm. In order to reduce this cost, a firm may 
choose to go private if production costs of outside investors increase or the stock price 
does not reflect accurate information (Bharath and Dittmar, 2010). A related issue in this 
context is a firm’s product market environment and its effect on information 
dissemination (Campbell, 1981). If disclosure requirements in a public market are likely 
to force a firm to divulge its competitive information in the product market, they will 
become an important consideration for the firm to opt out of the public capital market 
and go private.  
 
The asymmetric information environment between insiders and outside investors in a 
public capital market is partially mitigated by signaling methods used by the insiders. 
However, information signaling coupled with moral hazard creates the well-known 
adverse selection or ‘lemon’ problem for all investors (Akerlof, 1970). The adverse 
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selection problem imposes an unavoidable cost on all firms by lowering the average 
observed firm value. This cost is particularly severe for young, less well-known firms 
which suffer from less market visibility and poor investor recognition. Trying to convey 
information regarding the future investment opportunity set through credible signaling 
for these public firms is likely to be more costly than for similar firms in private hands. 
Thus, firms with smaller, younger and lower visibility profiles are likely to be main 
candidates in facing excessive adverse selection costs and, thus, are likely to prefer to go 
private to avoid these costs.   
 
In private equity takeovers, the material effect of information asymmetry is the perceived 
undervaluation by the insiders or the private equity consortiums or by both. The effects 
of information asymmetry are reflected in readily observable and comparative valuation 
metrics that are likely to act as key drivers of private equity takeovers. It is important to 
note here that I do not distinguish between private equity takeovers initiated by the 
management and that by outsiders. The primary focus is the role of information 
asymmetry and undervaluation per se that is likely to bring forth these takeovers, as 
illustrated in the anecdotal evidence of Qantas takeover. Thus, in this study I argue and 
empirically test the view that firms that are undervalued by the market as a result of 
information asymmetry are likely to attract private equity bids.  
 
It is further argued that levels of information asymmetry play a significant role in 
predicting private takeovers, more so than does the low valuation. Although valuation 
metrics are the triggers of private equity takeovers, the degree of information asymmetry 
is the basis of undervaluation. Indeed, some private equity firms pride themselves in 
creating value for their investors by investing in relatively ‘little understood’ firms 
(Metrick and Yasuda, 2011). Regardless of valuation measures, which are relative and 
transient, firms with a higher degree of information asymmetry should expect to have a 
higher private takeover probability. Thus, it is proposed that, in general, the relation 
between undervaluation and the likelihood of private equity takeover is stronger at high 
levels of information asymmetry. The above interaction between information asymmetry 
and undervaluation has not been previously considered in the private equity literature.  In 
this sense, the current study potentially provides a more comprehensive and rigorous test 
of the undervaluation hypothesis concerning private equity takeovers.  
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4.3 Research Design and Data     
The sample consists of all successful going private transactions involving companies 
listed on the ASX and made between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 2010. The 
sample is formed by utilizing a variety of databases and resources. Specifically the initial 
sample of all takeovers is collected from the SDC Platinum ANZ M&A Database. 
Initially a total of 517 successful going private bids are identified and the sample is 
screened for bids involving an acquirer with a status of ‘Joint Venture’ or ‘Subsidiaries’. 
My primary sample of going private bids are considered as a PE led bid only when it is 
financed wholly or partly by a PE firm to ensure that the firm has indeed become private 
and acquiring companies are not affiliated with public corporations. The going private 
transactions are then re-confirmed via the list of ASX delisted firms from Aspect 
Huntley Morning Star DatAnalysis Database. This list of PE takeovers is then confirmed 
through the Bureau Van-Dijk ORBIS Global Database. This process yields 129 firms as 
the final sample. Annual accounting information is obtained from Aspect Huntley 
Morning Star FinAnalysis database. In addition, institutional shareholding is collected 
from the company annual reports on a company-by-company basis.  
 
Table 4.1 provides the frequency distribution of PTP deals in Australia in terms of the 
number of deals. It shows that a total of 4546 completed deals took place in ASX. A total 
of 517 completed going private transactions have taken place in Australia within the past 
21 years, constituting around 12 percent of all completed deals. As is mentioned in Evans 
et al. (2005), approximately ten percent of all deals in Australia were going private deals. 
With a steady increase, the going private deals become around twelve percent in recent 
times. Stromberg (2007) notes that, going private deals increased considerably after 
2000. Table 4.1 suggests similar evidence for Australia where the majority of PTP deals 
took place between 2001 and 2007. Panel B shows the screening process of selecting the 
private equity deals.  
 
Table 4.1 panel C classifies the PE takeover firms into various industry groupings 
showing the number of firms in each industry group. ASX divides its listed companies 
into 25 different industry groups, including sub-groups. Prior Australian studies (Evans 
et al. 2005; Eddey et al. 1996) suggest that the financial sector had the greatest number 
of going private deals in Australia. Chapple et al. (2010) find a very low concentration of 
Australian PE firms in the financial and mining sectors. The evidence in Table 4.1 does 
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not agree with Chapple et al. (2010) in terms of the mining sector, but shows a similar 
pattern in terms of the financial sector. A possible reason for these differences could be 
the differences in the time period covered by these studies. However, it is apparent that 
during the last two decades, the PE firms in Australia did not concentrate in any 
particular industry sector. This can be seen from Table 4.1 in that out of 25 industry 
groupings available in ASX, PE transactions takes place in 16 industry sectors. This is 
consistent with the idea that PE firms in Australia are ‘opportunistic’ and do not seem to 
concentrate on any particular industry sector for their target firms (Chapple et al. 2010).  
 
Table 4.1: Private Equity Transactions in Australia, 1990 – 2010   
 
Panel A: Annual Frequency of all completed Going Private Transactions 
 
 All Non-PTP Deals All Going Private Only Private Equity 
    
Year Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
1990 - 1992 171 4.24 11 2.13 0 0.00 
1993 - 1995 340 8.44 34 6.58 1 0.77 
1996 - 1998 462 11.47 40 7.74 5 3.88 
1999 - 2001 341 8.46 51 9.86 19 14.73 
2002 - 2004 777 19.29 93 17.98 33 25.58 
2005 - 2007 799 19.83 133 25.73 52 40.31 
2008 - 2010 1139 28.27 155 29.98 19 14.73 
       
Total 4029 100% 517 100% 129 100% 
 
 
Panel B: Private Equity Deals in Australia 
 
  Sub-total  Total 
All PTP Deals   517  
    
Less:  Acquirers or targets with status of ‘Subsidiary’ or ‘Joint Venture’  95 422 
Less:  Deals not financed (wholly/partly) by private equity firms  244 178 
Less:  Information not available for the last 3 years  49 129 
    
 Final Total of Private Equity deals   129 
 
 
Panel C: Industry Concentration of Private Equity Transactions  
 
Industry   PE Deals  Industry   PE Deals  
    
Mining  22 Transportation Services  4 
Oil and Gas exploration  4 Communication Supplies/Services   12 
Equipment Production/Supplies  7 Media, Audio/Video Distribution  8 
Construction Services  7 Amusement/Recreation Services  7 
Food, Drink and Kindered Products  6 Real Estate Investment  9 
Firms, Dealers, Exchanges  8 Miscellaneous Trade  11 
Financial Institutions  2  Business Services  13 
Health and Allied Services  6 Hotels and Motels  4 
Total Completed PE Deals: 129  
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A key aspect of the proposed hypotheses in the earlier section is the uniqueness of the 
private equity takeover rationale from an undervaluation perspective. Since takeovers by 
public companies are governed by similar aspects of valuation and information 
asymmetry, I construct a matching sample of firms which are taken over in the public 
market via acquisition by a publicly listed firm and in which their assets stayed public. I 
term this set of firms as ‘Non PE’ firms and use comparative analysis throughout the 
study6. For each PE firm, I use a two-dimensional scoring method to match to a non-PE 
firm. I first match the PE firm in the same industry sector that has a public-to-public 
transaction and, secondly, in the same year as the PE firm.  
 
The first set of regression analysis involves testing the association between information 
variables and valuation metrics. If information asymmetry plays any role in valuation of 
firms, specifically in order to reduce valuation, it should be observed in a cross sectional 
regression as follows:  
Vali = α + β1Asyi + β2Coni + ɛi    (1) 
Vali and Asyi are the valuation and information asymmetry measures of a firm i with 
Coni representing a vector of control variables. I construct three valuation metrics that 
are relevant in the private equity literature and thought to trigger private equity 
takeovers: Ratio of Enterprise Value (EV), Q ratio (Q-ratio) and Market-to-Book Ratio 
(MTB). Following Weir et al. (2005b), I compute the ratio of enterprise values in year t 
to that in year t-2. Enterprise value is measured as market capitalization plus debt minus 
cash. The EV measures the relative changes in valuation which are likely to act as a 
catalyst for private equity takeovers. Further, the enterprise value is a key metric for 
private equity investors and funds to assess the value of a firm. I also use Q ratio as 
another measure of valuation following Morck et al. (1988) and Weir et al. (2005a). Q 
ratio, a widely used measure of firm valuation, is calculated as market capitalization 
divided by total assets. MTB is also a well-known valuation metric that reflects stock 
price valuation relative to its intrinsic book value. Firms with a low MTB ratio are 
considered to have low growth prospects and consequently can be regarded as 
undervalued by the market and can impact on the decision to go private (Evans et al. 
2005). I measure MTB as the most recent available annual market value of the firm’s 
equity divided by the book-value of assets.  
                                                 
6 Matching samples have been used in studies of private equity transactions.  See for example, Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989) and Weir et al. (2005a, 2005b). 
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For the information asymmetry measures, I choose four variables that capture the 
information environment of a firm. Leland and Pyle (1977) show that young firms have 
substantial difficulty in signaling the value of their firms and face significant adverse 
selection cost. Firms with low visibility and low institutional ownership are likely to go 
private to avoid these costs. In a recent paper, Bharath and Dittmar (2010) find that these 
factors are important drivers of a firms’ decision to go private. Hence I choose the age of 
a firm (years subsequent to its IPO on the ASX) and institutional holding as my 
information variables. Following Bharath and Dittmar (2010) I also choose total assets 
and revenues of a firm as proxies of information asymmetry. Bharath and Dittmar (2010) 
argue that the total assets and sales revenues proxy for a host of factors that relate to 
investor recognition and information production in a public market. Their argument 
relies on the Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) duplicative information production model 
in which the information production costs are inversely related to larger firms.  
 
A reasonable question at this point is why I do not use earnings based measures of firm 
information asymmetry such as analyst forecasts and the earnings forecast dispersion.  
First, my focus is on cross-sectional variation of information asymmetry and its 
relationship with the firm-level undervaluation that triggers the going private decision. 
The earnings forecast based information asymmetry measures are more suitable in 
capturing the time varying asymmetric information properties (Autore and Kovacs, 
2004). Second, firms in the sample exhibit very low analyst following, if any at all, with 
very low institutional holding. Given the premise that going private decisions are related 
to high information asymmetry, it is not surprising that the analyst followings are sparse 
in my sample. For these reasons I do not use earnings forecast based measures of 
information asymmetry.  
 
The control variables are drawn from prior literature of firm-specific accounting 
variables that may also contribute to the going private decision. Specifically, following 
Weir et al. (2005b) I select leverage, current ratio, free cash flow and capital expenditure 
to be the control variables. Below I list all the variables and their measurement.  
Enterprise Value Ratio (EV): EV ratio is used as a measure of valuation. It is 
calculated as enterprise value at the year of takeover transaction, ‘t’, divided by the 
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enterprise value at time ‘t-2’. Enterprise value is measured as market capitalization plus 
debt minus cash.  
Q Ratio (Q-Ratio): Q ratio is the second measure of valuation. It is calculated as market 
capitalization divided by total assets.  
Market-to-Book Ratio (MTB): Market-to-Book ratio is the third measure of valuation. 
It is calculated as market value of the company divided by book value of the company’s 
assets.  
Age of firm (LNAGE): LNAGE is the natural logarithm of number of years between the 
firms’ IPO and being taken over.  
Total Assets (LNTA): LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets.  
Sales Revenue (LNSA): LNSA is the natural logarithm of sales revenue. 
Institutional Holding (INST): INST is the number of ordinary shares held by the 
institutional holders expressed as a percentage of total shares outstanding.  
Leverage (LVG): LVG is a measure of the debt condition of the firm. It is calculated as 
total liabilities divided by total assets.  
Current ratio (CURR): CURR is a measure of the liquidity condition of the firm. It is 
calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities.  
Relative Free Cash Flow (FCF): FCF is measured as operating cash flow minus 
interest, taxes and dividends. Relative FCF is found as free cash flow divided by total 
assets.  
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX): CAPEX measures a company’s net capital 
expenditure. It is defined as spending on new buildings, property and equipment minus 
depreciation, divided by the book value of total assets. 
 
I use logistic regression to model a firm’s decision to go private. In the first set of logit 
regressions, I estimate the probability Pi of a firm going private as:  
Li = Ln [Pi/(1-Pi)] = α + β1Asyi + β2Coni + ɛi      (2) 
I then test the joint effect of information asymmetry and valuation measures on going 
private decision through the second logit regression as follows:  
Li = Ln [Pi/(1-Pi)] = α + β1Asyi + β2Asyi*Vali + β3Coni + ɛi   (3) 
 
4.4 Univariate Analysis  
Table 4.2 shows the results of univariate tests of the proposition that firms going private 
through PE takeovers experienced declining market valuation compared to traditional 
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takeover firms. The mean values of LNSA and INST of PEs are significantly different 
from those of the Non-PEs at the one percent level; while the mean value of LNTA of 
PEs is significantly different from those of Non-PEs at the five percent level. The mean 
values of the EV, Q ratio and MTB of PEs are significantly different from those of Non-
PEs at the one percent level. In addition, the mean values of the LVG and CURR of the 
PE sample also show a significant difference from those of the Non-PE sample. The 
mean values of FCF and CAPEX for the PE and Non-PE samples are not significantly 
different. The median values of LNSA, INST, EV, Q ratio, MTB, LVG and CURR of 
PEs are also significantly different from those of Non-PE target firms at the one percent 
level. For both the PE and Non-PE target firms, the results of the t-tests and z-tests show 
that there are significant differences in mean values of the characteristics of these firms. 
These univariate results, therefore, support the hypotheses and show that Australian PE 
target firms have different firm attributes.   
 
Table 4.2: Univariate Analysis of PE and Non-PE Samples    
 
Table 4.2 shows the results of t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum Mann-Whitney test to identify if the mean and median 
values of different variables of PE and Non-PE sample target firms are significantly different from each other. The 
sample is drawn over the period from 1990 to 2010 and as in Table 4.1. LNAGE is the natural log of the number of 
years between the firms’ IPO and their being taken over. LNTA is the natural log of total assets. LNSA is the natural 
log of sales. INST is the number of ordinary shares held by the institutional holders expressed as percentage of total 
shares outstanding. EV is the enterprise value ratio calculated as enterprise value at time t divided by enterprise value 
at time t–2. Q Ratio is market capitalization divided by total assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio calculated as 
market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. LVG is the leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities 
divided by total assets. CURR is the current ratio calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. FCF is the 
free cash flow divided by total assets. Free cash flow is calculated as operating cash flow minus interest, taxes and 
dividends. CAPEX is the spending on new buildings, property and equipment minus depreciation, divided by the book 
value of total assets. ** indicates p < 0.01 and * indicates p < 0.05.  
 
 
 Mean   Median 
 PE    Non-PE  t-stat p-value  PE   Non-PE  z-stat  p-value 
          
LNAGE  2.110 2.12  0.13 0.551   2.190 2.190    0.13 0.899 
LNTA  18.76 18.32 -1.89* 0.029  18.82 18.27  -1.89 0.058 
LNSA  18.08 17.25 -2.42** 0.008  18.35 17.48  -2.25* 0.024 
INST  0.256 0.424  7.92** 0.000   0.218 0.405   7.46** 0.000 
          
EV  2.009 3.586  4.60** 0.000   1.163 2.725   8.82** 0.000 
Q Ratio  1.026  3.656  4.32** 0.000  0.669 1.736 7.79** 0.000 
MTB  1.034 4.508  9.10** 0.000   1.050 3.330   13.33** 0.000 
          
LVG  0.496 0.380 -2.91** 0.002   0.465 0.336  -3.64** 0.000 
CURR  4.095 1.332 -3.32** 0.000   2.25  1.23  -8.80** 0.000 
FCF 0.100 0.037 -1.45 0.074  0.104 0.093  -0.57 0.569 
CAPEX  0.085 0.109  1.07 0.142   0.041 0.041   0.20 0.845 
          
Observations  258  
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4.5 Multicollinearity Test  
High correlations among independent variables can indicate the possibility of 
multicollinearity which means that the resultant analysis may not give valid results about 
individual predictors. As a result, variables having multicollinearity should not be 
included in the same regression equation (Gujarati, 2005).  Hair et al. (1995) suggest that 
a bivariate correlation of around 0.9 and above is a strong indicator of multicollinearity 
in a model; while Tabachnik and Fidell (1996) contend that bivariate correlations over 
0.7 may suggest redundant variables in a model. Licht (1998) argues that a multiple 
regression model can have multicollinearity when the bivariate correlation value 
becomes 0.8 or above. Table 4.3 shows the correlation matrix for the independent 
variables generated through the Spearman and Pearson methods. The correlation 
coefficient of 0.791 (Pearson) between MTB and Q ratio seems to be very high and 
accordingly would not be used in the same regression. The correlation matrix does not 
exhibit any other significantly high level of correlation among the independent variables. 
Accordingly, it is not needed to exclude any of the variables from the models.  
 
Table 4.3: Correlation among Independent Variables   
 
Table 4.3 shows the correlation coefficients among the independent variables. The top diagonal numbers are Spearman 
correlation coefficients, while the bottom diagonal numbers are Pearson correlation coefficients. LNAGE is the natural 
log of the number of years between the firms’ IPO and their being taken over. LNTA is the natural log of total assets. 
LNSA is the natural log of sales. INST is the number of ordinary shares held by the institutional holders expressed as 
percentage of total shares outstanding. EV is the enterprise value ratio calculated as enterprise value at time t divided 
by enterprise value at time t–2. Q Ratio is market capitalization divided by total assets. MTB is the market-to-book 
ratio calculated as market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. LVG is the leverage ratio calculated as 
total liabilities divided by total assets. CURR is the current ratio calculated as current assets divided by current 
liabilities. FCF is the free cash flow divided by total assets. Free cash flow is calculated as operating cash flow minus 
interest, taxes and dividends. CAPEX is the spending on new buildings, property and equipment minus depreciation, 
divided by the book value of total assets. 
  
 LNAGE LNTA LNSA INST EV Q Ratio MTB LVG CURR FCF CAPEX 
LNAGE 1 0.117 0.165 0.099 -0.059 -0.084 0.029 0.099 0.019 0.068 0.077 
LNTA 0.153 1 0.698 0.278 -0.118 -0.306 -0.109 0.255 0.031 0.469 -0.141 
LNSA 0.193 0.672 1 0.098 -0.086 -0.323 -0.136 0.385 0.008 0.592 -0.083 
INST 0.097 0.257 0.079 1 0.203 0.212 0.389 -0.083 -0.316 0.047 0.016 
EV -0.091 -0.098 -0.083 0.041 1 0.234 0.425 -0.165 -0.296 -0.056 0.007 
Q Ratio -0.103 -0.368 -0.276 0.075 0.049 1 0.613 -0.397 -0.217 -0.124 0.235 
MTB -0.044 -0.212 -0.154 0.193 0.166 0.791 1 -0.209 -0.495 0.013 0.113 
LVG 0.098 0.092 0.261 -0.085 -0.094 -0.046 0.031 1 -0.024 0.217 -0.149 
CURR -0.041 -0.072 -0.093 -0.182 -0.079 -0.043 -0.105 -0.035 1 -0.091 0.068 
FCF 0.085 0.422 0.452 -0.008 -0.029 -0.641 -0.452 -0.031 -0.043 1 0.039 
CAPEX 0.021 -0.339 -0.275 0.079 -0.036 0.588 0.362 -0.022 -0.001 -0.358 1 
Observations  258  
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4.6 Information Asymmetry and Undervaluation      
Table 4.4 (Panels A, B and C) presents the estimates from the cross-sectional regression 
of valuation metrics (using Equation 1) on information asymmetry measures. Panels A, 
B and C show the estimates with EV, Q ratio and MTB separately. If valuation metrics 
are effective in capturing the effects of information asymmetry, it should show positive 
association between these variables (Models 1 to 12). Using the MTB as a valuation 
metric (Models 9 to 12 in Table 4.4: Panel C), it is found that the information variables 
of LNTA, INST and LNSA are positively related to valuation, but weakly so. The INST 
variable, which is the measure of institutional shareholding, however, appears to be 
robustly related to MTB. Using EV as another valuation metric (Models 1 to 4 in Table 
4.4: Panel A), similar weak association is found between information asymmetry and 
valuation. LNTA has a statistically significant relationship in the regression with EV as 
the dependent variable, while LNSA has a statistically significant relationship in the 
regression with Q ratio as the dependent variable (Models 5 to 8 in Table 4.4: Panel B). 
The signs of the coefficients of LNAGE, LNTA and LNSA are not consistent across the 
regressions with alternative measures of valuation. Overall, the results in Table 4.4 
(Panel A, B and C) do not portray an illuminative picture on the association between 
information asymmetry and valuation measures.  
 
I now use the logit specification of Equation 2 to estimate the probability of a going 
private decision. Table 4.5 presents the estimates of this probability of going private. 
Among the information variables, the coefficient estimate on INST in Table 4.5 is highly 
significant at less than the one percent level. This negative estimate shows that the 
institutional holding level of firms strongly deters the likelihood of a firm being taken 
over in a private equity transaction. To the extent that private equity investors look for 
firms which have low investor recognition (in order to capture the undervaluation), the 
negative association between the probability of private equity transaction and INST 
captures the reluctance of the investors to engage in transactions of firms with high 
institutional shareholding which are unlikely to be undervalued. Among the control 
variables, it is interesting to note that the LVG and CURR variables appear to be strong 
predictors of private equity transactions. High leverage signifies an unhealthy financial 
condition which may be a characteristic the private equity investors look for to 
opportunistically capture the underlying value of the firm. A high current ratio is an 
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indication of a firm with high liquid asset; a factor attractive for any takeover especially 
private equity investment.  
 
Table 4.4: Measuring the Effect of Information Asymmetry on Valuation     
 
This table shows the cross-sectional OLS regression of information asymmetry variables on valuation measures. EV is 
the enterprise value ratio calculated as enterprise value at time t divided by enterprise value at time t–2. Q Ratio is 
market capitalization divided by total assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio calculated as market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. LVG is the leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. 
CURR is the current ratio calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. FCF is the free cash flow divided 
by total assets. Free cash flow is calculated as operating cash flow minus interest, taxes and dividends. CAPEX is the 
spending on new buildings, property and equipment minus depreciation, divided by the book value of total assets. 
Figures in the parentheses represent standard error of estimates. Results reported are heteroskedasticity consistent with 
** and * denoting significance levels at 1% and 5%, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Information Asymmetry and EV  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Constant 3.894** (7.214) 
3.279** 
(6.697) 
6.688** 
(4.178) 
4.751** 
(4.038) 
     
LNAGE -0.252 (-1.417)    
LNTA   -0.178* (-2.188)  
LNSA    -0.081 (-1.271)
INST  0.329 (0.397)   
     
LVG -0.812 (-1.561)
-0.866 
(-1.644)
-0.783 
(-1.515)
-0.697 
(-1.402)
CURR -0.037** (-2.915) 
-0.034** 
(-2.712) 
-0.038** 
(-3.165) 
-0.037** 
(-2.951) 
FCF -0.394 (-0.927) 
-0.467 
(-1.099) 
-0.133 
(-0.299) 
-0.199 
(-0.451) 
CAPEX -0.838 (-0.977) 
-0.944 
(-1.136) 
-1.312 
(-1.562) 
-1.066 
(-1.283) 
     
R2 0.026 0.021 0.031 0.024 
F-statistic 1.353 1.046 1.587 1.251 
p-(F-stat) 0.243 0.391 0.165 0.286 
Observations 258 258 258 258 
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Panel B: Information Asymmetry and Q Ratio  
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     
Constant 2.987** (0.602) 
2.010** 
(0.576) 
3.410 
(2.371) 
-0.762 
(1.542) 
     
LNAGE -0.383 (0.233)    
LNTA   -0.064 (0.127)  
LNSA    0.180** (0.0893) 
INST  0.620 (1.134)   
     
LVG -0.739 (0.650) 
-0.815 
(0.652) 
-0.812 
(0.653) 
-1.261* 
(0.676) 
CURR -0.051 (0.031) 
-0.045 
(0.032) 
-0.049 
(0.031) 
-0.0437 
(0.0308) 
FCF -7.088** (0.644) 
-7.199** 
(0.644) 
-7.077** 
(0.686) 
-7.786** 
(0.703) 
CAPEX 11.46** (1.232) 
11.29** 
(1.239) 
11.20** 
(1.267) 
11.67** 
(1.237) 
     
R2 0.569 0.565 0.565 0.572 
F-statistic 67.24 65.51 65.52 66.63 
p-(F-stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 258 258 258 258 
 
 
 
Panel C: Information Asymmetry and MTB  
 
 (9) (10 (11) (12) 
 
Constant 2.862** (4.113) 
1.588** 
(2.406) 
2.092 
(0.833) 
0.814 
(0.417) 
     
LNAGE -0.096 (-0.489)    
LNTA   0.032 (0.229)  
LNSA    0.111 (0.943) 
INST  2.947** (3.242)   
     
LVG 0.249 (0.215) 
0.376 
(0.336) 
0.204 
(0.172) 
-0.035 
(-0.028) 
CURR -0.063 (-1.689) 
-0.047 
(-1.433) 
-0.062 
(-1.705) 
-0.059 
(-1.701) 
FCF -3.744* (-2.313) 
-3.787* 
(-2.321) 
-3.829* 
(-2.186) 
-4.137* 
(-2.265) 
CAPEX 4.439 (1.888) 
4.162 
(1.685) 
4.479 
(1.811) 
4.616 
(1.932) 
     
R2 0.266 0.289 0.266 0.271
F-statistic 18.29 20.55 18.25 18.75 
p-(F-stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 258 258 258 258 
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Table 4.5: Measuring the effect of Information Asymmetry on Going Private      
 
Table 4.5 shows the results of multivariate logit regression of information asymmetry variables on going private 
decisions. LNAGE is the natural log of the number of years between the firms’ IPO and their being taken over. LNTA 
is the natural log of total assets. LNSA is the natural log of sales. INST is the number of ordinary shares held by the 
institutional holders expressed as percentage of total shares outstanding. LVG is the leverage ratio calculated as total 
liabilities divided by total assets. CURR is the current ratio calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. 
FCF is the free cash flow divided by total assets. Free cash flow is calculated as operating cash flow minus interest, 
taxes and dividends. CAPEX is the spending on new buildings, property and equipment minus depreciation, divided by 
the book value of total assets. Figures in the parentheses represent standard error of estimates. Results reported are 
heteroskedasticity consistent with ** and * denoting significance levels at 1% and 5%, respectively.   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Constant -3.591** (-5.389) 
-5.133** 
(-2.806) 
-5.054** 
(-3.779) 
-1.991** 
(-2.989) 
     
LNAGE -0.098 (-0.551)    
LNTA  0.074 (0785)   
LNSA   0.078 (1.072)  
INST    -4.432** (-4.534) 
     
LVG 2.007** (3.443) 
1.916** 
(3.297) 
1.757** 
(2.892) 
1.783** 
(2.985) 
CURR 1.627** (6.509) 
1.624** 
(6.451) 
1.628** 
(6.461) 
1.519** 
(5.931) 
FCF 1.014 (1.644) 
0.826 
(1.278) 
0.635 
(0.918) 
1.069 
(1.619) 
CAPEX -1.528 (-1.216) 
-1.344 
(-1.047) 
-1.321 
(-1.059) 
-1.071 
(-0.709) 
     
McFadden R2 0.323 0.324 0.325 0.388 
Wald Chi2 49.68 52.70 51.07 54.77 
p-WChi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations  258 258 258 258 
 
  
In Table 4.6, I present the results of the estimation on my hypothesis concerning the joint 
association of information asymmetry and valuation and their effects on the likelihood of 
private equity takeover. I estimate this using Equation 3. Panels A, B and C show the 
estimates with EV, Q ratio and MTB separately.  
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Table 4.6: Measuring the Effect of Information Asymmetry and Valuation on Going Private  
 
Table 4.6 shows the results of multivariate logit regression of information asymmetry variables and interaction terms 
on going private decisions. LNAGE is the natural log of the number of years between the firms’ IPO and their being 
taken over. LNTA is the natural log of total assets. LNSA is the natural log of sales. INST is the number of ordinary 
shares held by the institutional holders expressed as percentage of total shares outstanding. EV is the enterprise value 
ratio calculated as enterprise value at time t divided by enterprise value at time t–2. Q Ratio is market capitalization 
divided by total assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio calculated as market value of assets divided by the book value 
of assets. The interaction terms are interacted with the EV, Q ratio and MTB dummy variables, where these dummy 
variables take the value 1 if their corresponding value is greater than their mean value and 0 otherwise. These three 
dummy variables have been interacted with information asymmetry variables to determine their joint effect on PE 
takeovers. LVG is the leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. CURR is the current ratio 
calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. FCF is the free cash flow divided by total assets. Free cash 
flow is calculated as operating cash flow minus interest, taxes and dividends. CAPEX is the spending on new 
buildings, property and equipment minus depreciation, divided by the book value of total assets. Figures in the 
parentheses represent standard error of estimates. Results reported are heteroskedasticity consistent with ** and * 
denoting significance levels at 1% and 5%, respectively.   
 
Panel A: Asymmetric Information, EV and Going Private   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Constant -2.677** (0.847) 
1.784 
(2.199) 
-2.897* 
(1.399) 
1.992 
(3.008) 
   
EV -0.231 (0.272) 
-2.882** 
(0.998) 
0.358* 
(0.405) 
-2.779* 
(1.278) 
LNAGE -0.132 (0.284)    
LNAGE*EV -0.009 (0.102)    
LNTA  
-0.260 
(0.165)   
LNTA*EV  
0.135* 
(0.071)   
LNSA   
-0.253* 
(0.124)  
LNSA*EV   
-0.141** 
(0.0531)  
INST    
-0.094* 
(3.194) 
INST*EV    
-2.295* 
(1.899) 
   
LVG 1.821** (0.663) 
1.566* 
(0.627) 
2.146** 
(0.743) 
1.696** 
(0.602) 
CURR 1.566** (0.209) 
1.674** 
(0.231) 
1.645** 
(0.336) 
1.583** 
(0.219) 
FCF 0.872 (0.604) 
0.554 
(0.644) 
0.959 
(0.708) 
0.735 
(0.622) 
CAPEX -1.601* (0.911) 
-2.041 
(1.506) 
-0.609 
(1.297) 
-1.724 
(1.274) 
   
McFadden R2 0.353 0.389 0.456 0.368 
Wald Chi2 64.41 55.66 57.95 66.41 
p-WChi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observation 258 258 258 258 
 
 
 
 68 
 
 
Panel B: Asymmetric Information, Q ratio and Going Private   
 
(5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
     
Constant -1.883 (1.298)
-4.976* 
(2.154)
-4.774* 
(2.170)
-2.421* 
(1.175)
   
Q Ratio -1.600* (0.784) 
1.238 
(0.836) 
0.023* 
(0.893) 
0.099 
(0.369) 
LNAGE -0.579* (0.331)    
LNAGE*Q 0.272 (0.242)    
LNTA  
0.093 
(0.117)   
LNTA*Q  
-0.124* 
(0.049)   
LNSA   
0.085 
(0.105)  
LNSA*Q   
-0.057 
(0.048)  
INST    
-0.760 
(1.680) 
INST*Q    
-4.251* 
(1.825) 
   
LVG 2.324* (1.133) 
2.295** 
(0.886) 
2.329* 
(1.058) 
1.624* 
(0.791) 
CURR 1.875** (0.338) 
1.952** 
(0.369) 
1.902** 
(0.344) 
1.874** 
(0.416) 
FCF 0.360 (1.208) 
0.987 
(1.219) 
0.556 
(1.183) 
1.784 
(1.518) 
CAPEX 2.376 (2.247) 
1.823 
(2.189) 
2.076 
(2.298) 
4.181 
(2.844) 
   
McFadden R2 0.461 0.458 0.453 0.544 
Wald Chi2 45.17 43.62 41.48 42.46 
p-WChi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observation 258 258 258 258 
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Panel C: Asymmetric Information, MTB and Going Private  
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
     
Constant -0.483 (2.270)
-22.12** 
(7.985)
6.215 
(10.89)
-8.557 
(8.684)
   
MTB -2.655* (1.300) 
-13.27** 
(5.120) 
-8.737 
(7.657) 
-2.672* 
(4.233) 
LNAGE 2.765* (1.245)    
LNAGE*MTB -1.689* (0.767)    
LNTA  
1.492** 
(0.497)   
LNTA*MTB  
-1.096** 
(0.324)   
LNSA   
-0.065 
(0.557)  
LNSA*MTB   
0.152 
(0.386)  
INST    
-51.94 
(32.90) 
INST*MTB    
-42.92* 
(26.00) 
   
LVG 2.697 (1.741) 
3.704* 
(1.553) 
2.100 
(1.734) 
6.531* 
(3.147) 
CURR 1.869** (0.678) 
2.193** 
(0.725) 
2.028** 
(0.694) 
3.054* 
(1.665) 
FCF 2.659 (1.388) 
3.221* 
(1.601) 
1.613 
(1.435) 
2.615 
(1.361) 
CAPEX 1.064 (4.178) 
0.846 
(3.196) 
1.981 
(3.620) 
10.20* 
(5.229) 
   
McFadden R2 0.821 0.819 0.893 0.827 
Wald Chi2 38.22 38.69 26.11 57.54 
p-WChi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 258 258 258 258 
 
 
The strong evidence that one notices in Table 4.6 (Panels A, B and C) is that most 
interaction terms are strongly negative. In equation (3), estimates of β1 and β2 together 
measure the effect of information asymmetry conditional on valuation (EV, Q ratio or 
MTB) while the coefficient β2 captures the additional affect due to valuation. In addition, 
EV, Q ratio and MTB appear to be mostly significant with a negative coefficient. Taking 
the INST as the illustrative information variable, the significant negative coefficient 
estimate of 2.295, 4.251 and 42.92, in Panels A, B and C respectively, on the interaction 
terms between INST and three valuation metrics (Models 4, 8 and 12; Table 4.6: Panels 
A, B and C) signify that firms with high valuation are unlikely to engage in private 
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equity transactions. Furthermore, given that the coefficients on INST in the same 
specifications are mostly statistically insignificant estimate, it is reasonable to suggest 
that the probability of private equity transaction is dominated more by the valuation 
measure than by the information variable of INST.  
 
This pattern of estimate is repeated for the other information variables LNAGE, LNTA 
and LNSA in the other models in Panels A, B and C in Table 4.6. The valuation metric 
seems to dominate the information variables. Comparatively, the information variables 
(LNAGE, LNTA, LNSA and INST) have much less predictive probability associated 
with them. Nonetheless, among the information variables, LNSA and INST appear to be 
economically significant negative predictors, when they are used with EV as the 
valuation metric (Models 3 and 4). Taken overall, it is clear from the analyses that it is 
the valuation metrics that drive the going private transactions.  
 
4.7 Further Analysis  
In order to complement the analyses, data is stratified according to their valuation 
metrics. If valuation is the measure that drives private equity transactions, it should show 
a clearer picture when the data is separated into PE and non-PE firms. Accordingly, I sort 
the two groups of firms (PE and non-PE) and place them into five quintiles according to 
their EV, Q ratio and MTB. The results are tabulated in Table 4.7. Q1 represents the 
lowest value and Q5 represents the highest value of sample firms. In terms of EV, more 
than one-third of the PE target firms are in Q1, while only around four percent of the 
non-PE target firms are in the same lowest value quintile. Likewise, more than sixty 
percent of non-PE target firms lie in quintiles 4 and 5 (higher value) with only around 
fifteen percent of the PE target firms lying in the same higher value quintiles (4 and 5). A 
similar picture is found with Q ratio and MTB. The table shows a strong negative 
relationship between the valuations of firms and going private through PE takeovers, 
underlying the fact that undervaluation is an important driving factor in going private 
transactions.  
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Table 4.7: Undervaluation by Quintiles  
 
This table compares the quintile distribution of 129 firms undergoing private equity transaction between 1990 and 
2010 with a paired sample of Non-PE target firms during the same period. Firms are sorted into quintiles according to 
the valuation measures of EV, Q ratio and MTB. EV is the enterprise value ratio calculated as enterprise value at time t 
divided by enterprise value at time t–2. Q Ratio is market capitalization divided by total assets. MTB is the market-to-
book ratio calculated as market value of assets divided by the book value of assets.  
 
 
Quintile Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 All Firms 
Total Firms (N)  51 52 51 52 52 258 
EV (expressed as a value) 
Average 0.79 1.24 1.89 2.87 7.16 
PE  
N 46 40 23 10 10 129 
% 35.66 31.01 17.83 7.75 7.75 
Non-PE  
N 5 12 29 41 42 129 
% 3.88 9.3 22.48 31.78 32.56 
MTB (expressed as a value)  
Average 0.65 1.13 1.61 2.96 7.47 
PE 
N 51 49 27 2 0 129 
% 39.53 37.98 20.93 1.55 0 
Non-PE 
N 0 3 25 49 52 129 
% 0 2.33 19.38 37.98 40.31 
Q-Ratio (expressed as a value)  
Average 0.34 0.68 1.08 1.82 1.73 
PE 
N 45 33 22 21 8 129 
% 34.88 25.58 17.05 16.28 6.21 
Non-PE 
N 6 19 29 31 44 129 
% 4.65 14.73 22.48 24.03 34.11 
 
 
4.8 Conclusion   
The current study is based on a unique hand-collected data of PEs and Non-PEs from 
various data sources during the period from 1990 to 2010. Particularly, this paper 
analyses the effect of information asymmetry and undervaluation on going private 
transactions through PE takeovers in the Australian context. It is found that firms taken 
over by PE firms are triggered due to market undervaluation, rather than information 
asymmetry. This evidence is new and adds to prior Australian studies (Eddey et al. 1996; 
Evans et al. 2005) in that I explicitly model the interplay between information 
asymmetry and undervaluation. The results of the predictive model reveal an inverse 
relationship between undervaluation and the firm’s likelihood to go private. The analysis 
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suggests that private equity firms can play a role as active investors in enhancing and 
recognizing the performance of corporations when capital markets do not. In the end, 
given the evidence in this paper, it is probably reasonable to argue that the Qantas board 
and Chairperson were probably correct in their response to the takeover bid.   
 
I also find the current ratio to be highly significant and positive in all regressions, 
revealing a strong positive relationship between liquidity and the likelihood of going 
private. This result is consistent with empirical literature suggesting that going private 
firms have a significantly higher level of liquidity (Carroll et al. 1988; Evans et al. 
2005), although it is not consistent with Chapple et al.’s (2010) study on Australia. The 
results are somewhat surprising with regard to leverage ratio which is significant but 
takes on a positive value. This result is in contrast to the theory of financial slack as 
advanced by Jensen and Meckling (1976), but consistent with the opportunistic 
behaviour by private equity investors. Combined with the results regarding the effect of 
liquidity, this result suggests that private equity investors in Australia are opportunistic 
(Chapple et al. 2010) in taking advantage of financially distressed firms with low 
valuations. I did not find any evidence in support of free cash flows. This is not 
surprising in the sense that empirical evidence on the role of free cash flow in going 
private transactions is mixed. My analysis also suggests that capital expenditure is not an 
important driving factor in going private and this is consistent with prior UK and US 
empirical studies (Weir and Wright, 2006; Opler and Titman, 1993).   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP, UNDERVALUATION AND 
PRIVATE EQUITY  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
A prevalent belief that buyout transactions provide a way to improve target businesses 
has accelerated the trend for public corporations to go private (Fidrmuc et al. 2007). 
Going private transactions also can be designed to expropriate wealth from bondholders 
and outside shareholders to the insiders and new owners (Cumming et al. 2007). 
Literature suggests a number of incentive devices that can align the interest of 
shareholders and mangers so as to mitigate agency conflicts within target firms. As a 
whole, the role of managerial incentives in corporate control is an area that has received 
substantial attention from financial economists (Weir et al. 2005a). However, the link 
between managerial ownership of target firms and their likelihood of going private 
through PE deals has received little attention. In this study, the presence of high 
managerial ownership is examined as a determinant for a public firm going private and, 
in particular, being taken over by a PE firm. Using a sample of ASX takeover firms from 
1990 to 2010, I test the proposition that high managerial ownership increases the 
likelihood of public firms going private through PE takeovers.  
 
The fact that going private transactions can be a way to expropriate wealth from the 
majority shareholders and bondholders (Fidrmuc et al. 2007) stems from ineffective 
incentive devices resulting in a misalignment between insiders and outside shareholders. 
Therefore, managerial shareholding has an important impact on the alignment of interests 
between shareholders and managers. The shareholder welfare hypothesis suggests that 
management will act in the best interests of outside shareholders. On the other hand, the 
managerial welfare hypothesis argues that managers will act in the best interests of 
themselves (Walkling and Long, 1984). While Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that, 
with high ownership stakes, managers are more likely to be aligned with the interests of 
outside shareholders, Demsetz (1983) points out, when having a substantial equity, 
managers might have tendencies to guarantee their employment in order to retain control. 
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This is formalized as the entrenchment hypothesis by Morck et al. (1988). It is important 
to note also that firms with high managerial ownership are more costly to acquire and are 
less likely to be targeted in a traditional takeover attempt (Stulz, 1988). One reason is 
that managers may not like to be taken over by any hostile corporate raiders and this 
makes it harder for the acquirer to acquire the firm easily. Jensen (1989) claims that PE 
firms require managers to have a meaningful equity stake within their firm, increasing 
the likelihood that firms with high managerial ownership will be taken over by PE firms 
instead. The above literature, therefore, reveals that there remains much to be learnt 
about how managerial incentive alignment changes with levels of management 
shareholdings.  
 
In the presence of substantial asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders, 
managers are likely to hold a large share of their firm’s stock (Leland and Pyle, 1977; 
Opler and Titman, 1993). With sufficiently high equity stakes, managers may seek to 
maintain their control over the firm by choosing not to disseminate sufficient information 
about their firms to attract new shareholders. In such a situation, information on future 
growth opportunities of the firm is not efficiently transmitted. This suggests that high 
managerial ownership, including the presence of managerial private information, might 
create impetus for the managers to become entrenched (Brailsford et al. 2002; Florackis 
and Ozkan, 2009a). Agha (2011) argues that this happens because when managers are 
subject to strong monitoring levels, they initially behave in the best interests of 
shareholders for fear of being replaced. With high ownership stakes, managers are in full 
control and may be motivated to abuse their power. Filatotchev et al. (1999) find that 
managers are hostile towards outside ownership and want to retain control when they 
have high ownership stakes. Therefore, an increase in management shareholdings may be 
driven by, among other motivations, their efforts to preserve control. This argument 
provides further reason to suggest that managers with high ownership stakes have a 
strong incentive to take their firm private in order to maintain control. Regardless of the 
fact that high managerial ownership increases the likelihood of firms going private, as 
evidenced in the US and in the UK (Maupin et al. 1984; Maupin, 1987; Weir et al. 
2005a), the extant research in this area within the Australian context has been limited. In 
particular, the empirical evidence on the significance of high managerial ownership in 
the private equity context remains an unexplored area. Therefore, in this study, high 
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managerial ownership is investigated as a rationale for going private through PE deals in 
the Australian context.  
 
While high managerial ownership is hypothesized to increase the likelihood of going 
private, market undervaluation can also provide impetus for public corporations to go 
private (Weir et al. 2005b). The undervaluation problem is intensified with low analyst 
coverage and high investor uncertainty (Mehran and Peristiani, 2010). Renneboog and 
Simons (2005) argue that financial visibility is an important determinant in the decision 
to go private for public firms. The lack of sufficient analyst following and low share 
price as a result of undervaluation are further deepened when managers have high equity 
stakes. This situation, as a whole, is likely to provide incentives to both managers and 
private equity investors to take the firm private and capture the full value of their firm. 
Lowenstein (1985) concludes that PTP transactions are expected to eliminate asymmetric 
information and remove undervaluation. Later research also supports this result, 
suggesting that firm value increases after a re-organisation because managers might 
deliver better result with better control and closer monitoring (Kaplan and Stormberg, 
2009). Therefore, the presence of information asymmetries may provide incentives for 
the managers to manipulate information to lower the value of the firm before they take 
their firm private. The anecdotal evidence of the private equity takeover attempt of 
Qantas in 2007 symbolizes managerial support in the face of market undervaluation. 
Facing the private takeover offer, the Qantas board recommended acceptance of the bid 
citing the low share price as the primary reason (Westcott, 2009).    
 
The majority of extant literature on private equity uses US or UK samples. Although 
private equity investment in Australia have grown to a considerable level since the 
1990s7, no empirical studies have been conducted to examine the impact of high 
managerial ownership on PE deals using Australian data. Additional research in 
Australia is important also because it is unclear if the US and UK evidence can be 
applied in the Australian case. Therefore, an empirical study uncovering the relationship 
between managerial ownership and private equity deals in Australia provides a 
significant contribution to the corporate control literature. Apart from the Chapple et al. 
(2010) study exploring the characteristics of target firms in PE transactions, I am not 
                                                 
7Chapple et al. (2010) provide an exploratory study on features of Australian going private firms with a smaller number of 
observations. 
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aware of any research linking the relationship between high managerial ownership and 
the likelihood of Australian firms going private through PE takeovers. Using a sample of 
Australian PE target firms and comparing them with a set of firms that do not go private, 
I examine the proposition that high managerial ownership and low market valuation 
increase the likelihood of a public firm going private through PE takeovers. The analysis 
reveals that high managerial ownership is an important factor in the likelihood of firms 
going private through PE takeovers in Australia. In addition, I find that undervalued 
public firms are more likely to be involved in PE transactions in Australia. The 
remainder of this study is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a discussion on the 
interplay of managerial ownership, undervaluation and PE takeovers. Section 3 describes 
the data, sample selection process and methodological issues. The empirical results are 
reported in Section 4. Section 5 presents the conclusions.  
 
5.2 Managerial Ownership, Undervaluation and Private Equity  
The review of recent empirical evidence indicates that buyouts and PE transactions 
appear to be associated with incentive and governance mechanisms that enhance 
performance. This stems from the fact that incumbent management is likely to have 
information on how to improve firm performance (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). Stuart 
and Yim  (2010) suggest that with high ownership stakes managers may have a strong 
incentive to increase their own wealth together with the controlling interest in the firm. 
One better way to do this is to take their firm private, enhance their performance and 
maximize their own benefit. Using a UK sample, Fidrmuc et al. (2007) also support the 
view that managers have incentives to take their firm private to enhance performance and 
in the process maximize their own benefit.  
 
Public corporations are characterised by diffuse shareholdings, while management is 
vested in the hands of a small number of professionals (O’Sullivan and Wong, 1999). It 
is thus necessary to ensure that appropriate methods of internal governance exist to 
prevent executives from pursuing their own interests at the expense of outside 
shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that offering ownership stakes to 
managers should reconcile the interests of shareholders and managers since owner-
managers are less likely to pursue non-value-maximizing behaviour. While owner-
managers are expected to deliver value-maximizing outcomes, there is evidence that 
managers may become more entrenched with increased levels of ownership stakes. 
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Morck et al. (1988) argue that with low shareholdings by management, an increase in 
shareholdings may increase their motivation to work more closely for the improvement 
of shareholder wealth; but with larger shareholdings, an increase in shareholdings may 
induce management to become more entrenched. Therefore, managerial shareholdings 
create a trade-off between incentives and entrenchment. Consistent with this, Manry and 
Nathan (1999) find that large ownership stakes by managers may induce entrenchment. 
In addition, with a high level of ownership, managers may have incentives to transfer the 
resources of the firm to other companies under their full control (Filatotchev et al. 1999). 
It should be noted here that I do not observe the issue of entrenchment as a source of 
conflict in the present study, since I am not focusing on what happens to the managers 
after the firms are actually taken private.  
 
To take a firm private, acquirers must have sufficient support from existing shareholders. 
High managerial ownership makes the acquisition process easier for the PE firms 
because mobilizing support for such transactions (Stuart and Yim, 2010) is 
comparatively simple. With high ownership stakes, managers are more likely to accept 
PE bids to maximize their own wealth while maintaining their controlling interest within 
the firm. A study by Maupin et al. (1984) also supports the idea that managers with high 
equity stakes are more likely to stage a PTP transaction for their own benefit. Increased 
managerial ownership tends to raise the financial gains of the managers through 
accepting a PE led bid (North, 2001). This should result in a positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and going private transactions. In addition, benefits of 
control can act as another key aspect in going private deals. Jensen (1989) argues that PE 
firms improve firm operations and create economic value by applying financial, 
governance and operational engineering to their companies. PE firms also require 
managers to make a meaningful investment in the company, so that managers have a 
considerable stake in the company’s equity capital. This high equity stake reduces 
management’s incentive to manipulate a company’s performance (Kaplan, 1989) since 
this situation also ensures that management has more control over their firm.  
 
Empirical evidence indicates that firms involved in PTP transactions have significantly 
higher managerial share ownership than those involved in traditional acquisitions 
(Maupin, 1987; Maupin et al. 1984; Halpern et al. 1999). A key feature in this evidence 
is that concentration of residual claims in the hands of decision makers makes a private 
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corporation more efficient (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Managers may invest a large 
amount of wealth in their firm because they value control or voting rights in their firm, 
which is consistent with entrenchment hypothesis. This idea suggests that managers with 
high ownership stakes will find going private an attractive vehicle to consolidate the 
firm’s residual claims into their hands and simultaneously increase the efficiency of their 
firm. The evidence thus suggests that target firms in PTP deals have high managerial 
ownership. I therefore hypothesize that high managerial ownership increases the 
likelihood of firms going private through PE backed deals in Australia.  
 
Proponents of PE transactions often claim that PE investors make proper use of the 
private information of management. This private information is not available in the 
market and is superior in the sense that with better incentives and closer monitoring, 
managers will be able to use the information and their knowledge to deliver better results 
(Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). Since one key aspect of a firm’s decision to stay public is 
to make information available to prospective investors, management may not accept the 
situation where information about future investment opportunities is not correctly 
transmitted. This may even lead to reversing the decision as to staying public or going 
private (Weir et al. 2005b) since information production and dissemination are very 
costly as explored by several information asymmetry models (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 
1999). If management believes that their firm is being undervalued, they may seek to 
realise some capital gains by taking their firm private. The information asymmetry 
between management and outside shareholders about the true and intrinsic value of the 
firm allows management to send a signal to the market by attempting a going private 
transaction (Evans et al. 2005).  
  
With high information asymmetry, incumbent management may view continued listing 
costs as an unnecessary burden (Weir and Wright, 2006). DeAngelo et al. (1984) note 
that the costs of maintaining a stock exchange listing are very high and might even affect 
the profitability of the firm. Renneboog et al. (2007) suggest that the wealth gains from 
going private are largely the result of the elimination of direct and indirect costs 
associated with maintaining a stock exchange listing. Further, a delisting would enable 
management to operate without any public perception that the company is a poor 
performer (Weir and Wright, 2006). Empirical evidence in the UK (Weir et al. 2005b) 
also confirms that undervaluation is an important reason for going private because low 
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valuation makes it difficult to make use of the capital market for equity expansion. This 
raises questions about the actual benefits of being publicly quoted (Weir et al. 2005b). 
As a result, remaining public creates severe restrictions on a company’s ability to 
compete. Firm valuation, thus, should be inversely related to the decision to go private. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that undervaluation increases the likelihood of firms going 
private through PE firms in Australia.  
 
Undervaluation is often considered to be an important driving force for private equity 
takeovers where there is high information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders 
(Bharat and Dittmar, 2010). While undervaluation is already in force, non-value 
maximizing behaviour resulting from high managerial ownership intensifies the problem 
for outside shareholders and investors (Manry and Nathan, 1999). This problem is 
particularly severe for firms with low market visibility and poor investor recognition. 
The likelihood of these less well-known firms going private is further enhanced with 
high managerial ownership because managers with high ownership put more value on 
their own utility maximization and consolidation of the residual claims on their hands 
(Halpern et al. 1999). The primary focus in this study is the role of high managerial 
ownership and undervaluation, which is likely to accelerate the invitation for private 
equity takeovers. It is argued, and tested empirically in this study, that firms that are 
undervalued and have managers with high ownership stakes are more likely to opt out of 
the public capital market and go private. While valuation might be a motivation for 
private takeovers, the level of managerial ownership may provide additional incentives to 
the managers to take their firm private. Therefore, I propose that the negative relation 
between undervaluation and the likelihood of private equity takeover is stronger at high 
levels of managerial ownership. This interaction between high managerial ownership and 
undervaluation in the context of private equity takeovers is the first to be examined 
applicable to the Australian going private literature. In this respect, this study potentially 
offers a more comprehensive and rigorous test of both the undervaluation and high 
managerial ownership hypotheses concerning private equity takeovers.   
 
5.3 Data and Research Design   
The sample consists of all successful going private transactions involving companies 
listed on the ASX and made between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 2010. The 
sample is formed by utilizing a variety of databases and resources. The initial sample of 
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all takeovers is collected from the SDC Platinum ANZ M&A Database. Initially a total 
of 517 successful going private bids are identified. I then screen the sample for bids 
involving an acquirer with a status of ‘Joint Venture’ or ‘Subsidiaries’. The primary 
sample of going private bids are considered as a PE led bid only when it is financed 
wholly or partly by a PE firm to ensure that the firm has indeed become private and 
acquiring companies are not affiliated with public corporations. The going private 
transactions are then re-confirmed via the list of ASX delisted firms from the Aspect 
Huntley Morningstar DatAnalysis Database. The list of PE takeovers is then finalized 
and confirmed through the Bureau Van-Dijk ORBIS Global Database. This process 
yields a final sample of 129 firms. Annual accounting information was obtained from the 
Aspect Huntley Morningstar FinAnalysis database. Once the financial data are collected 
from FinAnalysis, the annual reports of those 129 PE target firms are downloaded from 
DatAnalysis database. Managerial ownership data are then retrieved from those annual 
reports on a company-by-company basis.  
 
Table 5.1 Panel A provides the frequency distribution of all successful PTP deals in 
Australia. It shows that a total of 4546 completed takeovers took place in ASX. 517 
completed going private deals were identified in Australia during the sample period, 
constituting around twelve percent of all completed takeovers. As is mentioned in Evans 
et al. (2005), approximately ten percent of all deals in Australia were going private deals. 
With steady increase, the going private deals have reached around twelve percent in 
recent times. Stromberg (2007) notes that, going private deals increased considerably 
after 2000. Table 5.1 suggests a similar evidence for Australia where the majority of PTP 
deals took place between 2001 and 2007.  
 
Table 5.1 Panel B indicates the screening process in selecting the sample. Panel C 
classifies the PE takeover firms into various industry groupings showing the number of 
firms in each industry group. Prior Australian studies (Evans et al. 2005; Eddey et al. 
1996) have suggested that the financial sector has the greatest number of going private 
deals in Australia. Chapple et al. (2010) find a very low concentration of Australian PE 
firms in the financial and mining sectors. The evidence in Table 5.1 Panel C contradicts 
Chapple et al. (2010) in terms of the mining sector, but shows a similar pattern for the 
financial sector. A possible reason for these variances can be the differences in the time 
period covered by these studies. It is apparent, however, that PE firms in Australia do not 
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concentrate in any particular industry sector and this is consistent with the idea that PE 
firms in Australia are ‘opportunistic’ and do not seem to concentrate on any particular 
industry sector for their target firms (Chapple et al. 2010).  
 
Table 5.1: Private Equity Transactions in Australia 1990 – 2010 
  
Panel A: Annual Frequency of all completed going private transactions 
 
 All Non-PTP Deals All Going Private Only Private Equity 
    
Year Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
1990 - 1992 171 4.24 11 2.13 0 0.00 
1993 - 1995 340 8.44 34 6.58 1 0.77 
1996 - 1998 462 11.47 40 7.74 5 3.88 
1999 - 2001 341 8.46 51 9.86 19 14.73 
2002 - 2004 777 19.29 93 17.98 33 25.58 
2005 - 2007 799 19.83 133 25.73 52 40.31 
2008 - 2010 1139 28.27 155 29.98 19 14.73 
       
Total 4029 100% 517 100% 129 100% 
 
 
Panel B: Private Equity Deals in Australia 
 
  Sub-total  Total 
All PTP Deals   517 
    
Less:  Acquirers or targets with status of ‘Subsidiary’ or ‘Joint Venture’  95 422 
Less:  Deals not financed (wholly/partly) by private equity firms  244 178 
Less:  Information not available for the last 3 years  49 129 
    
 Final Total of Private Equity deals   129 
 
 
Panel C: Industry Concentration of Private Equity transactions  
 
Industry   PE Deals  Industry   PE Deals  
    
Mining  22 Transportation Services  4 
Oil and Gas exploration  4 Communication Supplies/Services   12 
Equipment Production/Supplies  7 Media, Audio/Video Distribution  8 
Construction Services  7 Amusement/Recreation Services  7 
Food, Drink and Kindered Products  6 Real Estate Investment  9 
Firms, Dealers, Exchanges  8 Miscellaneous Trade  11 
Financial Institutions  2  Business Services  13 
Health and Allied Services  6 Hotels and Motels  4 
Total Completed PE Deals: 129  
 
 
A key aspect of the proposed hypotheses in this study is rationales of PE takeovers from 
an insider ownership and undervaluation perspective. To investigate the differences 
between the nature of PE takeovers and traditional takeovers, I also construct a matched 
sample of firms which are taken over in the public market via acquisition by publicly 
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listed firms and in which their assets stayed public. I term this set of firms as ‘Non-PE’ 
firms and use comparative analysis throughout the paper8. For each PE firm, I use a two-
dimensional scoring method to match to a non-PE firm. I first match the PE firm in the 
same industry sector that had a public-to-public transaction and, secondly, in the same 
year as the PE firm.  
 
The first set of regression involves testing the probability of going private with low and 
high levels of managerial shareholdings including valuation measures. I introduce the 
interaction terms to determine the joint effect of managerial ownership and valuation at 
different levels of managerial ownership. The effect of different levels of managerial 
shareholdings including undervaluation is tested through the logit regression form as 
follows:  
Li = Ln [Pi/(1-Pi)] = α + β1LowMSOi + β2Vali + β3MSOi*Vali + β4Coni + ɛi   (1a) 
Li = Ln [Pi/(1-Pi)] = α + β1HighMSOi + β2Vali + β3MSOi*Vali + β4Coni + ɛi  (1b) 
 
The second set of regression involves testing the association between the levels of 
managerial shareholdings and firm valuation and this is examined through a cross 
sectional regression form as follows:  
Vali = α + β1LowMSOi + β2Coni + ɛi     (2a) 
Vali = α + β1HighMSOi + β2Coni + ɛi     (2b) 
  
In logit regressions, PEi, the dependent variable, is a dichotomous variable that takes the 
value 1 if the firm is taken over by PE firm and 0 otherwise. LowMSOi, HighMSOi and 
Vali are the low and high level of managerial shareholdings and valuation measures of a 
firm i respectively. Coni represents a vector of control variables. The MSO variable 
simply measures the number of ordinary shares held directly and indirectly by the 
managers expressed as a percentage. I use three valuation metrics that are relevant in the 
private equity literature and thought to trigger private equity takeovers: Ratio of 
Enterprise Value (EV), Market-to-Book Ratio (MTB) and Q ratio. Following Weir et al. 
(2005b), I compute the ratio of enterprise value in year t to that in year t-2. Enterprise 
value is measured as market capitalization plus debt minus cash; this EV measures the 
relative change in valuation which is likely to act as a catalyst for private equity 
                                                 
8Matched samples have been used in studies of private equity transactions.  See for example, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Weir et al. 
(2005a, 2005b). 
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takeovers. MTB measures stock price valuation relative to its intrinsic book value. Firms 
with low MTB are considered to be low growth firms. Following Evans et al. (2005), I 
also consider MTB as part of the valuation metric and believe that it can impact on the 
decision to go private. I measure MTB as the most recent available annual market value 
of the firm’s equity plus debt divided by the book-value of assets. I also use Q ratio as 
another measure of valuation following Morck et al. (1988). Q ratio, a widely used 
measure of firm valuation, is calculated as market capitalization divided by total assets.  
 
The control variables are drawn from prior literature of firm-specific accounting 
variables that may also contribute to the going private decision. Specifically, following 
Weir et al. (2005b) I select leverage ratio, current ratio, free cash flow and capital 
expenditure to be the control variables. Below is a list of the variables and their 
measurement.  
Managerial Share Ownership (MSO): MSO measures the number of ordinary shares 
held directly and indirectly by the management and is calculated as the absolute number 
of ordinary shares held by management team divided by the total number of ordinary 
shares outstanding.  
Enterprise Value Ratio (EV): EV is used as a measure of valuation. It is calculated as 
enterprise value at the year of takeover transaction, ‘t’, divided by the enterprise value at 
time ‘t-2’. Enterprise value is measured as market capitalization plus debt minus cash.  
Market-to-Book Ratio (MTB): MTB is used as the second measure of valuation. It is 
calculated as market value of the company divided by book value of the company’s 
assets.  
Q Ratio (Q-Ratio): Q ratio is used as the third measure of valuation. It is calculated as 
market capitalization divided by total assets.  
Leverage (LVG): LVG is a measure of the debt condition of the firm. It is calculated as 
total liabilities divided by total assets.  
Current ratio (CURR): CURR is a measure of the liquidity condition of the firm. It is 
calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities.  
Free Cash Flow (FCF): FCF measures a company’s relative free cash flow. Free cash 
flow is measured as operating cash flow minus interest, taxes and dividends. Relative 
FCF is found as free cash flow divided by total assets.  
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Capital Expenditure (CAPEX): CAPEX measures a company’s net capital 
expenditure. It is defined as spending on new buildings, property and equipment minus 
depreciation, divided by the book value of total assets. 
 
Finally, I use logistic regression to model a firm’s decision to go private. In the second 
set of logit regressions, I test the joint effect of MSO and valuation measures on going 
private through PE takeovers as follows:  
Li = Ln [Pi/(1-Pi)] = α + β1MSOi + β2Vali + β1MSOi*Vali + β3Coni + ɛi   (3) 
 
5.4 Univariate Results   
Table 5.2 shows the results of univariate tests of the hypotheses that firms going private 
through PE takeovers have higher levels of managerial shareholdings and lower market 
valuations than firms acquired in the traditional manner. The mean values of MSO, EV, 
MTB and Q-ratio of PEs are significantly different from those of Non-PE target firms at 
the one percent level. In addition, the mean values of LVG and CURR of the PE sample 
show a significant difference from those of the Non-PE sample. The mean values of FCF 
and CAPEX for the PE and Non-PE samples are not significantly different from each 
other. The median test also shows a similar result for PE and Non-PE firms. The median 
values of MSO, EV, MTB, Q-ratio, LVG and CURR of PEs are also significantly 
different from those of Non-PE target firms at the one percent level. The results of t-tests 
and z-tests, therefore, support the hypotheses and show that Australian PE target firms 
have different firm attributes.    
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Table 5.2: Univariate Analysis of PE and Non-PE Samples 
 
Table 5.2 shows the results of t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum Mann-Whitney test to investigate if the mean and median 
values of different variables of PE and Non-PE sample target firms are significantly different from each other. The 
sample is drawn over the period from 1990 to 2010 and as in Table 5.1. MSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held 
by management. EV is the enterprise value ratio calculated as enterprise value at time t divided by enterprise value at 
time t–2. MTB is the market-to-book ratio calculated as market value of the firm divided by the book value of assets. 
Q Ratio is market capitalization divided by total assets. LVG is the leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities divided 
by total assets. CURR is the current ratio calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. FCF is the free cash 
flow divided by total assets. Free cash flow is calculated as operating cash flow minus interest, taxes and dividends. 
CAPEX is the spending on new buildings, property and equipment minus depreciation, divided by the book value of 
total assets.  ** indicates p < 0.01 and * indicates p < 0.05.  
 
 Mean  Median 
 PE    Non-PE  t-stat p-value PE   Non-PE  z-stat  p-value 
         
MSO 0.141 0.041 -7.27** 0.000 0.085 0.032  -7.61**  0.0010 
  
EV 2.009 3.586 4.60** 0.000 1.163 2.725 8.82** 0.000 
MTB 1.034 4.508 9.10** 0.000 1.050 3.330 13.33** 0.000 
Q-Ratio 1.026 3.656 4.32** 0.000 0.669 1.736  7.79** 0.000  
  
LVG 0.496 0.380 -2.91** 0.002 0.465 0.336 -3.64** 0.000 
CURR 4.095 1.332 -3.32** 0.000 2.25 1.23 -8.80** 0.000 
FCF 0.100 0.037 -1.45 0.074 0.104 0.093 -0.57 0.569 
CAPEX 0.085 0.109 1.07 0.142 0.041 0.041 0.20 0.845 
 
 
5.5 Multicollinearity Test    
High correlations among independent variables can indicate the possibility of 
multicollinearity which means that the resultant analysis may not give valid results about 
individual predictors. As a result, variables having multicollinearity should not be 
included in the same regression equation (Gujarati, 2005). Table 5.3 shows the 
correlation matrix for the independent variables generated through the Spearman and 
Pearson correlation methods. The correlation coefficient between MTB and CURR is -
0.495; and that between Q-ratio and CAPEX is 0.588; while correlation coefficient 
between Q-ratio and FCF is -0.641. These values might indicate the existence of a slight 
multicollinearity between the variables. Gujarati (2005) argues that slight 
multicollinearity would not pose any statistical problem as long as the correlation 
between independent variables in a model is lower than the correlation between each of 
the independent and dependent variables. The correlation coefficient of 0.791 between 
MTB and Q-ratio seems to be very high and accordingly would not be used in the same 
regression. The correlation matrix does not exhibit any other significantly high level of 
correlation among the independent variables. Accordingly, it is not needed to exclude 
any of the other variables from our models.  
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Table 5.3: Correlation among Independent Variables 
 
Table 5.3 shows the correlation coefficients among the independent variables. The top diagonal numbers are Spearman 
correlation coefficients, while the bottom diagonal numbers are Pearson correlation coefficients. MSO is the 
percentage of ordinary shares held by management. EV is the enterprise value ratio calculated as enterprise value at 
time t divided by enterprise value at time t–2. MTB is the market-to-book ratio calculated as market value of the firm 
divided by the book value of assets. Q Ratio is market capitalization divided by total assets. LVG is the leverage ratio 
calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. CURR is the current ratio calculated as current assets divided by 
current liabilities. FCF is the free cash flow divided by total assets. Free cash flow is calculated as operating cash flow 
minus interest, taxes and dividends. CAPEX is the spending on new buildings, property and equipment minus 
depreciation, divided by the book value of total assets.  
 
  MSO EV MTB Q_RATIO LVG CURR FCF CAPEX 
MSO 1 -0.342 -0.393 -0.217 0.092 0.376 0.007 0.028 
EV -0.149 1 0.425 0.234 -0.165 -0.295 -0.056 0.007 
MTB -0.211 0.166 1 0.613 -0.209 -0.495 0.013 0.113 
Q_RATIO -0.117 0.049 0.791 1 -0.398 -0.217 -0.124 0.235 
LVG 0.079 -0.094 0.031 -0.046 1 -0.024 0.217 -0.149 
CURR 0.101 -0.079 -0.105 -0.043 -0.035 1 -0.091 0.068 
FCF 0.059 -0.029 -0.452 -0.641 -0.031 -0.043 1 0.039 
CAPEX 0.021 -0.036 0.362 0.588 -0.022 -0.001 -0.358 1 
 
 
5.6 MSO and Undervaluation by Quintile   
In Table 5.4, data is stratified according to their MSO and valuation measures. I sort the 
two groups of firms (PE and non-PE) and place them into five quintiles based on their 
MSO, MTB, EV and Q-ratio. The results are produced in Table 5.4. Q1 represents the 
lowest value and Q5 represents the highest value of MSO, MTB, EV and Q-ratio of 
sample firms. With respect to MSO, only around ten percent of the PE target firms are in 
Q1 while around thirty percent of the Non-PE target firms are included in the same 
lowest value Q1. Likewise, around sixty percent of the PE target firms are in higher 
value Q4 and Q5 while only around twenty percent of the Non-PE target firms are 
included in the same higher value Q4 and Q5. In terms of EV ratio, more than one-third 
of the PE target firms are in Q1, while less than five percent of the non-PE target firms 
are in the same lowest value Q1. A similar picture is portrayed with respect to MTB and 
Q-ratio. The quintile analysis, therefore, shows a positive relationship between MSO and 
going private; while a negative relationship is found between the valuations of firms and 
going private through PE takeovers. These results provide some initial evidence that 
MSO and undervaluation are important factors in the decision to go private through PE 
deals in Australia.   
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Table 5.4: MSO and Undervaluation by Quintiles 
 
This table compares the quintile distribution of 129 firms undergoing private equity transaction between 1990 and 
2010 with a paired sample of Non-PE target firms during the same period. Firms are sorted into quintiles based on 
MSO and valuation measures of EV, MTB and Q Ratio. MSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by 
management. EV is the enterprise value ratio calculated as enterprise value at time t divided by enterprise value at time 
t–2. MTB is the market-to-book ratio calculated as market value of the firm divided by the book value of assets. Q 
ratio is market capitalization divided by total assets.   
 
Quintile Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 All Firms 
Total Firms (N)  51 52 51 52 52 258 
MSO (expressed as a %)  
Average 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.27 
PE 
N 13 15 22 31 48 129 
% 10.08 11.63 17.05 24.03 37.21 
Non-PE 
N 38 37 29 21 4 129 
% 29.46 28.68 22.48 16.27 3.11 
EV (expressed as a value) 
Average 0.79 1.24 1.89 2.87 7.16 
PE  
N 46 40 23 10 10 129 
% 35.66 31.01 17.83 7.75 7.75 
Non-PE  
N 5 12 29 41 42 129 
% 3.88 9.3 22.48 31.78 32.56 
MTB (expressed as a value)  
Average 0.65 1.13 1.61 2.96 7.47 
PE 
N 51 49 27 2 0 129 
% 39.53 37.98 20.93 1.55 0 
Non-PE 
N 0 3 25 49 52 129 
% 0 2.33 19.38 37.98 40.31 
Q-Ratio (expressed as a value)  
Average 0.34 0.68 1.08 1.82 1.73 
PE 
N 45 33 22 21 8 129 
% 34.88 25.58 17.05 16.28 6.21 
Non-PE 
N 6 19 29 31 44 129 
% 4.65 14.73 22.48 24.03 34.11 
 
 
5.7 Levels of MSO and PE Takeovers   
It is hypothesized that high managerial ownership accelerates the decision to go private. 
In such a situation, managers will be motivated to ensure full control over their firm. One 
way to do it is to accept any going private offer from PE firms since PE firms require the 
management to make a meaningful investment within their firm (Jensen, 1989). With a 
view to determining the effect of low and high managerial shareholdings on PE 
takeovers, the sample firms are separated into low and high MSO groups. First, 129 PE 
target firms are sorted into low and high MSO groups according to their median value. 
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Likewise, 129 Non-PE target firms are also divided into low and high MSO groups 
according to their median value. The low MSO groups from PE and Non-PE target firms 
are then combined to form low MSO target firms, while the high MSO groups from PE 
and Non-PE target firms are then combined to form high MSO target firms. As a result, 
258 sample target firms are again divided into 129 low MSO target firms and 129 high 
MSO target firms. Table 5.5 portrays and compares the summary statistics of low and 
high MSO target firms. The mean value of MSO in low MSO group is 3.2 percent, while 
the mean value of MSO in high MSO group is 9.6 percent.  
 
Table 5.5: Summary Statistics of Low and High MSO Target Firms 
 
This table compares the summary statistics of low and high MSO target firms. 129 PE target firms are divided into low 
and high MSO groups according to their median value. Likewise, 129 Non-PE target firms are divided into low and 
high MSO groups according to their median value. The low MSO groups from PE and Non-PE target firms are then 
combined to form low MSO target firms, while the high MSO groups from PE and Non-PE target firms are then 
combined to form high MSO target firms. MSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by management. EV is the 
enterprise value ratio calculated as enterprise value at time t divided by enterprise value at time t–2. MTB is the 
market-to-book ratio calculated as market value of the firm divided by the book value of assets. Q Ratio is market 
capitalization divided by total assets. LVG is the leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. 
CURR is the current ratio calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. FCF is the free cash flow divided 
by total assets. Free cash flow is calculated as operating cash flow minus interest, taxes and dividends. CAPEX is the 
spending on new buildings, property and equipment minus depreciation, divided by the book value of total assets.  
 
 Low MSO Group  High MSO Group Total  
 Mean Median SD Mean Median SD  
        
MSO 0.032 0.024 0.022 0.151 0.096 0.148  
        
EV 2.792 1.981 2.679 2.802 1.755 3.048  
MTB 2.885 1.57 4.097 2.657 1.57 2.841  
Q-Ratio 2.335 1.074 6.014 2.348 1.162 3.897  
        
LVG 0.455 0.419 0.363 0.419 0.438 0.281  
CURR 2.933 1.43 9.027 2.494 1.72 3.378  
FCF 0.061 0.113 0.379 0.0762 0.098 0.319  
CAPEX 0.091 0.043 0.158 0.103 0.039 0.204  
Observations  129   129  258  
 
  
I now use the logit specification of Equation 1 to estimate the probability of PE takeovers 
with low and high levels of MSO. Table 5.6 presents the results of the estimates with 
Panel A showing the impact of low MSO and Panel B showing the impact of high MSO. 
Panel A of Table 5.6 shows that even at a low level, MSO is significant and positive at 
the one percent level (Model 1). Among the valuation measures, both MTB and Q ratio 
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are significant and negative. Panel B shows that at high levels of managerial 
shareholdings, MSO is significant and positive at the one percent level (Model 7). This 
positive estimate remains significant across all regressions. MTB and Q ratios are again 
significant and negative. I also include a set of dummy variables of valuation measures 
and their interaction terms with MSO both at low and high levels. Except for MSO*EV, 
none of the other interaction terms are significant. The results from Panel A and B of 
Table 5.6 suggest that low valuation and high managerial ownership drive the public 
firms’ going private decisions. However, I do not find any evidence that the negative 
association between firm valuation and going private intensifies at high levels of 
managerial shareholdings since the interaction terms are not consistently significant.    
 
5.8 Levels of MSO and Firm Value   
While the convergence of interest hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggests a 
uniform positive relationship between management equity stakes and firm value, 
entrenchment hypothesis predicts that firm valuation can be adversely affected through a 
significantly high degree of management ownership (Morck et al. 1988). Therefore, it is 
difficult to predict the actual relationship between management equity stakes and firm 
value only on the basis of theoretical arguments. This section is devoted to the analysis 
of this conflicting theoretical prediction of managerial shareholdings and firm value 
using cross sectional regressions. Initially, Table 5.7a shows a comparison of market 
valuation and different levels of managerial shareholdings of 258 Australian PE and 
Non-PE target firms. Following Morck et al. (1988) and Weir et al. (2005a), I use Q 
ratio as a proxy for market valuation of the target firms. Table 5.7a clearly shows Q ratio 
is increasing with MSO. This positive relationship remains until MSO reaches 
approximately ten percent at which stage Q ratio decreases with increasing MSO. This 
result therefore suggests a non-linear relationship between MSO and firm value. This 
result is reproduced in Figure 5.1, below, which captures the effect of the convergence of 
interest and entrenchment hypothesis. Thus, firm value rises with increasing MSO until 
the range of ten percent and firm value starts declining once MSO rises over ten percent. 
This non-linearity in managerial shareholdings is consistent also with previous empirical 
studies by Manry and Nathan (1999) and Morck et al. (1988).  
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Table 5.6: Logit Regression of Low and High MSO on PE Takeovers 
 
Table 5.6 shows the results of multivariate logit regression of Low and High MSO on PE takeovers. 129 PE target 
firms are divided into low and high MSO groups according to their median value. Likewise, 129 Non-PE target firms 
are also divided into low and high MSO groups according to their median value. The low MSO groups from PE and 
Non-PE target firms are then combined to form low MSO target firms, while the high MSO groups from PE and Non-
PE target firms are then combined to form high MSO target firms. MSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by 
management. EV is the enterprise value ratio calculated as enterprise value at time t divided by enterprise value at time 
t–2. MTB is the market-to-book ratio calculated as market value of the firm divided by the book value of assets. Q 
ratio is market capitalization divided by total assets. A set of dummy variables on valuation measures have been 
generated and they take the value 1 if their corresponding value is greater than their median value and 0 otherwise. 
These three dummy variables are then interacted with MSO to determine their joint effect on PE takeovers. LVG is the 
leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. CURR is the current ratio calculated as current 
assets divided by current liabilities. FCF is the free cash flow divided by total assets. Free cash flow is calculated as 
operating cash flow minus interest, taxes and dividends. CAPEX is the spending on new buildings, property and 
equipment minus depreciation, divided by the book value of total assets. Figures in parentheses represent standard 
error of estimate. Results reported are heteroskedasticity consistent. ** indicates p < 0.01 and * indicates p < 0.05.   
 
Panel A: Logit Regression of Low MSO on PE Takeovers 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Constant -5.133** (1.012) 
6.523 
(6.081) 
-4.253** 
(1.28) 
-4.490** 
(1.127) 
17.09 
(12.45) 
-5.141** 
(1.268) 
       
MSO 97.95** (21.49) 
202.7 
(117.5) 
106.1** 
(28.59) 
132.2** 
(32.01) 
179.4 
(97.91) 
99.39** 
(28.11) 
EV  -0.23 (0.314) 
-0.254 
(0.146) 
-0.015 
(0.13)   
MSO*EV    -79.57** (27.49)   
MTB  -14.69* (6.767)   
-22.10 
(11.39)  
MSO*MTB     236.6 (217.9)  
Q-ratio   -0.649** (0.227)   
-0.743* 
(0.291) 
MSO*Q-ratio      11.08 (28.98) 
       
LVG 1.267 (0.75) 
4.386 
(4.71) 
1.726 
(1.038) 
0.915 
(0.899) 
1.439 
(5.177) 
2.095* 
(1.024) 
CURR 1.077** (0.308) 
5.578 
(3.1) 
1.346** 
(0.371) 
0.975** 
(0.32) 
5.429 
(3.019) 
1.411** 
(0.399) 
FCF 2.011 (1.17) 
16.02 
(8.648) 
1.751 
(1.484) 
1.541 
(1.29) 
16.83* 
(8.524) 
1.886 
(1.516) 
CAPEX -3.631 (3.406) 
-5.656 
(8.004) 
-2.513 
(4.207) 
-3.178 
(3.584) 
-4.347 
(8.191) 
-1.553 
(4.03) 
       
McFadden R2 0.46 0.92 0.56 0.54 0.93 0.54 
LR stat 81.44 164.09 99.40 95.89 165.47 96.09 
p-LR stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observation 129 129 129 129 129 129 
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Panel B: Logit Regression of High MSO on PE Takeovers 
 
Variables (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
       
Constant -13.88** (3.658) 
-13.65** 
(4.16) 
-12.42** 
(4.421) 
-17.83** 
(5.915) 
-13.93** 
(4.849) 
-12.56* 
(5.295) 
       
MSO 72.91** (18.94) 
86.43** 
(23.95) 
78.44** 
(25.32) 
112.2** 
(38.26) 
97.67** 
(31.61) 
83.62** 
(32.12) 
EV  0.0775 (0.11) 
0.004 
(0.105) 
0.152 
(0.133)   
MSO*EV    -38.05* (14.98)   
MTB  -1.803* (0.782)   
-5.115* 
(2.336)  
MSO*MTB     55.23 31.78  
Q-ratio   -2.821* (1.108)   
-4.201* 
(1.788) 
MSO*Q-ratio      27.98 (16.51) 
       
LVG 4.575* (2.199) 
5.295 
(3.277) 
1.909 
(2.903) 
5.047 
(3.218) 
8.759* 
(4.219) 
-0.184 
(3.604) 
CURR 2.438** (0.827) 
2.729** 
(0.971) 
3.256** 
(1.123) 
3.282** 
(1.234) 
3.182** 
(1.129) 
3.529** 
(1.342) 
FCF 1.415 (4.529) 
6.504 
(5.357) 
6.832 
(3.675) 
0.587 
(4.621) 
9.412 
(4.29) 
6.166 
(2.06) 
CAPEX -3.034 (4.817) 
-4.311 
(7.507) 
-1.75 
(6.582) 
-1.942 
(4.214) 
-5.659 
(6.235) 
2.056 
(7.252) 
   
McFadden R2 0.80 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.88 
LR stat 142.69 152.81 153.32 153.65 156.59 157.47 
p-LR stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observation 129 129 129 129 129 129 
 
Table 5.7a: MSO and Firm Value 
 
Table 5.7a shows the relationship between firm value, as proxied by Q-ratio and the level of managerial shareholdings. 
MSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by management. Q ratio is market capitalization divided by total assets.  
 
MSO (%) Number of Firms Mean-Q 
PE  Non-PE Total 
0 - < 1% 5 0 5 0.6203 
1% - < 2% 7 37 44 2.2564 
2% - < 3% 12 25 37 3.8587 
3% - < 4% 6 21 27 2.7063 
4% - < 5% 4 10 14 2.6089 
5% - < 7% 18 13 31 3.0867 
7% - < 10%  21 17 38 2.4091 
10% - < 15%  18 5 23  1.0787 
15% - 25%  17 1 18 1.0914 
25% - < 40%  10 0 10 0.9696 
40% and over 11 0 11 0.7204 
Total 129 129 258 2.3413 
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Table 5.7b: OLS Regression of Low and High MSO on Firm Valuation 
 
Table 5.7b shows the results of OLS regression of Low and High MSO on firm value. 129 PE target firms are divided 
into low and high MSO groups according to their median value. Likewise, 129 Non-PE target firms are divided into 
low and high MSO groups according to their median value. The low MSO groups from PE and Non-PE target firms 
are then combined to form low MSO target firms, while the high MSO groups from PE and Non-PE target firms are 
then combined to form high MSO target firms. EV, MTB and Q-ratio are used as valuation ratios and thereby as 
dependent variables in the specifications. MSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by management. LVG is the 
leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. CURR is the current ratio calculated as current 
assets divided by current liabilities. FCF is the free cash flow divided by total assets. Free cash flow is calculated as 
operating cash flow minus interest, taxes and dividends. CAPEX is the spending on new buildings, property and 
equipment minus depreciation, divided by the book value of total assets. Figures in parentheses represent standard 
error of estimate. Results reported are heteroskedasticity consistent. ** indicates p < 0.01 and * indicates p < 0.05.  
 
Variables Low MSO Group High MSO Group Whole Sample  
EV MTB Q-Ratio EV MTB Q-Ratio EV MTB Q-Ratio 
Constant 3.562** (0.883) 
3.097** 
(0.925) 
1.655 
(0.982) 
4.155** 
(0.66) 
5.120** 
(0.551) 
4.395** 
(0.674) 
3.814** 
(0.389) 
3.506** 
0.404 
2.801** 
(0.457) 
         
MSO 19.19 (48.18) 
-92.43 
(50.47) 
-35.37 
(53.56) 
-12.35 
(6.315) 
-19.19** 
(5.271) 
-15.30* 
(6.448) 
-7.623* 
(4.058) 
-15.68** 
(4.208) 
-10.64* 
(4.766) 
MSO2 -541.7 (546.3) 
471.9 
(572.3) 
106.01 
(607.3) 
13.63 
(9.484) 
22.29** 
(7.916) 
18.14* 
(9.685) 
8.357 
(6.959) 
18.91** 
(7.217) 
12.92* 
(8.174) 
         
LVG -0.959 (0.668) 
2.229** 
(0.669) 
0.669 
(0.773) 
0.204 
(0.996) 
-0.975 
(0.831) 
-2.024* 
(1.017) 
-0.754 
(0.549) 
0.463 
(0.57) 
-0.685 
(0.645) 
CURR -0.025 (0.026) 
-0.021 
(0.027) 
-0.016 
(0.029) 
-0.015 
(0.087) 
-0.046 
(0.073) 
-0.061 
(0.089) 
-0.029 
(0.026) 
-0.0499 
(0.027) 
-0.041 
(0.031) 
FCF -0.464 (0.776) 
-2.724** 
(0.813) 
-7.283** 
(0.862) 
-0.22 
(0.864) 
-1.859* 
(0.721) 
-3.981** 
(0.882) 
-0.391 
(0.544) 
-3.650** 
(0.564) 
-7.116** 
(0.639) 
CAPEX -0.458 1.856 
13.54** 
(1.944) 
20.21** 
(2.063) 
-1.264 
(1.339) 
0.965 
(1.118) 
7.278** 
(1.368) 
-0.822 
(1.042) 
4.568** 
(1.08) 
11.45** 
(1.224) 
         
R-squared 0.09 0.57 0.78 0.06 0.25 0.41 0.04 0.32 0.58 
F stat 2.01 27.28 70.76 1.37 6.73 13.70 1.84 19.53 56.90 
p-F stat 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.000 
Observations 129 129 129 129 129 129 258 258 258 
 
  
5.9 MSO, Undervaluation and PE Takeovers   
I now use the logit specification of Equation 3 to estimate the probability of going 
private through PE takeovers. Table 5.8 presents the estimation of logit regressions to 
measure the effect of MSO and valuation measures on PE takeovers. I also include a set 
of dummy variables of valuation measures and their interaction terms with MSO. The 
estimates show that MSO is positive and significant in all regressions even after the 
model is controlled for different valuation measures and their corresponding interaction 
terms with MSO. This result validates the hypothesis and I find that the probability of PE 
takeover increases with increasing MSO.  
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Table 5.8: Logit regression of MSO and Valuation on PE takeovers  
 
Table 5.8 shows the results of multivariate logit regression of MSO and valuation measures on PE takeovers. MSO is 
the percentage of ordinary shares held by management. EV is the enterprise value ratio calculated as enterprise value at 
time t divided by enterprise value at time t–2. MTB is the market-to-book ratio calculated as market value of the firm 
divided by the book value of assets. Q ratio is market capitalization divided by total assets. A set of dummy variables 
on valuation measures have been generated and they take the value 1 if their corresponding value is greater than their 
median value and 0 otherwise. These three dummy variables are then interacted with MSO to determine their joint 
effect on PE takeovers. LVG is the leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. CURR is the 
current ratio calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. FCF is the free cash flow divided by total assets. 
Free cash flow is calculated as operating cash flow minus interest, taxes and dividends. CAPEX is the spending on 
new buildings, property and equipment minus depreciation, divided by the book value of total assets. Figures in 
parentheses represent standard error of estimate. Results reported are heteroskedasticity consistent. ** indicates p < 
0.01 and * indicates p < 0.05.  
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Constant -4.610** (0.649) 
12.54** 
(3.931) 
-3.364** 
(0.817) 
-4.581** 
(0.743) 
9.054* 
(3.921) 
-4.023** 
(0.786) 
       
MSO 20.56** (4.371) 
55.24** 
(17.39) 
18.82** 
(4.645) 
36.47** 
(6.795) 
46.69* 
(20.88) 
20.30** 
(5.743) 
EV  -0.377** (0.146) 
-0.163** 
(0.832) 
0.0196 
(0.0734)   
MSO*EVD    -30.55** (7.25)   
MTB  -12.11** (3.104)   
-10.44** 
(3.094)  
MSO*MTBD     2.446 (19.26)  
Q-Ratio   -0.813** (0.207)   
-0.764** 
(0.227) 
MSO*QRATD      -4.398 (6.37) 
       
LVG 1.925** (0.584) 
1.032 
(2.086) 
2.199** 
(0.766) 
1.827** 
(0.633) 
2.064 
(1.951) 
2.259** 
(0.758) 
CURR 1.354** (0.241) 
1.974** 
(0.626) 
1.530** 
(0.287) 
1.343** 
(0.257) 
1.873** 
(0.602) 
1.593** 
(0.295) 
FCF 1.083 (0.68) 
7.958*** 
(2.795) 
0.328 
(1.057) 
0.905 
(0.732) 
6.369** 
(2.446) 
0.409 
(1.035) 
CAPEX -1.696 (1.545) 
-4.017 
(4.859) 
0.38 
(2.453) 
-2.354 
(2.02) 
-1.332 
(4.445) 
1.094 
(2.425) 
       
McFadden R2 0.43 0.89 0.54 0.51 0.87 0.53 
LR stat 155.29 318.64 192.2 182.39 312.74 187.88 
p-LR stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observation 258 258 258 258 258 258 
 
 
All three valuation measures are negative and significant without the interaction terms, 
while the interaction term is significant only with the EV dummy variable. This result 
again validates my hypothesis in that valuation measures are also important driving 
forces in going private deals. The negative association between the probability of private 
equity transaction and valuation measures captures the magnitude of this association 
showing increasing motivation of the PE investors to engage in transactions of firms with 
low market valuation. Since the interaction terms between MSO and valuation measures 
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are not consistently significant, I am not certain that high MSO and undervaluation 
jointly increase the likelihood of firms going private in Australia. Amongst the control 
variables, LVG and CURR variables appear to be strong predictors of private equity 
transactions. High leverage indicates an unhealthy financial condition which may be a 
characteristic for which the private equity investors look for to opportunistically capture 
the underlying value of the firm. A high current ratio is an indication of high liquidity; a 
factor attractive for any takeover especially private equity investment.  
  
5.10 Further Analysis   
The decision to go private through PE firms in Australia is further investigated by 
assigning probabilities to going private decision with different levels of MSO and firm 
value (Weir et al. 2005a). The total number of completed ASX takeovers between 1990 
and 2010 is 4546. The number of PE takeovers within this time period is 178 (129 + 49 = 
178; completed information on the 49 PE target firms are not available and hence are not 
included in the sample for analysis purpose). The 178 private equity takeovers constitute 
a 3.92 percent of the takeover (178/4546) population within the sample period. To reduce 
sampling bias, the coefficient of the constant term (a logit regression is employed using 
all the variables) should be adjusted, where the adjustment term should be [ln (1) – ln 
(0.0392)] = 3.24. As such, the constant term should be reduced by 3.24 and is expected 
to overcome sampling bias. I use the following equation to calculate the probability of 
going private at different levels of MSO and valuation measures (Maddala, 1991):  
ଵܲ	 ൌ 	 11 ൅	݁௓௜	 
 
Inserting the mean values of the variables into the logit regression result gives an overall 
probability of going private of 0.0000001045. Table 5.9 depicts the probability of going 
private through PE firms for different levels of MSO and the valuation measures with 
other variables measured at their means. The table shows that probability of going 
private through PE firms in Australia is increasing with MSO and decreasing with firm 
valuation; the relationship that already been explored earlier through empirical analysis. 
This table shows that for managerial shareholdings up to twenty five percent, probability 
is quite low at less than one percent. At fifty percent shareholdings, probability of going 
private jumps up to close to one, ceteris paribus. This increased probability of going 
private is consistent with strong financial incentive effects at high shareholdings by 
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management as suggested by Weir et al. (2005a). With the valuation measures, the 
probability of going private is very high at low valuation. This is more prominent with 
MTB and Q ratio, than with EV.  
 
Table 5.9: Probability of Going Private with MSO and Valuation 
 
Table 5.9 shows the probability of going private through PE firms for different levels of managerial shareholdings and 
different values of valuation measures. MSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by management. EV is the 
enterprise value ratio calculated as enterprise value at time t divided by enterprise value at time t–2. MTB is the 
market-to-book ratio calculated as market value of the firm divided by the book value of assets. Q ratio is market 
capitalization divided by total assets.  
 
MSO (%) Probability Value Probability Probability Probability  
 (MSO) (EV, MTB, Q) (EV)  (MTB)  (Q-ratio)  
      
5% 8.9e-09 
 
0.50 2.84e-07 
 
0.999773 
 
4.15e-07 
10% 1.78e-07 
 
1.00 2.28e-07 
 
0.999703 2.85e-07 
15% 3.53e-06 1.50 1.84e-07 
 
0.795817 1.96e-07 
20% 7.02e-05 2.00 1.48e-07 
 
0.004084 
 
1.35e-07 
25% 0.001395 
 
2.50 1.19e-07 4.31e-06 9.28e-08 
30% 0.027033 
 
3.00 9.57-e08 4.5e-09 6.38e-08 
50% 0.99777 3.50 7.69e-08 4.0e-12 4.39e-08 
 
 
5.11 Conclusion     
The current study is based on unique hand-collected data of PEs and Non-PEs from 
various data sources during the period from 1990 to 2010. It analyses the effect of high 
managerial ownership and undervaluation on the decision to go private through PE 
takeovers in the Australian context. I find that firms taken over by PE firms exhibit both 
high managerial ownership and market undervaluation. This evidence is new and 
expands upon prior Australian studies (such as Eddey et al. 1996 and Evans et al. 2005) 
in that I explicitly model the interplay between managerial shareholdings and 
undervaluation. I do not find any evidence that undervaluation works as a stronger 
driving force in PE deals at high level of MSO. The results of the predictive model reveal 
a strong positive relationship between MSO and the firm’s likelihood to go private and 
an inverse relationship between undervaluation and the firm’s likelihood to go private. 
Consistent with prior empirical evidence, the analysis also reveals a possible existence of 
a non-linear relationship between firm value and managerial shareholdings in Australian 
target firms.  
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I find current ratio to be highly significant and positive, revealing a strong positive 
relationship between liquidity and the likelihood of going private. This result is 
consistent with empirical literature suggesting that going private firms have a 
significantly higher level of liquidity (Caroll et al. 1988; Evans et al. 2005). My results 
are somewhat surprising with regard to leverage ratio which is significant but takes on a 
positive value. This result is in contrast to the theory of financial slack as advanced by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), but consistent with the opportunistic behaviour by PE 
investors. Combined with the results regarding the effect of liquidity, this result suggests 
that PE investors in Australia are opportunistic (Chapple et al. 2010) in taking advantage 
of financially distressed firms with low valuations. I do not find any evidence in support 
of free cash flows. This is not surprising in that empirical evidence on the role of free 
cash flow in going private transactions is mixed. The analysis also suggests that capital 
expenditure is not an important driving force in going private and this is consistent with 
prior empirical studies in the US and UK (Weir and Wright, 2006; Opler and Titman, 
1993).  
 
This study has several implications. First, it suggests that high managerial ownership 
may provide incentives to insiders to take their firms private and in the process 
expropriate wealth from outside shareholders and bondholders. This finding indicates 
that existing agency structures appear to be insufficient in aligning the interest of outside 
shareholders and insiders in Australia. Second, an interesting area of future research 
would be to analyse the wealth effects of managers after the firm is actually taken 
private. This would shed light on all the ex-post wealth effects of managers in taking 
their firm private.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT, MONITORING MECHANISM 
AND PRIVATE EQUITY  
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The recent growth of LBOs and the simultaneous rise of PE markets in the US and 
internationally, as noted by Cumming et al. (2007), has highlighted the concerns about 
these transactions. Jensen (1989), in his seminal paper on the eclipse of the public 
corporation, argue that going private transactions, particularly LBOs, create value 
through improved monitoring and effective incentives. Public corporations that are 
characterized by non-value maximizing managerial behaviour are likely to have 
managers who are involved in squandering cash flow and averse to optimal levels of risk. 
With increasing importance being attached to internal governance mechanisms during 
recent times (Netter et al. 2009), it is important to discern the role of governance 
structure in aligning the interests between insiders and outsiders. In this study, I examine 
the role of governance mechanism, with the presence of high managerial ownership, in 
going private transactions. Using a sample of ASX takeover firms from 1990 to 2010, I 
test the proposition that high managerial ownership and ineffective governance 
mechanisms increase the likelihood of going private through PE takeovers.  
 
The development and adoption of corporate governance codes within the board structure 
is expected to improve internal governance mechanisms across firms (Keasey et al. 
2005). With improved internal governance, agency problems may be reduced and it 
becomes more difficult for managers to maximize their own interests. As a result, efforts 
have been made by policy makers in developed economics to develop effective corporate 
governance codes to ensure that appropriate mechanisms are put in place to minimize 
agency conflicts (Henry, 2004; Weir and Wright, 2006; Cumming et al. 2007). Literature 
on corporate control research has also suggested a number of incentive devices and 
monitoring mechanisms that can align the interest of shareholders and managers to 
mitigate agency conflicts.   
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Extant literature suggests that poor governance mechanism can provide incentives for 
public corporations to go private (Weir et al. 2005a). The internal governance 
mechanisms that have been shown to be effective are the presence of independent 
directors in the board, absence of CEO-Chair duality, smaller board size etc (Henry, 
2004; Weir et al. 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009a).  
Although governance mechanisms are put in place internally, they may not always work 
properly. With a non-performing internal governance structure in place, disciplinary 
takeovers will occur as a response to the under-performing management. However, firms 
with high insider ownership are more costly to acquire and managers of those firms are 
likely to protect any hostile raider’s attempt (Stulz, 1988). Therefore, the problem of 
ineffective internal governance structure is exacerbated with high managerial 
shareholdings. This situation, as a whole, is likely to provide incentives to both managers 
and private equity investors to take the firm private where managers are expected to 
deliver better results under better and closer monitoring (Jensen, 1989). However in 
public corporations, managers can act in their best interests when opportunity arises. This 
non-value maximizing behaviour is more prominent in firms with ineffective monitoring 
mechanisms (Keasey et al. 2005). Managers in these firms are more likely to be engaged 
in activities that make themselves outwardly indispensable. Therefore, a crucial role of 
the company board is to adopt appropriate governance and disciplinary mechanisms to 
align the interests between insiders and outside shareholders (Florackis and Ozkan, 
2009b). In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that in the absence of effective 
internal control mechanism, an external control mechanism often referred to as the 
market for corporate control will play its disciplinary role in aligning the interest 
between mangers and outside shareholders.  
 
Leland and Pyle (1977) and Opler and Titman (1993) suggest that managers are more 
likely to hold a large share of their firms’ stock in the presence of substantial asymmetric 
information between managers and shareholders. This is because managers may not wish 
to disseminate sufficient information about their firms in order to maintain control over 
the firm and to maximize their own benefit. Therefore, an increase in management 
shareholdings might be driven by the efforts to preserve insider control (Filatotchev et al. 
1999). This argument provides reason to suggest that managers with high ownership 
stakes have an incentive to take their firm private in order to maintain control. Given that 
PE bidders are friendly acquirers, as suggested by Chapple et al. (2010), managers may 
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believe that they would retain their position after being taken over by PE firms. In such a 
situation, external control mechanisms are expected to play roles in disciplining the 
managers through possible takeover pressure from the market (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989). 
This takeover pressure may also reflect a market response to an observed exploitation of 
asymmetric information by the management (Eddey et al. 1996). However as Stulz 
(1988) suggests, firms with high managerial ownership are more costly to acquire and 
are less likely to be targeted in a traditional takeover attempt.  
 
The empirical evidence on the nature of incentive devices and governance structure and 
their role in the private equity context is an unexplored area. Despite a considerable body 
of research on the aspects of manager-shareholder conflict and governance mechanisms, 
there is little attempt in the current literature to examine the interaction of incentive 
alignment and monitoring mechanism in private equity transactions. The main objective 
in this study, therefore, is to address this gap by focusing on managerial shareholdings 
and firm specific governance characteristics on going private through private equity in 
the Australian context. In doing so, it is hypothesized that high managerial shareholdings 
and ineffective internal governance structure increase the likelihood of public firms 
going private. Further, it is argued that the impact of managerial shareholdings on going 
private is likely to be affected by firm-specific governance characteristics. I also 
hypothesize and test that in the absence of an effective internal control mechanism, the 
market for corporate control plays its disciplinary role and attempts to remove the non-
value maximizing management and the board.  
 
The majority of extant literature on private equity uses samples of US or UK deals. 
Although, private equity investment in Australia has grown to a considerable level since 
the 1990s9, there is a lack of sufficient research in this area. Therefore, a comprehensive 
study exploring the relationship between incentive alignment, monitoring mechanism 
and private equity deals in the context of Australia provides a significant contribution to 
the private equity literature. With the existence of the Chapple et al. (2010) study 
exploring the characteristics of target firms in PE transactions in Australia, I am not 
aware of any research that examines the interaction of managerial ownership and 
governance structure in the likelihood of Australian firms going private through PE 
                                                 
9Chapple et al. (2010) provide an exploratory study on features of Australian going private firms with a smaller number of 
observations. 
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takeovers. I use a sample of PE target firms and compare them with a set of firms that do 
not go private within a longer period of 1990 to 2010. Analysis reveals that high 
managerial ownership alone is a dominant factor in the likelihood of firms going private 
through PE takeovers in Australia. In addition, I find that managerial ownership has a 
significantly non-linear relationship with board governance structure. Consistent with 
this, I also present evidence that market for corporate control is active in playing its 
disciplinary role in Australia. The remainder of this study is structured as follows: 
Section 2 provides a discussion on the interplay of managerial ownership, corporate 
governance characteristics and PE takeovers. Section 3 describes the data, sample 
selection process and methodological issues. The empirical results are reported in 
Section 4 and Section 5 presents the conclusions.  
  
6.2 Managerial Ownership, Governance and Private Equity  
Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) argue that PE transactions appear to be associated with 
incentive and governance mechanisms that enhance performance. This is because 
incumbent management is likely to have information on how to make a firm perform 
better. As a result, with better incentives and closer monitoring, managers are expected to 
deliver better results. Stuart and Yim  (2010) suggest that with high ownership stakes, 
managers may have a strong incentive to increase their own wealth together with the 
controlling interest in the firm. One way to do this is to take their firm private, enhance 
their performance and maximize their own benefit.  
 
Public corporations are characterized by dispersed shareholdings. Since management is 
vested in the hands of a small number of professionals who are less likely to act in the 
best interest of the outside shareholders (O’Sullivan and Wong, 1999), it is necessary to 
ensure that appropriate methods of internal governance exist to prevent executives from 
pursuing their own interests. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that offering ownership 
stakes to managers should reconcile the interests of shareholders and managers. 
Literature, however, suggests that this may not be the case (Manry and Nathan, 1999; 
Weir et al. 2005b). While owner-managers are expected to deliver value maximizing 
outcomes, there is evidence that managers may become more opportunistic with 
increased levels of ownership (Morck et al. 1988). Therefore, managerial shareholdings 
create a trade-off between convergence of interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and non-
value maximizing behaviour (Manry and Nathan, 1999). In addition, Filatotchev et al. 
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(1999) argue that with a high level of ownership, managers may have incentives to 
transfer the resources of the firm to other companies under their full control.  
 
Stuart and Yim  (2010) suggest that high insider ownership makes the acquisition 
process easier for the PE bidders. With high ownership stakes, managers are more likely 
to accept a PE bid to maximize their own wealth together with ensuring their controlling 
interest within the firm. North (2001) argues that increased managerial ownership tends 
to raise the financial gains of the managers through accepting a PE led bid. This suggests 
a positive relationship between managerial ownership and going private transactions. 
Furthermore, benefits of control can act as another key aspect in going private deals. 
Jensen (1989) argues that PE firms apply financial, governance and operational 
engineering to their portfolio companies and, in the process, improve firm operations and 
create economic value. PE firms also require managers to make a meaningful investment 
in the company, so that managers have a considerable stake in the company’s equity 
capital. This high equity stake reduces management’s incentive to manipulate the 
company’s performance (Kaplan, 1989) since this situation also ensures management to 
have more control over their firm.  
 
Evidence suggests that PTP firms have a higher managerial share ownership than those 
involved in traditional acquisitions (Maupin, 1987; Maupin et al. 1984; Halpern et al. 
1999, Weir et al. 2005a). Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that going private may 
increase the efficiency of the organization with concentration of residual claims in the 
hands of decision makers and controllers. As a result, with high ownership stakes 
managers will find going private an attractive vehicle to consolidate the firm’s residual 
claims into their own hands. The evidence thus suggests that target firms in PTP deals 
have high managerial ownership. I, therefore, propose that high managerial ownership 
increases the likelihood of firms going private through PE backed deals in Australia.  
 
Another aspect of the agency problem that has received little attention, as denoted by 
Weir and Wright (2006), is the link between governance structure and a going private 
decision. Maupin et al. (1984) find that managers and directors have significantly higher 
ownership in PTP transactions relative to traditional takeovers. As a result, there has 
been an increasing international awareness on the role of internal governance 
mechanisms in aligning the interest between managers and outside shareholders. In the 
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US, the most recent is the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002. In the UK, a number of reports have 
specifically addressed the issue; namely, Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and Hampel 
(1998). In Australia, ASX CGC proposed a set of corporate governance best practices in 
2003 to be implemented from the 2004 reporting year onwards (Henry, 2004). These 
guidelines suggest that publicly quoted companies should adopt a Code of Best Practice 
in their governance structure. The recommendation identifies a number of specific 
governance characteristics that are associated with good governance, such as a 
significant representation of independent non-executive directors and absence of CEO-
Chair duality. Weir and Wright (2006) argue that if the firms do not exhibit these 
structures, they are likely to be poor performers. If the market for corporate control 
operates as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), ineffective corporate governance 
mechanisms should result in successful hostile takeover bids being made.  
 
Fama (1980) notes that significant nonexecutive director representation usually brings 
the necessary skills and experience that enable effective monitoring to ensure policies are 
consistent with shareholder objectives. Another important governance mechanism relates 
to the existence of CEO-Chair duality, the condition where one person takes on the posts 
of both chairman and CEO. US, UK and Australian good governance practices take the 
view that duality is undesirable given the degree of control and influence that it gives to 
one person in the decision-making process (Weir et al. 2005a; Henry, 2004). The 
development and adoption of good corporate governance codes are expected to lead a 
convergence of internal governance (Ezzamel and Watson, 2005). With ineffective 
monitoring, public corporations will be subjected to non-value maximizing managerial 
behaviour. Weir et al. (2005a) argue that taking a company private would also yield 
significant financial gains to the executive directors in the form of increasing 
shareholdings post-PTPs. For example, Frankfurter and Gunay (1992) report that insider 
shareholdings increase by an average of 58% post-PTPs. I, therefore, propose that 
ineffective internal control mechanisms increase the likelihood of going private. I also 
believe that, the ineffective internal governance mechanisms intensify at higher 
managerial shareholdings and interact with non-value maximizing managerial behaviour 
to further increase the likelihood of public firms going private.  
 
Literature suggests that in the absence of effective internal monitoring mechanisms, the 
market for corporate control can play its disciplinary role (Morck et al. 1988). Consistent 
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with this, Weir and Wright (2006) argue that companies that go private have been the 
subject of takeover speculation whilst being publicly quoted; it is because those 
companies are considered to have ineffective internal governance mechanisms. The 
market for corporate control, therefore, is regarded as a substitute for weak internal 
governance (Kini et al. 1995). A number of studies (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Halpern et 
al. 1999) find that companies going private are more likely to experience takeover 
speculation than firms that do not. This evidence is consistent with the basic role of the 
market for corporate control as described by Jensen and Meckling (1976). This leads to 
the argument that going private is a response to the threat of takeover and it implies that 
takeover threat is a substitute for non-optimal internal governance mechanisms. I, thus, 
propose that in the absence of effective internal governance mechanisms, going private 
firms are more likely to experience takeover pressure from the market for corporate 
control before they go private.  
 
The primary focus in this study is the role of incentive alignment and firm specific 
governance characteristics in going private through PE takeovers. Using managerial 
shareholdings as a proxy to the incentive alignment, I examine whether firms with high 
managerial ownership and poor internal governance structure are more likely to opt out 
of the public capital market and go private. I argue that the levels of managerial 
ownership in predicting private equity takeovers are interlinked with the internal 
governance mechanism. Although governance plays an important role in aligning the 
interests between insiders and outside shareholders, the level of managerial ownership 
may provide incentives to managers to take their firm private. Therefore, I propose that 
the effectiveness of internal governance structure is likely to be reduced at high levels of 
managerial ownership. This interaction between high managerial ownership and internal 
governance structure in the context of private equity takeovers using Australian data is 
the first to be examined in the literature. In this respect, this study potentially provides 
new evidence to the Australian going private literature concerning private equity 
takeovers.  
 
6.3 Data and Research Design   
The sample consists of all successful going private transactions involving companies 
listed on the ASX and made between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 2010. The 
sample is formed by utilizing a variety of databases and resources. The initial sample of 
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all takeovers is collected from the SDC Platinum ANZ M&A Database. Initially a total 
of 517 successful going private bids are identified. I then screen the sample for bids 
involving an acquirer with a status of ‘Joint Venture’ or ‘Subsidiaries’. The primary 
sample of going private bids are considered a PE led bid only when it is financed wholly 
or partly by a PE firm to ensure that the firm has indeed become private and acquiring 
companies are not affiliated with public corporations. The going private transactions are 
then re-confirmed via the list of ASX delisted firms from Aspect Huntley Morning Star 
DatAnalysis Database. The list of PE takeovers is then finalized and confirmed through 
the Bureau Van-Dijk ORBIS Global Database. This process yields 129 firms as the final 
sample, which I refer to as ‘PE’ target firms. Annual accounting information is obtained 
from Aspect Huntley Morning Star FinAnalysis database. Once the financial data are 
collected from FinAnalysis, the annual reports of those 129 PE target firms have been 
downloaded from DatAnalysis database. Managerial ownership and other governance 
information were then retrieved from those annual reports on a company-by-company 
basis.  
 
Table 6.1 provides the frequency distribution of PTP deals in Australia in terms of 
number of deals. It shows that a total of 4546 completed deals took place in ASX. 517 
completed going private deals are identified in Australia during the sample period, 
constituting 11.37 percent of all completed deals. As is mentioned in Evans et al. (2005), 
approximately ten percent of all deals in Australia are going private deals. With steady 
increase, the going private deals have become around twelve percent in recent times. 
Stromberg (2007) notes that, going private deals increased considerably after 2000. 
Table 6.1 suggests a similar evidence for Australia where the majority of PTP deals take 
place between 2001 and 2007. Panel B shows the screening process of selecting the 
sample for the study.  
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Table 6.1: Private Equity Transactions in Australia 1990 – 2010 
  
Panel A: Annual Frequency of all completed going private transactions 
 
 All Non-PTP Deals All Going Private Only Private Equity 
    
Year Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
1990 - 1992 171 4.24 11 2.13 0 0.00 
1993 - 1995 340 8.44 34 6.58 1 0.77 
1996 - 1998 462 11.47 40 7.74 5 3.88 
1999 - 2001 341 8.46 51 9.86 19 14.73 
2002 - 2004 777 19.29 93 17.98 33 25.58 
2005 - 2007 799 19.83 133 25.73 52 40.31 
2008 - 2010 1139 28.27 155 29.98 19 14.73 
       
Total 4029 100% 517 100% 129 100% 
 
 
Panel B: Private Equity Deals in Australia 
 
  Sub-total  Total 
All PTP Deals   517  
    
Less:  Acquirers or targets with status of ‘Subsidiary’ or ‘Joint Venture’  95 422 
Less:  Deals not financed (wholly/partly) by private equity firms  244 178 
Less:  Information not available for the last 3 years  49 129 
    
 Final Total of Private Equity deals   129 
 
 
Panel C: Industry Concentration of Private Equity transactions  
 
Industry   PE Deals  Industry   PE Deals  
    
Mining  22 Transportation Services  4 
Oil and Gas exploration  4 Communication Supplies/Services   12 
Equipment Production/Supplies  7 Media, Audio/Video Distribution  8 
Construction Services  7 Amusement/Recreation Services  7 
Food, Drink and Kindered Products  6 Real Estate Investment  9 
Firms, Dealers, Exchanges  8 Miscellaneous Trade  11 
Financial Institutions  2  Business Services  13 
Health and Allied Services  6 Hotels and Motels  4 
Total Completed PE Deals: 129  
 
Table 6.1 panel C classifies the PE takeover firms into various industry groupings 
showing the number of firms in each industry group. ASX divides its listed companies 
into 25 different industry groups, including sub-groups. Prior Australian studies (Evans 
et al. 2005; Eddey et al. 1996) have suggested that the financial sector had the greatest 
number of going private deals in Australia. Chapple et al. (2010) find a very low 
concentration of Australian PE firms in the financial and mining sectors. The evidence in 
Table 6.1 does not agree with Chapple et al. (2010) in terms of the mining sector, but 
shows a similar pattern in terms of the financial sector. A possible reason for these 
differences can be the differences in the time period covered by these studies. However, 
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it is apparent that during the last two decades, PE firms in Australia do not concentrate 
on any particular industry sector and this is consistent with the idea that PE firms in 
Australia are ‘opportunistic’ and do not seem to concentrate on any particular industry 
sector for their target firms (Chapple et al. 2010).  
 
To investigate the differences between the nature of PE takeovers and traditional 
takeovers, I construct a matching sample of firms which are taken over in the public 
market via acquisition by a publicly listed firm and in which their assets stayed public. I 
term this set of firms as ‘Non-PE’ firms and use comparative analysis throughout the 
paper10. For each PE firm, I use a two dimensional scoring method to match to a non-PE 
firm. I first match the PE firm in the same industry sector that had a public-to-public 
transaction and, secondly, in the same year as the PE firm.  
 
The first set of regression analysis involves testing the impact of managerial 
shareholdings and internal governance structure on the probability of going private. In 
doing so, I first determine the probability of going private of each of the firms in the 
sample using only the firm-specific accounting variables. I employ a logit regression to 
find the probability of going private as follows:  
Li = Ln [Pi/(1-Pi)] = α + β1LVGi + β2CURRi + β3FCFi + β4CAPEXi + ɛi 
 
Employing the logit regression form as above, I then generate the probability of going 
private for each of the observations in the sample. Based on the generated probability, I 
then stratify the 129 PE target firms into three different groups; namely, firms with low 
probability of going private, firms with high probability of going private and firms lying 
in the middle of these two groups. Each of the groups, then, yields 43 PE target firms. I 
then test the impact of managerial shareholdings and internal governance structure on the 
probability of going private in three different stages using low, middle and high 
probability group of firms as follows:  
Pi (PE) = α + β1LowPiMSOi + β2LowPiCG + β3LowPiMSOi*CGi + ɛi    (1a) 
Pi (PE) = α + β1MiddlePiMSOi + β2MiddlePiCG + β3MiddlePiMSOi*CGi + ɛi   (1b) 
Pi (PE) = α + β1HighPiMSOi + β2HighPiCG + β3HighPiMSOi*CGi + ɛi    (1c) 
 
                                                 
10Matching samples have been used in studies of going private transactions.  See for example, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Weir et 
al. (2005a, 2005b). 
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Since the dependent variable in this case is a generated regressor, I employ OLS 
regression using bootstrapped standard error method (Pagan, 1984) to account for the 
generated regressor. I also introduce the interaction terms to determine the joint effect of 
managerial shareholdings and corporate governance at different levels of probability of 
going private.  
 
The second set of regression analysis involves testing the association between different 
levels of managerial shareholdings and firm-specific internal governance characteristics. 
I also use the control variables to control for firm-specific accounting characteristics:  
CGi = α + β1MSOi + β2Coni + ɛi     (2) 
 
Next, I use logistic regression to model a firm’s decision to go private. In this analysis, I 
introduce a takeover speculation variable to account for the effect of the market for 
corporate control. I also use interaction terms in the last set of empirical analysis to 
examine the joint effect of managerial shareholdings and governance mechanisms. I test 
this as follows:   
Li = Ln [Pi/(1-Pi)] = α + β1MSOi + β2CGi + β3Coni + β4MSOi*CGi + ɛi   (3) 
 
In logit regression, PEi, the dependent variable, is a dichotomous variables that takes the 
value 1 if the firm is taken over by PE firm and 0 otherwise. LowPi, MiddlePi and HighPi 
are the PE target firms stratified into low, middle and high probability groups of going 
private. MSO represents the level of managerial shareholdings and CG represents the 
internal governance variables of a firm i with Coni representing a vector of control 
variables. The MSO variable simply measures the number of ordinary shares held 
directly and indirectly by the managers of a firm i expressed as a percentage. Following 
Weir et al.(2005a), Weir and Wright (2006) and Henry (2010), I construct four internal 
governance variables that are relevant in going private and private equity literature and 
thought to have effects on private equity takeovers: board shareholdings (BSO), board 
independence (BIND), CEO-Chair duality (DUAL) and board size (BRDSZ). All 
variables are measured as of the balance sheet date of the year in which the firm was 
taken over.  
 
The control variables are drawn from prior literature of firm-specific accounting 
variables that may also contribute to the going private decision. Specifically, following 
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Weir et al. (2005a, 2005b) I select leverage ratio, current ratio, free cash flow and capital 
expenditure to be the control variables. Below I present a list of all the variables and their 
measurement.  
Managerial Share Ownership (MSO): MSO measures the number of ordinary shares 
held directly and indirectly by the management and is calculated as the absolute number 
of ordinary shares held by management team divided by the total number of ordinary 
shares outstanding.  
Board Share Ownership (BSO): BSO measures the number of ordinary shares held 
directly and indirectly by the members of the company board and calculated as the 
absolute number of ordinary shares held by the members of the company board divided 
by the total number of ordinary shares outstanding.  
Board Independence (BIND): BIND is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
number of independent non-executive directors is equal to or less than 50% on the board 
and 0 otherwise. The ASX CGC recommends the majority of the board members are to 
be independent, non-executive directors to ensure board independence (Henry, 2004).  
CEO-Chair duality (DUAL): DUAL is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
posts of CEO and Chairman are combined and 0 if they are separated.  
Board Size (BRDSZ): BRDSZ is the total number of directors on the company board.  
Takeover Speculation (THREAT): THREAT is a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 if there is a takeover bid and/or rumour of a bid on the target firms during the last 24 
months prior to the actual takeover and 0 otherwise. The information on takeover 
speculation is collected through the ASX Announcement Section from the DatAnalysis 
database by a company-by-company basis.  
Leverage (LVG): LVG is a measure of the debt condition of the firm. It is calculated as 
total liabilities divided by total assets.  
Current ratio (CURR): CURR is a measure of the liquidity condition of the firm. It is 
calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities.  
Relative Free Cash Flow (FCF): This measures a company’s relative free cash flow. 
Free cash flow is measured as operating cash flow minus interest, taxes and dividends. 
Relative FCF is found as free cash flow divided by total assets.  
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX): CAPEX measures a company’s net capital 
expenditure. It is defined as spending on new buildings, property and equipment minus 
depreciation, divided by the book value of total assets. 
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6.4 Univariate Results   
Table 6.2 below, shows the results of univariate tests of the proposition that firms going 
private through PE takeovers have high managerial shareholdings and ineffective internal 
governance structure compared to the traditional takeover firms. The mean values of 
MSO, BSO and BIND of PEs are significantly different from those of Non-PE target 
firms at the one percent level. In addition, the mean values of the LVG and CURR of the 
PE sample also show a significant difference from those of the Non-PE sample. 
However, the mean values of DUAL, BRDSZ, FCF and CAPEX for the PE and Non-PE 
samples are not significantly different from each other. Consistent with this, the mean 
value of THREAT of PEs is significantly different from the Non-PE firms at the one 
percent level. The median test also shows a similar result for PE and Non-PE firms. The 
median values of MSO, BSO, BIND, LVG, CURR and THREAT of PEs are 
significantly different from those of Non-PE target firms at the one percent level. The 
results of t-tests and z-tests, therefore, support the hypotheses and show that Australian 
PE target firms have different firm attributes.  
 
Table 6.2: Univariate Analysis of PE and Non-PE Samples 
 
Table 6.2 shows the results of t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum Mann-Whitney test to identify if the mean and median 
values of different variables of PE and Non-PE sample target firms are significantly different from each other. The 
sample is drawn over the period from 1990 to 2010 as in Table 6.1. MSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by 
management. BSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by board members. BIND is a binary variable that takes 
the value 1 if the majority of the board members are independent non-executive directors and 0 otherwise. DUAL is a 
binary variable that takes the value 1 if CEO and Board-Chair are the same person and 0 otherwise. BRDSZ is the 
number of directors on the company board. THREAT is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the target firm faces 
speculation of being taken over within the last 24 months of actual takeover and 0 otherwise. LVG is the leverage ratio 
calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. CURR is the current ratio calculated as current assets divided by 
current liabilities. FCF is the free cash flow divided by total assets. Free cash flow is calculated as operating cash flow 
minus interest, taxes and dividends. CAPEX is the spending on new buildings, property and equipment minus 
depreciation, divided by the book value of total assets.  ** indicates p < 0.01 and * indicates p < 0.05.  
 
 
 Mean  Median 
 PE    Non-PE  t-stat p-value PE   Non-PE  z-stat  p-value 
         
MSO 0.141 0.041 -7.27** 0.000 0.085 0.032  -7.61**  0.000  
  
BSO 0.101  0.033 -4.79** 0.000 0.033 0.019  -3.92**  0.000  
BIND 0.574  0.295  -4.69** 0.000  1.00  0.00  -4.51**  0.000  
DUAL  0.101  0.102  0.00  1.00   0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  
BRDSZ  5.829  5.729  -0.45  0.653 6.00 5.00 -1.49  0.134  
THREAT  0.566  0.163  -7.38** 0.000  1.00 0.00  -6.71**  0.000  
  
LVG 0.496 0.380 -2.91** 0.002 0.465 0.336 -3.64** 0.000 
CURR 4.095 1.332 -3.32** 0.000 2.25 1.23 -8.80** 0.000 
FCF 0.100 0.037 -1.45 0.074 0.104 0.093 -0.57 0.569 
CAPEX 0.085 0.109 1.07 0.142 0.041 0.041 0.20 0.845 
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6.5 Multicollinearity Test  
High correlations among independent variables can indicate the possibility of 
multicollinearity which means that the resultant analysis may not give valid results about 
individual predictors. As a result, variables having multicollinearity should not be 
included in the same regression equation (Gujarati, 2005). Table 6.3 shows the 
correlation matrix for the independent variables generated through the Spearman and 
Pearson correlation methods. The correlation coefficient between BIND and BSO is 
0.482. This value might indicate the existence of a slight multicollinearity between the 
variables. Gujarati (2005) argues that slight multicollinearity would not pose any 
statistical problem as long as the correlation between independent variables in a model is 
lower than the correlation between each of the independent and dependent variables. The 
correlation matrix does not exhibit any other significantly high level of correlation 
among the independent variables. Accordingly, it is not needed to exclude any of the 
other variables from the models.  
 
Table 6.3: Correlation among Independent Variables 
 
Table 6.3 shows the correlation coefficients among the independent variables. The top diagonal numbers are Spearman 
correlation coefficients, while the bottom diagonal numbers are Pearson correlation coefficients. MSO is the 
percentage of ordinary shares held by management. BSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by board members. 
BIND is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the majority of the board members are independent non-executive 
directors and 0 otherwise. DUAL is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if CEO and Board-Chair are the same 
person and 0 otherwise. BRDSZ is the number of directors on the company board. THREAT is a binary variable that 
takes the value 1 if the target firm faces speculation of being taken over within the last 24 months of actual takeover 
and 0 otherwise. LVG is the leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. CURR is the current 
ratio calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. FCF is the free cash flow divided by total assets. Free 
cash flow is calculated as operating cash flow minus interest, taxes and dividends. CAPEX is the spending on new 
buildings, property and equipment minus depreciation, divided by the book value of total assets.  
 
MSO BSO BIND DUAL BRDSZ THREAT LVG CURR FCF CAPEX 
  
MSO 1 0.159 0.231 0.083 -0.014 0.186 0.092 0.376 0.007 0.028 
BSO 0.081 1 0.482 0.062 -0.081 0.116 -0.098 0.129 -0.156 0.011 
BIND 0.182 0.391 1 0.097 -0.088 0.133 -0.106 0.129 -0.115 -0.028 
DUAL 0.046 -0.028 0.097 1 -0.143 0.041 -0.131 0.008 -0.091 0.065 
BRDSZ -0.049 -0.029 -0.123 -0.088 1 0.079 0.159 0.067 0.283 -0.107 
THREAT 0.064 0.081 0.133 0.041 0.053 1 0.105 0.164 0.085 -0.033 
LVG 0.079 0.107 -0.066 -0.123 0.122 0.058 1 -0.024 0.217 -0.149 
CURR 0.101 0.055 0.015 0.029 -0.098 0.031 -0.035 1 -0.091 0.068 
FCF 0.059 -0.089 -0.065 0.007 0.195 0.076 -0.031 -0.043 1 0.039 
CAPEX 0.021 -0.027 0.032 0.047 -0.189 -0.069 -0.022 -0.001 -0.358 1 
 
 
 112 
 
6.6 MSO and Governance Characteristics by Quintile   
Table 6.4 shows the summary statistics of 129 PE target firms stratified into a low, 
medium or high group according to their probability of going private. The probability of 
going private is calculated for each of the observations employing a logit regression 
using the firm-specific accounting variables. This process yields 43 observations in each 
of the groups. The summary statistics shows that both MSO and BSO are increasing in 
moving from the low to the high probability group, with an exception of MSO mean 
value in the medium probability group which is higher than that of high probability 
group. In the low probability group, sixty percent of the firms do not have an 
independent board; while in the high probability group fifty five percent of the boards are 
not independent. The THREAT variable shows a similar fashion of having higher 
speculation in the low probability group. Table 6.4 also shows the results of the 
univariate tests of mean and median between the low and the high probability group. The 
t-test shows that none of the mean values of the low probability MSO and governance 
variables is significantly different from those of the high probability firms. In terms of 
the z-test, only the median value of MSO of the low and the high probability firms is 
significantly different from each other.   
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Table 6.4: Summary Statistics of Low, Medium and High Probability PE Target Firms  
 
Table 6.4 compares the summary statistics of 129 PE target firms stratified into low, medium and high group 
according to their probability of going private. The probability of going private is calculated for each of the 
observations employing a logit regression using the firm-specific accounting characteristics. MSO is the percentage of 
ordinary shares held by management. BSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by board members. BIND is a 
binary variable that takes the value 1 if the majority of the board members are independent non-executive directors and 
0 otherwise. DUAL is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if CEO and Board-Chair are the same person and 0 
otherwise. BRDSZ is the number of directors on the company board. THREAT is a binary variable that takes the value 
1 if the target firm faces speculation of being taken over within the last 24 months of actual takeover and 0 otherwise. 
LVG is the leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. CURR is the current ratio calculated as 
current assets divided by current liabilities. FCF is the free cash flow divided by total assets. Free cash flow is 
calculated as operating cash flow minus interest, taxes and dividends. CAPEX is the spending on new buildings, 
property and equipment minus depreciation, divided by the book value of total assets. ** indicates p < 0.01 and * 
indicates p < 0.05.  
 
 
 Low Probability Group Medium Probability Group High Probability Group  High and Low  
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median t-stat z-stat 
         
MSO 0.104 0.054 0.164 0.097 0.156 0.103 -1.721   -2.008* 
         
BSO 0.078 0.023 0.109 0.042 0.115 0.044 -1.262 -1.516  
BIND 0.605 1.00 0.558 1.00 0.558 1.00 0.433 0.435  
DUAL 0.069 0.00 0.116  0.00 0.116 0.00 -0.736 -0.738  
BRDSZ  5.721 6.00 5.767  6.00 6.00  6.00  -0.817 -0.649  
THREAT 0.698  1.00 0.488 0.00 0.512 1.00 1.776  1.754  
         
LVG 0.481 0.497 0.488 0.419 0.515 0.472 -0.524 0.436  
CURR 1.371  1.27  2.319 2.25 8.596 4.51 -0.367** -7.986** 
FCF 0.121 0.139 0.127 0.119 0.052 0.037 1.643 3.511** 
CAPEX 0.077 0.044 0.059 0.035 0.118 0.048 -1.412  -0.738  
Observation  43  43 43    
 
 
I now sort the whole sample and place them in seven quintiles according to their MSO 
and present a comparison of different governance measures at those seven levels of 
MSO. If MSO and governance drive private equity transactions, it should be clear 
through the firm characteristics when data is separated into PE and non-PE firms. The 
results are produced in Table 6.5. From very low to high levels of MSO, none of the 
governance measures moves with the MSO in a linear fashion. Average BSO is 
increasing with increasing MSO but in a non-linear fashion, while the board 
independence is decreasing with increasing MSO, again in a non-linear fashion. 
Takeover speculation also seems to be increasing with increasing MSO but in a non-
linear fashion. The quintile analysis, therefore, does not indicate any consistent positive 
or negative relationship between the levels of MSO and governance variables. However, 
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this result does show the fact that PE target firms have inferior governance structures to 
those of Non-PE target firms at different levels of MSO. These results provide some 
initial evidence that ineffective governance structures are prevalent within the PE target 
firms. In addition, these results also provide some initial evidence of a possible non-
linear relationship between the levels of MSO and firm-specific governance 
characteristics.  
 
Table 6.5: Governance Characteristics of Target Firms at different levels of MSO  
  
Table 6.5 shows the firm-specific corporate governance characteristics at different levels of MSO. 258 target firms are 
stratified into seven quintiles based on their MSO. MSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by management. 
BSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by board members. BIND is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if 
the majority of the board members are independent non-executive directors and 0 otherwise. DUAL is a binary 
variable that takes the value 1 if CEO and Board-Chair are the same person and 0 otherwise. BRDSZ is the number of 
directors on the company board. THREAT is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the target firm faces speculation 
of being taken over within the last 24 months of actual takeover and 0 otherwise.     
 
 Avg BSO BIND% DUAL% Avg BRDSZ THREAT% 
MSO % N PE Non-PE PE Non-PE PE Non-PE PE Non-PE PE Non-PE 
 
< 0.017 36 0.065 0.034 0.751 0.786 0.00 0.00 6.251 6.429 0.501 0.179 
0.017 < 0.027 37 0.138 0.036 0.455 0.654 0.00 0.154 6.182 5.115 0.545 0.038 
0.027 < 0.039 37 0.105 0.034 0.401 0.629 0.00 0.185 5.801 5.074 0.401 0.223 
0.039 < 0.062 37 0.113 0.016 0.529 0.801 0.118 0.151 6.294 5.951 0.588 0.351 
0.062 < 0.09 37 0.101 0.048 0.476 0.813 0.095 0.00 5.762 5.875 0.809 0.063 
0.09 < 0.151 37 0.099 0.033 0.269 0.545 0.077 0.091 6.038 6.182 0.654 0.091 
0.151 & over 37 0.091 0.076 0.389 0 0.194 0.00 5.306 8.001 0.417 0.00 
Observations 258 
 
 
6.7 MSO, Governance and the Probability of PE Takeovers   
Panel A, B and C of Table 6.6 show the results of cross sectional regressions of MSO 
and governance variables on the probability of going private. I also use interaction terms 
between MSO and governance variables to determine the joint effect of MSO and 
governance mechanisms. In addition, I use the quadratic form of MSO in the regression 
to capture any possible non-linearity in MSO and going private. The dependent variable 
for this regression is the probability of going private which is calculated through a logit 
regression using only firm-specific accounting variables. I then generate probabilities for 
each of the observations in the sample. Based on the probabilities, I stratify 129 PE target 
firms in three different groups; namely, firms with low probability of going private, firms 
with high probability of going private and firms that lie in the middle. This process 
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yields 43 firms in each group. I then match the Non-PE target firms with the PE target 
firms based on industry and the time period. Therefore, I have 86 observations in each of 
the groups of low, middle and high probability. Since the dependent variable in this 
regression model is a generated regressor, I employ bootstrapped standard error method 
for the empirical analysis (Pagan, 1984). To employ empirical analysis in this section, I 
use the regression specification of Equation 1. Panel A shows the regression result of the 
low probability group. None of the variables seem to affect the firm-specific probability 
of going private when they are in the low probability group. The results exhibit a 
significant change with the high probability group. Panel C shows that MSO and MSO2 
are consistently significant with MSO having a positive relation with the probability of 
going private and MSO2 having a negative relation with the probability of going private. 
This result seems consistent with the result from Panel A revealing the fact that at low 
probability of going private, MSO is not a driving force in going private. However, with 
high probability firms, MSO significantly increases the likelihood of going private. This 
evidence presents a significant non-linear relationship between MSO and going private. 
The governance variables, including the interaction terms, do not seem to have 
differential effect on the probability of going private at different levels of probability.  
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Table 6.6: OLS Regression of MSO and Governance on the Probability of PE Takeovers 
  
Table 6.6 shows the results of cross sectional regressions of MSO and governance variables on the probability of going 
private. Since the dependent variable is a generated regressor, bootstrapped standard error method is used to account 
for the generated regressor. 129 PE target firms are stratified into low, medium and high groups according to their 
probability of going private. The probability of going private is calculated for each of the observations employing a 
logit regression using only the firm-specific accounting characteristics. A matched sample of Non-PE target firms for 
each of the PE target firm groups has also been determined based on the industry and time period. Panel A, B and C 
show the results of low, medium and high probability groups of firms. MSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held 
by management. MSO2 is the quadratic form of MSO. BSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by board 
members. BIND is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the majority of the board members are independent non-
executive directors and 0 otherwise. DUAL is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if CEO and Board-Chair are the 
same person and 0 otherwise. BRDSZ is the number of directors on the company board. Interaction terms are 
interacted with MSO dummy where MSO dummy takes the value 1 if MSO > median and 0 otherwise. ** indicates p 
< 0.01 and * indicates p < 0.05. Figures in parentheses represent standard error of estimate.   
   
Panel A: OLS Regression of MSO and Governance on PE Takeovers by Low Probability Group  
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Constant 0.253* (0.096) 
0.317** 
(0.019) 
0.324** 
(0.047) 
0.313** 
(0.025) 
0.289** 
(0.092) 
MSO 0.636 (0.425) 
0.460 
(0.622) 
0.607 
(0.900) 
0.666 
(0.591) 
-1.232 
(2.341) 
MSO2 -0.768 (1.081) 
0.096 
(1.740) 
-0.740 
(2.382) 
-0.805 
(1.893) 
0.235 
(16.87) 
BSO -0.093 (0.165) 
-0.221 
(0.652)    
BIND -0.019 (0.047)  
-0.014 
(0.053)   
DUAL -0.094 (0.103)  
0.121 
(1.113)   
BRDSZ 0.0131 (0.016)    
0.003 
(0.015) 
BSO*MSO  6.511 (18.78)    
BSO*MSO2  -43.49 (79.87)    
BIND*MSO   -0.118 (1.408)   
BIND*MSO2   -0.446 (3.821)   
DUAL*MSO    -4.432 (38.91)  
DUAL*MSO2    9.766 (292.3)  
BRDSZ*MSO     0.376 (0.468) 
BRDSZ*MSO2     -0.197 (3.442) 
      
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.037 0.033 0.033 0.058 
Observations 86 86 86 86 86 
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Panel B: OLS Regression of MSO and Governance on PE Takeovers by Medium Probability Group  
 
 
Variables (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
      
Constant 0.277 (0.162) 
0.397** 
(0.110) 
0.470** 
(0.119) 
0.474** 
(0.089) 
0.329 
(0.377) 
MSO 1.546 (0.998) 
1.405 
(1.526) 
0.868 
(3.180) 
0.934 
(1.041) 
1.622 
(4.231) 
MSO2 -1.360 (1.204) 
-1.134 
(3.030) 
-0.373 
(7.315) 
-0.650 
(1.700) 
-3.681 
(7.412) 
BSO 0.367 (0.345) 
0.681 
(0.489)    
BIND -0.056 (0.098)  
-0.031 
(0.233)   
DUAL -0.005 (0.088)   
-0.542** 
(0.204)  
BRDSZ 0.025 (0.023)    
0.003 
(0.068) 
BSO*MSO  -4.854 (11.73)    
BSO*MSO2  4.767 (44.43)    
BIND*MSO   0.179 (3.864)   
BIND*MSO2   -0.367 (7.648)   
DUAL*MSO    9.446 (8.114)  
DUAL*MSO2    -36.73 (81.93)  
BRDSZ*MSO     0.187 (0.816) 
BRDSZ*MSO2     0.047 (1.369) 
      
Pseudo R2 0.147 0.132 0.095 0.139 0.125 
Observations 86 86 86 86 86 
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Panel C: OLS Regression of MSO and Governance on PE Takeovers by High Probability Group  
 
 
Variables (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
      
Constant -0.120 (0.173) 
0.217* 
(0.091) 
0.234* 
(0.093) 
0.349* 
(0.173) 
-0.240 
(0.331) 
MSO 4.137** (1.476) 
5.477** 
(1.242) 
5.343* 
(3.953) 
4.391** 
(1.414) 
6.366* 
(3.924) 
MSO2 -5.783** (2.851) 
-7.806** 
(3.680) 
-7.608* 
(19.98) 
-5.767** 
(2.078) 
-8.391* 
(9.133) 
BSO 0.914 (0.503) 
1.459** 
(0.426)    
BIND 0.155 (0.127)  
0.662 
(0.382)   
DUAL -0.114 (0.116)   
-0.335 
(1.667)  
BRDSZ 0.063* (0.031)    
0.098 
(0.071) 
BSO*MSO  -11.79 (8.913)    
BSO*MSO2  17.52 (18.13)    
BIND*MSO   -4.690 (4.924)   
BIND*MSO2   6.627 (20.44)   
DUAL*MSO    3.028 (120.6)  
DUAL*MSO2    -5.962 (1.827)  
BRDSZ*MSO     -0.400 (0.830) 
BRDSZ*MSO2     0.526 (1.923) 
      
Pseudo R2 0.347 0.316 0.301 0.273 0.298 
Observations 86 86 86 86 86 
 
 
6.8 MSO and Internal Governance Structure    
While the convergence of interest hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggests a 
uniform positive relationship between management equity stakes and firm value, the 
entrenchment hypothesis predicts that firm valuation can be adversely affected through a 
significantly high degree of management ownership (Morck et al. 1988). Following from 
this, I expect management equity stakes would affect the internal governance structure 
differently at different levels of ownership. To capture this, I use the quadratic form of 
MSO variable in the model. Table 6.7 shows the results of OLS and logit regression of 
MSO on firm-specific governance characteristics of 258 Australian PE and Non-PE 
target firms using the specification of Equation 2. The analysis reveals that MSO is 
positive and significant against BSO, BIND and DUAL variables, while BRDSZ does 
not seem to be effected by the levels of MSO. This means that high managerial 
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ownership is a possible driving force to ensure that a non-optimal governance 
mechanism is in place. I also find that MSO2 variable is significant with a negative 
coefficient along with MSO variable. This suggests that the level of managerial 
ownership affects the internal governance structure in a non-linear way. This result is 
surprisingly consistent with managerial entrenchment theory as suggested by Morck et 
al. (1988). This result is also consistent to the one presented in Table 6.6. I thus conclude 
that MSO has a significant non-linear relationship both with the probability of going 
private and with the internal governance structure. The results from Table 6.6 and Table 
6.7 also reveal an important fact with regard to the internal governance structure in 
Australia. The analysis suggests that internal governance structure is weak or ineffective 
in Australia. This is not surprising since corporate governance best practice 
recommendations have only been in practice in Australia since 2004 (Henry, 2004).   
 
Table 6.7: OLS and Logit Regression of MSO on Governance Structure 
 
Table 6.7 shows the results of cross sectional and logit regressions of MSO on governance variables. BSO is the 
percentage of ordinary shares held by board members. BIND is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the majority 
of the board members are independent non-executive directors and 0 otherwise. DUAL is a binary variable that takes 
the value 1 if CEO and Board-Chair are the same person and 0 otherwise. BRDSZ is the number of directors on the 
company board. MSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by management. MSO2 is the quadratic form of MSO. 
LVG is the leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. CURR is the current ratio calculated as 
current assets divided by current liabilities. FCF is the free cash flow divided by total assets. Free cash flow is 
calculated as operating cash flow minus interest, taxes and dividends. CAPEX is the spending on new buildings, 
property and equipment minus depreciation, divided by the book value of total assets. Figures in parentheses represent 
standard error of estimate. Results reported are heteroskedasticity consistent. ** indicates p < 0.01 and * indicates p < 
0.05. 
 
Variables BSO BIND DUAL BRDSZ 
     
     
Constant 0.038* (0.017) 
-0.573 
(0.296) 
-2.148** 
(0.442) 
5.778** 
(0.225) 
MSO 0.323* (0.169) 
9.677** 
(3.138) 
9.178* 
(4.413) 
-2.939 
(2.312) 
MSO2 -0.458* (0.248) 
-11.58* 
(5.276) 
-14.49* 
(7.085) 
3.832 
(4.048) 
     
LVG 0.034 (0.045) 
-0.625 
(0.453) 
-2.026* 
(0.943) 
0.710** 
(0.344) 
CURR 0.0007 (0.001) 
-0.005 
(0.015) 
0.004 
(0.019) 
-0.021** 
(0.006) 
FCF -0.037 (0.029)
-0.448 
(0.438)
0.422 
(0.540)
0.773** 
(0.250)
CAPEX -0.042 (0.036) 
0.0007 
(0.668) 
1.094 
(0.957) 
-1.291** 
(0.401) 
     
R2 0.041   0.083 
F stat 1.34 7.66
p-F stat  0.242   0.000 
     
McFadden R2  0.049 0.056   
Wald Chi2   15.33  8.15   
p-WChi2    0.018  0.228  
Observations 258 258 258 258 
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6.9 MSO, Market for Corporate Control and PE Takeovers   
I now use the logit specification of Equation 3 to estimate the firm’s decision to go 
private through PE takeovers. The THREAT variable is introduced in this section to 
incorporate the role of external control mechanism with a possible existence of a weak or 
ineffective internal governance mechanism. Takeover threat represents an external 
control mechanism in the market for corporate control (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989). It may 
also reflect a market response to an observed exploitation of asymmetric information by 
the management (Eddey et al. 1996). A number of US studies (Lehn and Poulsen 1989; 
Kieschnick 1998; Halpern et al. 1999) and prior Australian studies (Eddey et al. 1996 
and Evans et al. 2005) have incorporated a takeover speculation variable based on press 
reports of takeover interest. I also include the same variable on the basis of such interest 
as reported by the ASX announcement window within the last 24 months of being taken 
over. I find that MSO is significant and positive in all regressions revealing the fact that 
high managerial ownership is a strong driving force in Australian PE takeovers. To the 
extent that private equity investors are friendly acquirers (Chapple et al. 2010), the 
positive association between MSO and going private captures the keenness of the PE 
investors to engage in transactions of firms with high managerial shareholding which are 
unlikely to be hostile. Among the internal governance variables, BIND is consistently 
significant while BSO is significant but not consistent enough. DUAL and BRDSZ are 
not significant and this is consistent with the earlier findings presented in Table 6.2. This 
suggests that internal governance mechanisms in Australia are not effectively designed to 
play a monitoring role. Therefore, I can conclude that corporate governance practices 
have a significant impact on the decision to go private in Australia. Henry (2004 and 
2005) analyses the influence of internal governance measures in the outcome of 
takeovers in general and did not find any evidence of any specific internal governance 
and monitoring measures to be effective in Australia. No interaction terms are significant 
in the analysis, suggesting that MSO and internal governance mechanisms do not affect 
the going private decision jointly.  
 
Consistent with this, I find THREAT variable to be significant and positive. This finding 
also supports the basic role of the market for corporate control as described by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) which says that market for corporate control will play a 
disciplinary role when the internal governance mechanism is weak. This result validates 
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the hypothesis and supports the prior Australian going private study by Eddey et al. 
(1996). This result seems logical in the Australian context since internal governance 
seems to be weak or ineffective in Australia and corporate governance best practice 
recommendations have been in practice only since 2004 in Australia (Henry, 2004). 
Therefore, I conclude that this is new evidence for Australia where a going private 
decision through PE firms might be used as a takeover defense mechanism as suggested 
by Lehn and Poulsen (1989). Amongst the control variables, LVG and CURR variables 
appear to be strong predictors of private equity transactions. High leverage dignifies an 
unhealthy financial condition which may be a characteristic the private equity investors 
look for in order to opportunistically capture the underlying value of the firm. A high 
current ratio is an indication of high liquidity, a factor attractive for any takeover 
especially private equity investment.  
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Table 6.8: Logit regression of the Effect of External Governance on PE Takeovers   
 
Table 6.8 shows the results of logit regressions of MSO and internal/external governance variables on PE takeovers. 
MSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by management. BSO is the percentage of ordinary shares held by 
board members. BIND is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the majority of the board members are independent 
non-executive directors and 0 otherwise. DUAL is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if CEO and Board-Chair are 
the same person and 0 otherwise. BRDSZ is the number of directors on the company board. THREAT is a binary 
variable that takes the value 1 if the target firm faces speculation of being taken over within the last 24 months of 
actual takeover and 0 otherwise. Interaction terms are interacted with MSO dummy where MSO dummy takes the 
value 1 if MSO > median and 0 otherwise. LVG is the leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities divided by total 
assets. CURR is the current ratio calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. FCF is the free cash flow 
divided by total assets. Free cash flow is calculated as operating cash flow minus interest, taxes and dividends. CAPEX 
is the spending on new buildings, property and equipment minus depreciation, divided by the book value of total 
assets. Figures in parentheses represent standard error of estimate. Results reported are heteroskedasticity consistent. 
** indicates p < 0.01 and * indicates p < 0.05. 
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  
         
Constant -4.610** (0.605) 
-5.301** 
(0.901) 
-7.037** 
(1.182) 
-4.903** 
(0.652) 
-5.429** 
(0.734) 
-4.503** 
(0.625) 
-5.186** 
(1.121) 
-6.447** 
(1.008) 
         
MSO 20.56** (3.658) 
18.03** 
(3.816) 
22.44** 
(5.194) 
19.68** 
(4.991) 
20.16** 
(6.105) 
19.28** 
(3.718) 
39.01* 
(15.85) 
23.53** 
(5.127) 
BSO  6.077* (2.509) 
5.743 
(3.128) 
8.844* 
(3.731)     
BIND  0.936* (0.439) 
1.110* 
(0.487)  
1.503* 
(0.627)    
DUAL  0.009 (0.557) 
0.198 
(0.614)   
-1.415 
(1.239)   
BRDSZ  -0.008 (0.117) 
-0.058 
(0.125)    
0.096 
(0.164)  
THREAT   2.828** (0.569)     
2.661** 
(0.807) 
BSO*MSO    -8.155 (50.68)     
BIND*MSO     -3.490 (7.866)    
DUAL*MSO      24.98 (19.17)   
BRDSZ*MSO       -3.038 (2.555)  
THREAT*MSO        0.543 (11.46) 
LVG 1.925** (0.656) 
2.127** 
(0.713)
2.616** 
(0.753)
1.782** 
(0.635)
2.361** 
(0.725)
1.926** 
(0.677)
1.955** 
(0.694) 
2.31** 
(0.715)
CURR 1.354** (0.216) 
1.340** 
(0.244) 
1.629** 
(0.321) 
1.293** 
(0.232) 
1.381** 
(0.234) 
1.334** 
(0.215) 
1.347** 
(0.216) 
1.674** 
(0.301) 
FCF 1.083 (0.666) 
1.494 
(0.841) 
1.437 
(0.737) 
1.394 
(0.769) 
1.339 
(0.788) 
1.083 
(0.668) 
1.212 
(0.742) 
0.928 
(0.624) 
CAPEX -1.696 (1.160) 
-1.286 
(1.145) 
-1.435 
(1.502) 
-1.372 
(1.119) 
-1.423 
(1.165) 
-1.887 
(1.361) 
-1.998 
(1.337) 
-1.857 
(1.410) 
         
McFadden R2 0.434 0.485 0.602 0.471 0.469 0.438 0.438 0.556 
WALD Chi2 71.82 74.00 46.22 73.20 72.88 74.87 70.15 52.13 
p-WChi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observation 258 258 258 258 258 258 258 258 
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6.10 Conclusion     
This study is based on unique hand-collected data of PEs and Non-PEs from various data 
sources during the period from 1990 to 2010. Particularly, this study analyses the effect 
of high managerial ownership and firm-specific governance characteristics in going 
private through PE takeovers in the Australian context. I find that firms taken over by PE 
firms exhibit both high managerial ownership and a weak internal governance 
mechanism. The analysis also reveals that, in the absence of an effective internal 
governance mechanism, the market for corporate control is active and plays a 
disciplinary role in Australia. This evidence is new and an addition to the prior 
Australian studies (Eddey et al. 1996; Evans et al. 2005) in that the interaction between 
managerial shareholdings and firm specific corporate governance characteristics in the 
context of private equity has not been analysed before. I also find a significant non-
linearity between managerial shareholdings and internal governance mechanism. 
Consistent with this, I also present a significant non-linear relationship between 
managerial ownership and going private. However, I do not find any evidence that an 
ineffective internal governance mechanism intensifies at high levels of managerial 
shareholdings.  
 
I also find the current ratio to be highly significant and positive, revealing a strong 
positive relationship between liquidity and the likelihood of going private. This result is 
consistent with empirical literature suggesting that going private firms have a 
significantly higher level of liquidity (Caroll et al. 1988; Evans et al. 2005). My results 
are somewhat surprising with regard to the leverage ratio which is significant but takes 
on a positive value. This result is in contrast to the theory of financial slack as advanced 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976), but consistent with the opportunistic behaviour by 
private equity investors. Combined with the results regarding the effect of liquidity, this 
result suggests that private equity investors in Australia are opportunistic (Chapple et al. 
2010) in taking advantage of financially distressed firms with high liquidity. I do not find 
any evidence in support of free cash flows. This is not surprising in that empirical 
evidence on the role of free cash flow on going private transactions is mixed. The 
analysis also suggests that capital expenditure is not an important driving force in going 
private and this is consistent with prior empirical studies on UK and US (Weir and 
Wright, 2006; Opler and Titman, 1993).  
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The evidence described in this study has policy implications. The results in this study 
suggest that internal monitoring mechanism is weak or ineffective in Australian going 
private firms. Following Netter et al. (2009), I also believe that the internal governance 
mechanism is more important relative to the disciplining mechanism imposed by the 
traditional market for corporate control. I suggest that good governance practices should 
be applied as a legal requirement instead of only as a reporting option in the Annual 
Report. This also raises a need to review the existing corporate governance best practice 
recommendations in Australia to ensure that internal governance structure plays its role 
as and when necessary.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this study, an empirically examination is undertaken of how information asymmetry, 
undervaluation, high managerial ownership and firm-specific corporate governance 
characteristics affect PE takeovers. The analysis in this study is based on a unique, hand-
collected dataset of 129 Australian private equity takeovers spanning a 21 year time 
period with a matched sample of the same number of traditional takeover target firms. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the summary of 
the findings from empirical analysis carried out in this study. Section 3 provides a 
discussion on the contributions of this research. Section 4 summarizes the possible future 
implications of the findings of this research. The issue of limitations and future research 
directions are presented in Section 5.  
 
7.2 Summary of Findings   
The three aspects examined in this study are presented in Chapters Four, Five and Six. 
Chapter Four presents the empirical analysis on the aspect of asymmetric information 
and undervaluation. The aspect of managerial shareholdings and undervaluation is 
presented in Chapter five. Chapter Six relates to the aspect of both managerial 
shareholdings and corporate governance practices.  
 
It is hypothesized that information asymmetry and undervaluation will increase the 
likelihood of going private through PE takeovers. The analysis presented in Chapter Four 
supports that hypothesis and suggests that undervaluation is a stronger driving force in 
PE takeovers. This study is the first to model the interplay between information 
asymmetry and undervaluation in the context of Australian PE takeovers. The results of 
the predictive model reveal an inverse relationship between undervaluation and the 
firm’s likelihood of going private. The analysis suggests that private equity firms can 
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play an important role as active investors in enhancing and recognizing the performance 
of corporations when capital markets do not.   
  
In Chapter Five, I examine the effect of high managerial ownership and undervaluation 
in going private through PE takeovers in the Australian context. I present strong evidence 
that firms taken over by PE firms exhibit both high managerial ownership and market 
undervaluation. This evidence is the first in Australia to model the interaction between 
managerial shareholdings and undervaluation in the context of private equity. No 
evidence is found to suggest that undervaluation works as a stronger driving force in PE 
deals at high level of managerial shareholdings. Thus, the estimations of the predictive 
model reveal a strong positive relationship between managerial shareholdings and the 
firm’s likelihood to go private and an inverse relationship between undervaluation and 
the firm’s likelihood to go private. The analysis also reveals a non-linear relationship 
between firm value and managerial shareholdings in Australian target firms.  
 
In Chapter Six, I analyse the effect of high managerial ownership and firm-specific 
governance characteristics in going private through PE takeovers in the Australian 
context. I find that firms taken over by PE firms exhibit both high managerial ownership 
and weak internal governance mechanisms. The analysis also reveals that in the absence 
of effective internal governance mechanism, the market for corporate control is active 
and plays a disciplinary role in Australia. This evidence is the first in explaining the 
interaction between managerial ownership and corporate governance practices in the 
context of private equity using Australian data. I also reveal some evidence of a non-
linear relationship between managerial shareholdings and internal governance 
mechanism as well as between managerial ownership and going private. Against 
expectations, I do not find any evidence that an ineffective internal governance 
mechanism intensifies at high levels of managerial shareholdings.  
 
With regard to the control variables, I find similar evidence across three aspects of 
private equity that are examined. I find current ratio to be significantly and positively 
related to the likelihood of going private. This result is consistent with empirical 
literature suggesting that going private firms have higher levels of liquidity (Caroll et al. 
1988; Evans et al. 2005). I find leverage ratio to be positively related to the likelihood of 
a firm going private. This result is in contrast to the theory of financial slack as advanced 
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by Jensen and Meckling (1976), but consistent with opportunistic behaviour by PE 
investors (Chapple et al. 2010). Combined with my results regarding the effect of 
liquidity, this result suggests that PE investors in Australia are opportunistic in taking 
advantage of financially unhealthy, but highly liquid, firms with low valuations. I do not 
find any evidence in support of a free cash flow explanation for going private. My 
analysis also suggests that capital expenditure is not an important driving force in going 
private and this is consistent with prior empirical studies on UK and US markets (Weir 
and Wright, 2006; Opler and Titman, 1993).  
 
7.3 Contributions of the Research  
This study makes two major contributions to the literature on Australian private equity 
takeovers. Prior empirical literature suggests that firms going private suffer from market 
undervaluation. In addition, literature also suggests that firms going private are more 
likely to have high managerial shareholdings. The first contribution I make is that the 
motivations for going private transactions, in general, are applicable to private equity 
takeovers in particular. The analyses in this study should provide future private equity 
researchers with confidence that many motivations for private equity transactions may be 
common across countries.  
 
Secondly, this study is the first Australian study to investigate the influence of 
asymmetric information, undervaluation, high managerial shareholdings and governance 
mechanisms in going private through private equity takeovers. In addition, modeling the 
interplay of asymmetric information, undervaluation, incentive alignment and monitoring 
mechanism in the context of private equity takeovers has not been done before. In this 
respect, this study provides an important contribution to the corporate finance literature 
in general.  
  
7.4 Future Implications  
The evidence presented in this study has several implications as follows:  
First, it will be of interest to academics and researchers as the analysis carried out in this 
study is a comprehensive one. The development of the arguments applied to private 
equity transactions in this study will also be applicable for future research related to 
private equity transactions. In addition, the investigation carried out in this study is 
expected to provide a better understanding about the mechanism of private equity 
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takeovers, the reasons why firms opt out of the public market and the distinguishing 
features of private equity target firms in Australian context.  
 
Second, this study may assist investors to evaluate firm characteristics in order to analyse 
the possibility that a firm may engage in going private transactions. The findings in this 
study might help strengthening the investors’ ability to analyse firm characteristics 
before they actually commit their investment.  
 
Third, the results in this study suggest that high managerial ownership may provide 
incentives to managers to take their firms private. This finding indicates that existing 
agency structure does not appear to be sufficient in aligning the interests of outside 
shareholders and insiders. To ensure a better alignment between the majority 
shareholders and the corporate managers, policy makers may need to review the existing 
rules and regulations and propose some new guidelines to be enforced with regard to the 
incentive devices. Further research is also warranted to determine the exact form of 
improvement in the rules and regulations required to align the interest between the 
managers and outside shareholders.  
 
Finally, regulatory authorities may well be interested in reviewing the rules governing 
takeovers and the role of insiders in takeovers deals. The analysis in this study suggests a 
weaker or ineffective internal governance structure in Australian going private firms. As 
a result, there is a need to review the existing corporate governance best practice 
recommendations to ensure that internal governance structure plays its role as, and when, 
necessary before the market for corporate control can play its role. I believe that the 
internal governance mechanism is more important relative to the disciplining mechanism 
imposed by the traditional market for corporate control. I suggest that good governance 
practices should be applied as a legal requirement instead of only as a reporting option in 
the Annual Report.  
  
7.5 Limitations and Future Research Directions   
My study explores three different aspects of private equity takeovers in the Australian 
context. Like all research, this study is not free from limitations. The limitations in this 
study leading to future research directions are explained as below:  
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First, the empirical analysis in this study is based on the successful PE transactions. The 
unsuccessful PE transactions have not been considered and this approach to sample 
selection might have various biases in itself. The consideration of unsuccessful PE 
takeovers in future research would produce more acceptable results.  
  
Second, the analysis in this study suggests a non-linear relationship between firm value 
and managerial shareholdings. Future research might find a clearer solution to this 
incentive mechanism and the optimal level of MSO and firm value.  
 
Third, high managerial ownership has been found to be an important driving factor in 
private equity takeovers in Australia. However, I do not observe entrenchment in this 
study, neither do I analyse the ex-post wealth effects of managers in such transactions. 
An interesting area of further research would be to analyse the wealth effects of the 
managers after the firm is actually taken to private. This would shed light on all the ex-
post wealth effects of managers in taking their firms private.  
 
Fourth, internal governance structure in Australian target firms is found to be ineffective 
in this study. However, I analysed governance variables that are available to me. Other 
internal governance variables such as, compliance rate, number of board meetings, 
composition of other important committees etc. are not considered in this study. In-depth 
analysis on the effectiveness of internal governance structure incorporating all these 
variables could provide further insight into the effectiveness of Australian internal 
governance structure and this would be an interesting area of future research. In addition, 
I didn’t control for the pre and post ASX CGC best practice recommendations in the 
empirical analysis. Future research might include this issue to differentiate between pre 
and post ASX CGC guidelines. This would reveal if changing environments have any 
impact on the research outcomes.   
 
Finally, the analysis also reveals that private equity firms can play an active investor role 
from the governance and strategic perspective to enhance performance when public 
markets are unable to do so. An analysis of the effectiveness of corporate governance by 
private equity firms would also reveal interesting aspects of the role of private equity 
investors in the modern capital market.  
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